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Since their inception nearly three decades ago, charter schools have played a 
critical role in the reform of our nation’s public education system. As the charter 
movement has progressed, many single-site schools have evolved into charter 
management organizations (CMOs) responsible for operating networks of several 
campuses with the hope of increasing the number of quality seats available to students 
and families. Growing to scale is often challenging for single-site schools and small 
CMOs. In order to execute expansion successfully, this study sought to answer the 
overarching question, “How does a charter school or small CMO know that it is ready to 
grow?” The study’s findings demonstrated that, in order to evaluate readiness for scale, 
charter/CMO leaders must consider several key internal and external factors. The internal 
factors are: (a) “The Why” (primary reason or motivation for scaling), (b) Organizational 
Identity, (c) Human Capital, (d) Governance, (e) Fiscal Health, (f) Infrastructure, and  
08	Fall	
		
(g) Growth Mindset and Strategy. The external factors are: (a) Need and Demand;  
(b) Funding; (c) Facilities; (d) Political Context, Policy, and Climate; (e) Parent and 
Community Relations; and (f) Collaboration and Competition Inside and Outside the 
Sector. The research and findings from this study also informed the development of a 
workbook for charter/CMO leaders seeking to evaluate their organization’s proficiency in 
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     The charter movement is one of the most profound changes in 
American education—bringing new options to underserved communities 
and introducing competition and innovation into the education system. 
Across America we see great charter schools, from Noble Street in 
Chicago to IDEA Academy in Texas, Inner-City Education Foundation 
and Partnerships to Uplift Communities in Los Angeles and Friendship 
Public Charter Schools in D.C. . . . We have great charter networks like 
Aspire, KIPP, Achievement First, and Uncommon Schools. You’re 
steadily getting to scale. (Duncan, 2009, pp. 1, 4) 
 
Throughout the last two decades, public charter schools have become key players 
in bringing about change and producing improved educational outcomes for America’s 
students, especially those faced with challenging socioeconomic circumstances in urban, 
suburban, and rural settings. Charters were not always praised or acknowledged as major 
players, as former Secretary of Education Arne Duncan suggested in his statement above. 
The development of the sector has had a varied and sometimes rocky history. However, 
since 1991, the year in which Minnesota passed the first law allowing charter school 
operations, nearly 43 states and the District of Columbia have adopted similar legislation, 
leading to the present-day 6,723 charter schools that serve nearly 2.9 million students 
(Mead, Mitchel, & Rotherham, 2015). In 2000, there were just over 2,000 schools serving 
roughly 750,000 students (Mead et al., 2015). The charter sector’s rapid expansion should 





standardized assessments and graduation rates. However, current research has suggested 
that charters actually continue to produce mixed achievement results compared to their 
peers—traditional public schools (Buckley & Schneider, 2007; Center for Research on 
Education Outcomes [CREDO], 2013; Frumpkin, Manno, & Edgington, 2011).   
Despite these inconsistent outcomes across the sector, charters still market 
themselves as a high-quality alternative to a family’s neighborhood school, offering 
parents and students more instructional time via a longer school day and school year, 
personalized attention for the individual student through smaller class sizes, myriad 
methods for parents to become more involved in the school community, and (depending 
on the charter school/organization’s external partnerships) the opportunity to engage in 
internships and college-level coursework and programs. Most importantly, most charters 
have the autonomy to design their own curriculum and, as a result, guarantee families that 
their students will graduate “college and career ready” thanks to a rigorous academic 
program (Frumpkin et al., 2011).   
Context and Demonstrated Need 
While some charters over-deliver on these lofty promises and others fail to meet 
these expectations, the demand by parents and the broader community for “better-than-
the-neighborhood school” education options has rapidly intensified, as demonstrated by 
the lengthy wait lists of many charter schools. According to the National Alliance for 
Public Charter Schools (NAPCS, 2013), in Summer 2013, the total number of students on 
charter wait lists across the country was 920,007. In 2013, sector experts projected that 





2013). A report from the same organization in 2014 confirmed that the charter wait list 
had broken the million mark, totaling 1,043,311 names (Kern & Gebru, 2014). A recent 
parent survey from the NAPCS (Kern & Gebru, 2014) also found that families were 
astutely aware that the number of charter seats was limited and, in turn, sought to 
increase their child’s chances of obtaining one of those seats by placing themselves on 
several wait lists.  
In response to this extraordinary stakeholder demand, single-campus charter 
schools (referred to as “charters” throughout this study), as well as charter management 
organizations (CMOs), have realized the need to grow, as indicated by parents and 
families voicing and exercising their rights to pursue the limited number of quality seats 
currently available across the public school sector. In conjunction with this realization, 
charter authorizers have also felt the pressure to directly address parents who have 
continued to exercise their right to choose the public schools that best meet the needs of 
their children. In turn, almost all states that have adopted charter laws have also updated 
their legislation to allow authorizers to grant replicating charter agreements.  
It is important to note that charter schools and CMOs approach growth 
differently. While there is a perception that all charters and CMOs aggressively pursue 
expansion, some organizations take a “premeditated” approach, while others take an 
“organic” approach (Farrell, Wohlstetter, & Smith, 2012). The premeditated method 
involves careful planning and often inclusion of the goal to replicate in the organization’s 
vision (Farrell et al., 2012). The organic approach is much more emergent, where an 
organization allows “growth plans [to] develop in response to changing internal pressures 





CMOs: Emergence Within the Charter Movement  
and Defining Characteristics  
 
Early on in what has now become known as the “charter school movement,” 
many charter schools were the product of a collaborative effort between local 
stakeholders such as teachers, parents, and community members, many of whom sought 
to create an alternative quality choice to neighborhood or traditional public schools 
(Farrell et al., 2012; Huerta & Zuckerman, 2009). In the subsequent 25 years, single-site 
charter schools and operators have continued to innovate around methods for scaling 
successful school models and organizational practices—both instructional and 
operational—that support high levels of student achievement (Huerta & Zuckerman, 
2009). The motivation for “think[ing] beyond the ‘one school-one community’ ideology 
that dominated the first decade of the movement” (Farrell, Nayfack, Smith, Wohlstetter 
& Wong, 2009, p. 3) was and continues to be driven by several critical factors. The speed 
at which quality charters were opening and impacting children and families was far too 
slow to have a true sector-wide, transformational effect (Farrell et al., 2012; Huerta & 
Zuckerman, 2009). In tandem, charter leaders sought to be much more competitive with 
traditional district schools and to enact reform not just via a single-site school, but also in 
the broader communities that housed these sites (Farrell et al., 2009; Huerta & 
Zuckerman, 2009). Additionally, operating a single site presented a number of 
operational, facilities, and financial challenges, threatening the long-term sustainability of 
a charter school. Thus, operating under such circumstances—in isolation—became 
increasingly difficult for many charter schools (Farrell et al., 2009). These factors drove 





CMOs are still relatively new organizational/governance structures within the 
charter sector (Farrell et al., 2009; Farrell et al., 2012; Huerta & Zuckerman, 2009; Lake, 
Dusseault, Bowen, Demeritt, & Hill, 2010). In the early 2000s, as opportunities for 
replicating charter schools to obtain both federal and foundational funding continued to 
multiply, the New Schools Venture Fund coined the term CMO, primarily to designate 
the CMO as a nonprofit entity rather than the more common education management 
organization (EMO) (Farrell et al., 2012; Huerta & Zuckerman, 2009; Wohlstetter, Smith, 
& Farrell, 2013). Unlike their EMO counterparts, “CMOs . . . offer a way to replicate 
‘what works’ in a school model without the demand of generating profits for 
shareholders” (Farrell et al., 2012, p. 6).   
It is important to note that since, even at present, CMOs are continuing to evolve, 
there are varying definitions of the CMO and the role it plays in the charter movement 
(Farrell et al., 2012; Lake et al., 2010). According to Huerta and Zuckerman (2009), 
CMOs provide management oversight for networks comprised of several charter schools 
and are geographically situated in either a single region or state; in addition, CMOs 
develop, promote, and enforce a specific, common vision for instructional excellence and 
model for achieving student results across the multiple schools within their networks. 
Similarly, Farrell et al. (2012) and Wohlstetter et al. (2013) delineated four defining 
characteristics for CMOs: 
1. CMOs are not-for-profit entities;  
2. CMOs operate and manage several charter schools;  
3. CMOs foster both a collective vision and approach to instruction; and 





This final characteristic supports Huerta and Zuckerman’s (2009) argument that “[b]y 
organizing centrally, CMOs can leverage their size and resources to help charter school 
principals and teachers overcome the entrepreneurial challenges of building and 
sustaining new schools in the complex environment of public education” (p. 420). This 
particular study attempted to define CMO according to the four aforementioned 
characteristics. 
Prior to CMOs, individual charter schools became singular pockets of success in 
relation to surrounding traditional district schools. Still, many early charter practitioners, 
especially the founders of some of the movement’s most successful schools, aspired to 
achieve change on a much larger scale at a much faster pace (Whitmire, 2016). In turn, 
the birth and accelerated growth of CMOs within the charter school movement stemmed 
from lack of “…the rapid, large-scale, systemic impact originally intended by charter 
reformers” (Farrell et al., 2015, p. 5). While the movement intended for systemic change 
to occur through single charter sites, authorized one by one, early practitioners began to 
brainstorm how to achieve better academic outcomes for more students and families 
(Whitmire, 2016). As a result, charter school laws across a variety of jurisdictions and 
states evolved, with strategic work and advocacy on the part of charter leaders at the 
time, to allow for the unanticipated establishment of the CMO.   
Most prominently, with immediate scale in mind, Aspire Public Schools fought 
for the passing of a state law in California that allowed a group of charter schools to be 
governed by a single board of directors, transforming itself into the nation’s first CMO. 
In 2007, the California State Board of Education granted Aspire a “statewide benefit 





and without local approval (California Charter Schools Association, 2010). The law 
further detailed its stipulations for replication:  
     The State Board of Education may authorize, under Education Code Section 
47605.8, a five-year charter for the operation of a charter school that will “provide 
instructional services of statewide benefit that cannot be provided by a charter 
school operating in only one school district, or only in one county.” Statewide 
benefit charters must adhere to all other charter laws with the exception of 
geographic limitations. They must open at least two new sites/schools in different 
counties in areas with struggling schools. After the first two sites have operated 
for two years and met performance objectives, operators may open two additional 
sites each year. (California Charter Schools Association, 2010, p. 2) 
 
This advancement in the law allowed the nation’s first CMO to pursue scale in an 
unprecedented manner.  
In 2009, 10 years after Aspire Public Schools began operations (Farrell et al., 
2012), CMOs had become a leader in opening and managing multiple school sites. 
According to Miron and Urschel (2010), 137 CMOs managed nearly 800 charter schools 
that educated over 200,000 students in 26 states. Other already successful CMOs such as 
Uncommon Schools, Achievement First, and Green Dot continue to pursue aggressive 
growth plans with the full support of philanthropic and foundational funding from 
organizations specifically dedicated to the support and expansion of charter schools, 
especially as incubators for public education innovation including the Gates Foundation, 
the Walton Foundation, the Broad Foundation, the Charter Schools Growth Fund, and the 
aforementioned New Schools Venture Fund (Farrell et al., 2012; Huerta & Zuckerman, 
2009; Wohlstetter et al., 2013).  
In addition to CMOs, or networks of schools, attracting numerous funding 
opportunities and, in turn, increasing the potential for long-term financial sustainability, 





environment needed to create more than just one high-performing charter school. 
Ironically, the centralized (similar to traditional) public school district model that the 
large majority of CMOs enact is key to consistent academic results: that is, accountability 
for well-aligned instructional practices and fidelity to a particular academic/curricular 
program “[provide] charter leaders with the organization structure to build not just one 
school, but an entire charter school system” (Huerta & Zuckerman, 2009, p. 421).   
The process of charter school replication, including the opening and expansion of 
CMOs, requires its own oversight and accountability parameters. While varying from 
state to state, each jurisdiction designates an authorizer or set of authorizers to provide 
governance for the opening, expansion, and, in some cases, even shuttering of charter 
schools and CMOs due to consistently low academic performance. 
Charter Replication and the Role of Authorizers 
The practice of authorizing charter schools is only 20 years old—about the same 
age as the inception of the charter sector itself (National Association of Charter School 
Authorizers [NACSA], 2012). A number of entities serve as authorizers, including local 
education agencies, most commonly traditional school districts; state education agencies; 
higher education institutions; not-for-profit organizations; and independent chartering 
boards (NACSA, 2012). Besides parent demand and the advocacy for expansion that 
charter schools and CMOs continue to enact, authorizers “have a tremendous opportunity 
to build portfolios of high performing schools” (NACSA, 2010, p. 1). Many sector 
leaders claim this prospect is a key lever to advancing the nation’s continued efforts to 
reform its public education system. In turn, replication has become a forceful sub-





replication laws and policies have evolved, authorizers and charter schools/CMOs alike 
have seen a pathway to increasing their positive influence and have dramatically 
increased charter expansion activity in an unprecedented manner (NACSA, 2010).   
According to the NACSA (2010), charter school replication is defined as “a 
package deal that includes all elements necessary to allow a freestanding charter school 
to reproduce its core features in a distinctly separate context” (p. 2). The same definition 
also applies to CMOs, where an executive leadership team, rather than a school 
leadership team, engages in the process of recreating its school program/model in a new 
context. At present, a number of states have laws that “[allow] school developers to open 
and operate more than one school under a single charter agreement awarded to a single 
entity with one corporate structure and a single board of directors” (NACSA, 2010,  
p. 4)—an agreement more commonly known as a replication charter. More specifically, 
this type of agreement allows the education organization to grow its academic model to 
scale by opening multiple campuses within the same jurisdiction or across several 
jurisdictions over a defined period of time, usually 3 to 5 years. This organizational 
expansion widens the charter organization’s positive impact as it grows to serve more 
students and families. 
Replication and Charter/CMO Consideration of External Factors 
In addition to parental/community demand, authorizers and charter schools/CMOs 
often consider a number of other external factors that directly influence the decisions of 
charter boards and executive leaders to scale, as well as authorizers’ decisions on whether 
or not to approve a charter replication request. These factors are briefly detailed in the 





accordance with Farrell et al.’s (2012) article “Charter Management Organizations: An 
Emerging Approach to Scaling Up What Works.” 
Federal and state charter policy environment. Broad, overarching federal 
policies often impact charters in both similar and different ways as compared with 
traditional district schools. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 
(formerly No Child Left Behind [NCLB]) can support replication if the single-site school 
or schools in a smaller CMO are all meeting or exceeding performance indicators; 
however, these same policies can pose an obstacle to growth when a single-site school or 
some of the schools in a smaller CMO demonstrate inconsistent or poor academic results 
(Farrell et al., 2012). In these instances, single-site operators or CMOs invest time and 
resources in correcting mediocre performance rather than focusing on continuing or 
pursuing their designated replication plans.   
Charter and CMO growth decisions, especially as related to geographic decisions 
(i.e., what states or regions to expand to), are often informed by how amenable a state’s 
charter laws and policies are (Farrell et al., 2009). Charter leaders consider not only the 
actual level of autonomy, but also processes that both support and hold charters and 
CMOs accountable, including appeals processes in the case of corrective action from the 
designated authorizer (Farrell et al., 2009). In addition, the cap on the number of charter 
schools in a certain region or jurisdiction is another factor that impacts the growth plan of 
a charter or CMO, as well as the per-pupil funding formula (Farrell et al., 2009).   
Authorizer context. Since the authorizer provides direct accountability to 
charters and CMOs, the authorizer’s policies, as well as the number of authorizers 





et al., 2009). Authorizers with sound policies and processes for new school application, 
approval, and opening are ideal, as are authorizing entities such as private institutions 
(i.e., local university) that do not have a competing interest throughout the authorization 
process (i.e., the local school district, whose schools are competing for the same financial 
and facilities resources and student enrollment) (Farrell et al., 2009).  
Market demand. Once again, the “market demand” for new, high-quality public 
education in a specific state, region, or jurisdiction often dictates a charter’s or CMO’s 
growth trajectory (Farrell et al., 2009). In Farrell et al.’s interview with the leader of a 
large CMO, the executive simply stated: “Our CMO has grown in response to what the 
community and the parents have asked us to do. With this approach, we’ve ensured that 
students will show up the first day the school opens” (p. 20).  
In addition, charters and CMOs often seek to align their growth decisions with the 
critical issues within traditional public schools, other than the quality of educational 
services, including the alleviation of school overcrowding. Several larger urban 
districts/authorizers, such as the Chicago Public Schools, continue to allow charters and 
CMOs to replicate in city neighborhoods where district schools are over-enrolled and 
class sizes have become too large.   
Potential funding opportunities and investor disposition. Monetary incentives 
are offered by state and local jurisdictions as well as private organizations seeking to 
expand parent choice through the creation of portfolio districts that offer quality seats 
across different types of schools. Examples of these types of incentives include school 
start-up grants from the local school district, school expansion grants from the state 





Foundation and New Schools Venture Fund. These incent a collaborative portfolio 
approach to education reform between the local traditional public schools and charter 
schools/CMOs in a specific jurisdiction. 
Oftentimes, despite being nonprofit entities, scaling charters or CMOs can 
encounter pressure from private investors to expand the influence and impact of their 
dollars (even if they are not making a profit). If charters have garnered financial support 
in the form of bonds or other significant non-philanthropic investments, these financial 
entities may push for a charter’s or CMO’s expansion according to the entities’ interests, 
including increasing the reach of the school’s services or replicating in jurisdictions the 
school/CMO might not have originally considered. 
Political and community interests. Political dynamics, including pressure from 
powerful stakeholders (e.g., mayors, city/town council members, etc.), are another 
significant external factor that shapes a charter’s or CMO’s plans for replication. While 
the National Resource Center for Charter School Finance and Governance champions the 
practice of charters lobbying for improved charter legislation that will positively impact 
schools and students, it also advises charters and CMOs to refrain from any type of 
political activity (Farrell et al., 2009). Still, charter school and CMO leaders must 
continue to know and understand their political landscape and ethically address pressures 
in order to continue to operate successfully. This can be especially challenging if the 
board or organizational leadership is any way affiliated with the jurisdiction’s key 
political players.   
Facilities. The availability of low-cost/low-maintenance school-ready facilities is 





guarantees a physical plant for each campus, charters and CMOs must often pursue 
alternative means, including their own financing, to secure buildings that will house their 
schools (Farrell et al., 2009). These methods include cohabitating in a single facility with 
a district public school, renting a separate facility from the district itself or other private 
entities, or even engaging in the process of constructing a brand-new facility either on its 
own or with the support of limited public capital funding. 
Prospective partnerships. Charters and CMOs are also intentional about 
considering potential partnerships when scaling (Farrell et al., 2009). Partnerships that 
build the capacity of the organization, such as those with local universities or institutions 
of learning, provide direct talent pipelines and ready access to research and resources to 
improve teaching and learning (Farrell et al., 2009). In addition, other partnerships can 
enhance a charter’s or CMO’s reputation; with additional credibility via such 
relationships, charters and CMOs can strategically expand the number of key allies 
needed to pursue an aggressive growth plan (Farrell et al., 2009). 
Given the complexity of these factors and the competing interests they present, 
the decision to scale is not easy for charter and CMO boards and leaders to make. A 
number of organizational theories have cited how an organization survives by responding 
to exterior dynamics in the broader environment (Daft, 2008). More specifically, 
resource-dependent perspective theory details how an organization’s external 
environment is the “source of scarce and valued resources essential to organizational 
survival” (p. 158). This particular perspective characterizes the organizational reality for 
many charters and CMOs, whose outlook and potential for successful replication depend 





Replication and Charter/CMO Consideration of Internal Factors 
While charters must carefully consider these issues outside of the organization, 
the researcher argues that it is equally, if not even more, important for charters to reflect 
on internal factors as well when considering replication. In order to answer the question 
“Are we ready to grow?”, charter and CMO leadership must become much more 
introspective, also evaluating several critical organizational components.  
Mission and identity. Charters and CMOs contemplating replication need to 
ensure they have a clear, compelling mission in place. If an organization does not 
understand its identity—what it is, what it seeks to accomplish, and which population it 
seeks to serve—its leadership will likely face difficulty in managing the organization’s 
daily operations, let alone investing all stakeholders in a plan for the school/CMO to 
grow (Frumpkin et al., 2011). In addition to being a guiding beacon when external forces 
challenge the organization, a compelling mission also fuels the development of an 
organization’s values and broader culture—foundational elements that must be fully 
functional and in place for successful growth (Frumpkin et al., 2011). A clear mission 
also lays the groundwork for the school/CMO to develop clear non-negotiables for the 
team—an unwavering programmatic and operational framework within which replication 
can take place (Farrell et al., 2009). Additional research has strongly suggested that 
schools and CMOs looking to replicate design or update their mission in such a way that 
actually shapes the course for the organization’s future growth and provides clear 
organization direction (Farrell et al., 2009).   
Board governance and organizational structure. High-quality board 





to grow, schools and CMOs need to ensure their boards are sustainable by ensuring 
effective board composition and providing proper training for all board members in their 
respective areas of responsibility (Butler, Smith, & Wohlstetter, 2008). Schools and 
CMOs must also work to ensure that sustainable governance is accompanied by sound, 
sustainable organizational structure. According to Higgins and Hess (2009), “[w]ise 
growth begins with smart organizing” (p. 10). More successful replication charters tend 
to steer clear of completely bureaucratic, corporate, or cooperative structures and instead 
gravitate toward the clan organizational model (Higgins & Hess, 2009). Organizations 
adopting this structure are “highly stable, elite . . . [and also] have low formal 
centralization with empowered principals and teachers” (p. 10). Even within this model 
are clear systems for accountability, communication, and decision making, whose 
effectiveness is bolstered by “intense employee commitment, strong organizational 
culture, and superb quality control” (p. 10).  
Finance. Another internal component critical to the type of organizational 
stability that prepares a charter school/CMO for replication is its finances and operations. 
Growth can eventually become a source of financial security, allowing the organization 
to utilize economies of scale to its advantage (more schools equate with an increase in 
per-pupil revenue from local and/or state education agencies). However, schools and 
CMOs need to create a diverse funding portfolio of strategies that is aligned with its 
replication goals (Aldeman, Carey, Dillon, Rotherham, & Tucker, 2009; Farrell et al., 
2009). A school’s/CMO’s financial savvy—including its ability to create cost savings—is 
directly tied to its ability to invest strategically in the development of operational systems 





Farrell et al., 2012). More specifically, “[l]ack of systems is a barrier to the growth of the 
best charter operators, but the obstacle is primarily financial: finding enough funding to 
build systems for handling student data, instructional content, human resources, and a 
range of financial and back office operations” (Hassel, Hassel, & Ableidinger, 2011,  
p. 27). Efficient back-of-the-house operations allow board and executive leadership to 
remain focused on academic outcomes and continue the creation of new campuses 
(Aldeman et al., 2009; Farrell et al., 2012).   
Academic model and program. Schools and CMOs must ensure that their 
academic program and school model have a proven track record before attempting 
replication (Lake, 2007). A quality model should contain clearly defined frameworks for 
curriculum, instruction, assessment, and ongoing professional development for teachers 
(Lake, 2007; New Schools Venture Fund, 2006). Without this clear definition, often 
enacted as a set of non-negotiables and operation systems, the school/CMO will likely 
find it difficult to replicate its academic program with fidelity across more than one 
school (Lake, 2007). This fuels a decline in quality as growth increases—the exact 
opposite of the desired outcome for replication, which is to produce high student 
achievement at scale (Lake, 2007; New Schools Venture Fund, 2006). 
Human capital. In order to replicate successfully, schools and CMOs also need 
top talent, especially for principal and teacher positions (Farrell, Nayfack, Smith, 
Wohlstetter, & Wong, 2013). A number of researchers in the field have indicated that 
human capital is one of the primary drivers beyond the pace at which a charter expands; 
in fact, the better the talent, the more accelerated the organization’s growth (Farrell et al., 





capital potential certainly includes evaluating current and future pipelines for recruitment 
with external partners. However, in keeping with internal reflection, schools and CMOs 
should also determine the level of talent within and develop strategies to cultivate that 
talent (Farrell et al., 2013). Promoting qualified instructional and operational leaders from 
within saves both time and money when it comes to organizational induction and 
indoctrination, and these resources are better spent on other means for driving replication 
forward (Farrell et al., 2013).  
 
The Need for Internal Organizational Assessment and Consideration  
of Critical External Factors When Considering Replication 
 
Educational Leadership Constituent Council (ELCC) Standards 3 and 5 require 
district leaders to manage their organizations both efficiently and ethically, for the good 
of all students and the district’s entire learning community. Charters do not adhere to this 
charge when they scale without proper internal assessments and preparations. In fact, 
charters demonstrate extreme educational irresponsibility by choosing a “We’ll figure it 
out as we go along approach”—or an emergent approach—which puts children and youth 
at even more risk than they already are in the current high-stakes environment of public 
education. 
Purpose. The purpose of this study was to produce an organizational assessment 
tool, entitled Ready to Scale: A Readiness Assessment Tool for Charter Schools and 
Charter Management Organizations, that will assist charters and CMOs in answering the 
question “Are we ready to grow?” The product itself is a workbook with a protocol that 
charter organizations should utilize to evaluate their organizations internally, as well as 





consideration are: (a) The “Why,” (b) Organizational Identity, (c) Human Capital,  
(d) Board Governance, (e) Fiscal Health, (f) Infrastructure, and (g) Growth Mindset and 
Strategy. The external factors are: (a) Need and Demand; (b) Funding; (c) Facilities;  
(d) Political Context, Policy, and Climate; (e) Parent and Community Relations; and  
(f) Collaboration and Competition Inside and Outside the Sector. If a charter or CMO is 
adequately prepared (organizationally healthy with favorable environmental factors in 
place) to grow, this strengthens the chances for successful replication, during which the 
quality of student outcomes is not undermined by the increasing quantity of campuses. 
Target Audience 
The target audience for this research and the assessment tool produced consists of 
the following individuals: leaders at the executive and senior management levels of:  
(a) single campus charters (again, referred to as “charters” throughout the study) and  
(b) smaller CMOs (organizations that operate/manage either one or two schools). A 
number of these leaders work across the country in a variety of contexts, including urban, 
suburban, and rural environments.  
Research Questions 
This study and the development of the Ready to Scale assessment tool were 
grounded in three primary research questions:  
1. To what extent do charter school and charter management organization 





2. Which internal organizational components and external factors have the 
greatest impact on a charter school’s or charter management organization’s 
readiness for replication?  
3. How do we define proficiency in those internal organizational components 
and optimality in those external factors that are crucial in determining a 
charter’s/CMO’s readiness to scale?  
Organization of the Study 
This study is comprised of five chapters.  
Chapter I – Introduction: This chapter provided critical introductory information 
and important context for understanding charter replication, as well as the demonstrated 
need for the product, the purpose of the study, the target audience for whom the study and 
product are intended, the research questions that shaped the study and the product’s 
development, and additional background information that prepares the reader for a review 
of the literature.  
Chapter II – Literature Review: This chapter comprehensively reviews the small 
body of relevant research and literature that currently exists on charter and CMO 
preparedness to grow to scale. This review considers the following areas: (a) mission, 
mission management, and organizational identity; (b) quality board governance;  
(c) financially sustainable charter schools and CMOs; (d) replicating school models and 
maintaining school quality; (e) human capital challenges and opportunities; (f) federal 
and state charter policy environment; (g) authorizer context; (h) market demand;  





(k) facilities; (l) prospective partnerships, (m) prevalent causes for failed charters and 
CMO replicators; and (n) general principles of organizational health and assessment.  
Chapter III – Research Methodology: This chapter describes the qualitative 
research approach to this study and details the methods that were used not only to 
conduct research, but also to develop and validate Ready to Scale: A Readiness 
Assessment Tool for Charter Schools and Charter Management Organizations.   
Chapter IV – Findings and Analysis: This chapter provides an overview of the 
research results, highlighting major themes and findings as well as an analysis of the 
product validation survey, expert panel validation, and how the survey results and panel 
feedback assisted the researcher in refining Ready to Scale.  
Chapter V – Validated Product: This final chapter presents the final, complete 
version of Ready to Scale: A Readiness Assessment Tool for Charter Schools and Charter 
Management Organizations. Charters and CMOs that utilize this tool will be able to 
effectively assess those internal organizational components and those external factors 
whose proficiency and optimality are critical for successful pursuit of scaling efforts. The 
study’s implications on the charter sector are also discussed, and recommendations for 
future research and studies are offered.  
Conclusion 
Parents continue to “vote with their feet” as they enroll their children in charter 
schools in the hopes of receiving a better product than they would at their neighborhood 
traditional public school. This demand has led to the rapid growth of the country’s charter 





2025 (Hassel et al., 2011). This external pressure to grow has prompted many charters 
and CMOs to pursue hasty replication. While authorizing entities are responsible for 
approving charter expansion, policies and standards for replication vary from state to 
state and have led to inconsistencies in authorizing practices. As such, charters and 
CMOs should not rely solely on external guidance or allow only external factors to 
control the decision to grow their organizations to scale. 
By using the growth readiness assessment tool produced as a result of this study, 
charters and CMOs can take control of their growth trajectories, conduct a thorough 
internal evaluation to assess their organizational health, evaluate thoroughly the external 
landscape and, in turn, their own readiness to expand. More specifically, this evaluation 
will help charters and CMOs gather and analyze the types of evidence and data necessary 
to determine proficiency in those major organizational components that have the greatest 
impact on an organization’s capacity to grow. As well, it will determine the optimality of 
those external environmental components that also deeply and directly affect an 
organization’s growth trajectory. The more prepared charters and CMOs are from an 
organizational health perspective and a risk-assessment perspective regarding external 
factors, the more likely the charter/CMO can increase the quantity of schools it operates 










REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
 
Recent research has provided the basis for the present study’s claim that charters 
must be “organizationally healthy” in specific internal areas in order to scale their models 
successfully. While the experiences of already established CMOs provide a case for the 
key role that external factors play in influencing and shaping replication, a small body of 
literature has suggested that specific internal factors have a significant impact on a 
charter’s ability to both grow and strive to become better.   
Sutton and Rao (2014), experts in the field of scaling organizations especially in 
the private sector, asserted that while “replication and repeatability will always be part of 
the scaling equation . . . effective scaling isn’t simply a matter of running up the numbers 
by replicating the same old magic again and again” (p. xiii). Instead, organizations and 
companies that scale successfully must be intentional as they seek to “spread and sustain 
excellence” and must always possess an urgency to innovate or, in other words, to 
improve continuously while increasing their size and impact (Sutton & Rao, 2014). This 
notion is especially critical for charter organizations: the more campuses they open, the 
greater the risk that the quality of teaching and learning will decline, sometimes very 
rapidly. Charter organization leaders who reflect on and assess in depth the 





measure to ensure that their “product”—student achievement—will be optimized as they 
pursue “intentional evolution” and increase the number of students served (Kahan, 2010).  
The organizational components discussed in the following sections are also represented 
in this study’s conceptual framework (Version 1), which the researcher further details at 
the end of this chapter.   
Internal Factors That Potentially Impact Growth 
Mission, Mission Management, and Organizational Identity 
On a broader level, a mission is a “clarion call” or an agenda that signals the 
values and aspirations of an organization (Frumpkin et al., 2011; Minkoff & Powell, 
2006). It is difficult to imagine any type of charter school or organization, including a 
CMO, without a mission. Charters are often founded on the premise that the educational 
services they will deliver will serve an even broader purpose: improving a community 
and the lives of its residents, uniting a community divided over specific issues through a 
high-quality academic program, or even changing the trajectory of a community that is 
facing specific challenges. Whatever the vision for the CMO, it should be crafted in such 
a way that it provides coherent direction for the entire learning community, including a 
clear instructional and curricular approach (Frumpkin et al., 2011). Frumpkin et al. 
asserted that the key to a successful mission is that it is never seen as completely fulfilled 
or absolute. Rather, it becomes a “constitution of sorts and a basis for decision making 
when the school [or organization] faces unforeseen circumstances and crisis” (p. 7). This 
use of mission—or mission management—prepares an organization to be flexible: a key 





Frumpkin et al., 2011). This internal component is designated in the study’s conceptual 
framework (Version 1) as “Mission and Identity”.  
Effective charter organization missions have several common components. 
According to Frumpkin et al. (2011):  
     A mission begins with a statement of general values. These values explain the 
orientation of the school and provide an underlying coherence to various aspects 
of school operation, including curriculum, administration, and people’s dealings 
with one another. Many charter schools are founded to realize a particular 
educational vision, but all charter schools need a mission that defines an 
educational approach—a plan for how students will learn. At a discipline-focused 
school, learning might emphasize student drills, hard work, and frequent student 
assemblies. A more open school might adopt a progressive or constructivist 
approach. Other charter schools could take a technology-based tone, emphasizing 
computer literacy. A mission also identifies the target student population. This 
means limiting the school to certain grade levels and identifying a pool of 
potential students: Does this charter school plan to concentrate on at-risk youths, 
students for whom English is a second language, or students returning to school 
after having dropped out? (pp. 5-6) 
 
Further, an effective and, more importantly, clear mission also establishes the CMO’s 
organizational identity. According to Farrell et al. (2009), a CMO’s clear communication 
of its identity leads to the formation of its brand. Ensuring that all internal stakeholders—
current school leadership/staff and newly recruited staff—understand the brand 
guarantees a consistent level of quality as the organization grows (Farrell et al., 2009). 
Solidifying the brand is also a preventative measure, decreasing the chances that the 
organization’s vision and mission will be diluted and increasing a sense of cohesive 
community as new employees join the team (Farrell et al., 2009). This course of action 
should dovetail with the practice of ensuring brand consistency across every campus in 
the CMO. All internal actions (e.g., messaging, regular written communication, 
individual conversations between team members and CMO leadership) should emulate 





continue to reflect on critical questions regarding the mission and brand of the 
organization, including, “Do our actions and messaging as CMO leaders ensure that staff 
across schools are developing a sense of belonging and internal stakeholder interest in the 
fulfillment of our vision and the preservation of our brand?”   
Growing to scale or “scaling up” is often a longer-term, transformational, and 
significant process that will present a number of challenges to the organization’s mission 
and intentions (Frumpkin et al., 2011; Kahan, 2010). However, Kahan argued that:  
     At the center of [any] dramatic growth is [the] organization’s mission. It will 
guide every choice that is made, both strategic and tactical, as [it] scales up to 
deliver broader and deeper impact. It must be clearly understood and stated 
explicitly as the [organization’s] compass. This is especially true in times of stress 
or when tough decisions are called for. (p. 2) 
 
The act of scaling up is directly tied to a charter organization’s positioning within its 
organizational life cycle (Frumpkin et al., 2011; Minkoff & Powell, 2006). Frumpkin et 
al. (2011) claimed that of the three stages of organization specific to charters—the start-
up phase, the expansion phase, and the institutionalization phase—it is during the 
expansion phase that the mission is often most critical. During expansion, the process of 
mission creep or mission drift causes an organization to stray from its original purpose 
and values for the sake of achieving the goal of either growing larger or surviving the 
external or governance-related obstacles often faced during a scale-up. This process 
threatens the charter organization’s overall direction (Frumpkin et al., 2011; Minkoff & 
Powell, 2006). An excerpt demonstrating this process comes from Minkoff and Powell’s 
(2006) interview with an organizational leader who pursued new and innovative methods 
to increase revenue in order to generate funds to expand to another region: 
     You get in a financial situation like we are, and you tell yourselves it’s okay to 





grocery store to generate some revenues. So then the mission changes and the 
reason why the agency was originally started has gotten watered down. You learn 
that you’ve changed the whole nature of the organization without really knowing 
it, and the mission has become much more diffuse. It happens a lot, it’s very 
seductive. (p. 592) 
 
These claims, however, should not go so far as to suggest that a charter’s mission 
become totally inflexible. In fact, “managing the mission of a charter school requires a 
willingness to never view the mission as immutable or every fully completed” (Frumpkin 
et al., 2011, p. 7). While always providing clear expectations for all stakeholders 
regarding the academic, curricular, and character education experience students and 
families will receive, leadership must ensure that the mission not become ossified over 
time (Frumpkin et al., 2011). In fact, “mission management by its very nature must 
assume that refinement and improvement are both possible and desirable” (p. 7).   
It is important to note the authorizer’s expectation regarding a charter 
organization’s mission, especially because the organization has to be prepared to obtain 
the authorizer’s approval for replication. While student achievement (both growth and 
attainment) are critical factors in an authorizer’s decision for charter expansion, so too is 
the organization’s accomplishment of mission-specific goals (NACSA, 2013). These 
types of goals are often characteristic of charter organizations that seek unique outcomes 
or whose mission has established a less common model for educating students (i.e., dual 
language immersion, alternative education, virtual charter school, etc.) (NACSA, 2013). 
In turn, a significant part of mission management, especially during replication/ 
expansion, is ensuring that clear non-negotiables are established and adequate resources 






Quality Board Governance 
High-quality board governance continues to be a challenge for single-campus 
charter schools and CMOs across the sector. However, the charter concept, grounded in 
site-based decision making and autonomy around curriculum and instruction, also 
provides a means for education leaders to reform traditional school governance structures 
in order to achieve better outcomes for students (Smith, Wohlstetter, & Brewer, 2007). In 
order to grow to desired scale, charter organizations need to ensure their boards are 
sustainable by enacting effective board composition and providing the proper training for 
all board members in their respective areas of responsibility (Butler et al., 2008). 
Oversight via a board of directors is especially critical as “[m]ost charter schools fail for 
non-academic reasons such as operational mismanagement and financial difficulties. 
Creating an effective organizational structure is critical to charter schools’ survival and 
success” (Smith et al., 2007, p. 17).  This internal component is designated in the study’s 
conceptual framework (Version 1) as “Board Governance”. 
According to the national not-for-profit organization Charter Board Partners 
(CBP) (2014), which specializes in assisting charters and CMOs in building high-quality 
governance structures, Best Practices in charter school and CMO board governance are 
grounded in several standards:  
• Standard 1 - Focus Relentlessly on Student Achievement: Charter boards must 
both take ownership of and regularly evaluate progress through use of sound 
data and evidence.  
• Standard 2 – Recruit and Retain Exceptional Leaders: Whether a school leader 





CMO, charter boards must recruit, hire, and partner collaboratively with 
charter leadership to execute upon mission and key strategies, as well as 
develop clear expectations for performance and methods for holding these 
leaders accountable. 
• Standard 3 – Invest in Exemplary Governance: Charter boards must develop 
effective strategies for recruiting and engaging competent directors with a 
wide range of skills and implement a structure for its own effective operation 
of meetings and fulfilling its own goals and objectives.  
• Standard 4 – Act Strategically and Hold the Board Accountable: Charter 
boards must avoid micromanagement of day-to-day operations and instead 
lead the development and implementation of a strategic plan and hold itself 
accountable for performance against this plan.   
• Standard 5 – Raise and Use Resources Wisely: Charter boards must align the 
management of all resources in alignment with strategic priorities and 
determine a variety of methods for which directors can contribute to the 
organization’s long-term financial viability.   
• Standard 6 – Commit Steadfastly to Legal and Regulator Compliance: Charter 
boards must be proactive in managing risk for the organization, while also 
remaining compliant with authorizer regulations. 
These Best Practices frame the review of the existing research on quality charter as well 







The relationship between the board’s actions and its charter school’s performance 
in the realm of student achievement seems nebulous at first. In fact, when it comes to the 
structure of most school boards—whether public charter, public traditional, or private—
very few members actually have educational expertise (Butler et al., 2008; Smith et al., 
2007). Moreover, while some charter boards allow school leaders or even teachers to be 
board members, many boards often struggle with understanding how student achievement 
is measured, let alone setting realistic but academic expectations for charter and CMO 
leadership (Butler et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2007). This common occurrence hinders the 
board’s ability to take the ownership and execute the accountability called for by 
Standard 1 of CBP’s best board practices. 
While boards are responsible for providing oversight and claiming ownership for 
school and student outcomes, it is often charter and CMO leadership that must 
proactively close the gap of understanding around student achievement for its board of 
directors—both what it consists of and how it is measured (Drucker, 1990; Eadie, 2003; 
Marzano & Waters, 2009). Charter and CMO leadership must educate board directors on 
specific indicators of student achievement—those that are required by federal and state 
regulations (i.e., state exams, National Association of Education Progress [NEAP] 
testing, etc.) as well as the internal means for assessing growth and attainment (i.e., 
charter-specific interim benchmark assessments, etc.), especially in critical subjects like 
Math and Reading (Eadie, 2003). Once board members possess comprehensive 
knowledge of these indicators, they can work closely with charter/CMO leadership to 





goals/actions and policies that shape both non-negotiables for instruction and 
achievement (Eadie, 2003; Marzano & Waters, 2009). While it may not be at the top of 
many charter board agendas, the board of directors has the authority to influence the 
formation of the types of policies holding teachers and students not only to high academic 
expectations, but also to rigorous instructional classroom practices, while maintaining the 
school and charter executive autonomy necessary to make day-to-day operational 
decisions tailored to students’ needs (Marzano & Waters, 2009; Washington State School 
Directors’ Association, 2014). Furthermore, board members can also begin to put 
together a framework for determining the methods and cycle/timeline they will utilize to 
evaluate student progress regularly. The accountability and transparency created by these 
actions further build the credibility of both the board and the charter/CMO leadership it is 
responsible for supervising (National Consensus Panel on Charter School Operational 
Quality, 2009). In turn, with the proper collaborative planning with charter/CMO 
leadership, charter boards of directors can actively take part in contributing to the 
continued growth of students, even when an organization is undergoing change, such as 
replicating its academic model across multiple campuses and increasing the size of its 
overall operations. 
Hiring and Retaining Exceptional Leaders 
Charter and CMO boards tend to be structured in one of three ways: (a) school 
committee or council composed of parents, teachers, and others; (b) owner/operator, 
either for-profit or nonprofit foundation, with or without a formal board committee; and 
(c) a board of directors with a structure of officers, by-laws, and delegation of 





school (Grignano, 1999). The last structure, which is similar to that of traditional public 
school boards as well as board governance in the private and not-for-profit sectors, is 
considered a best practice, according to the CBP (2014). With this structure, it is the 
board’s responsibility to hire either a single campus leader/executive director or an 
executive officer for the CMO. Boards encounter several common challenges when 
looking for the right leader that are directly linked to their actual mismanagement of the 
recruitment and selection process. Often, boards will engage in the following practices 
which limit their ability to attract the best candidates: “[1] Failing to determine and 
understand the needs of the school or CMO; [2] Casting too narrow of a net, especially in 
the geographic sense; and [3] allocating inadequate time and funding to the search, as 
typical executive searches often require upwards of $100,000” (American Institute of 
Research, 2012, p. 5). Boards are also notorious for the mis-structuring and 
mismanagement of the leader hiring committee, which leads to poor decision making 
through the following actions:  
1. Disregarding relevant data during the hiring process, such as candidates’ 
previous track records of student and school achievement in previous roles;  
2. Overlooking selection criteria and standards that are aligned with school or 
CMO goals;  
3. Failing to clarify roles and responsibilities within the committee itself; and  
4. Hiring for just the position [in the case of school leaders], and not the 
organization, as school leaders are often asked to lead projects and initiatives 
at a higher, broader level. (American Institute of Research, 2012, pp. 5-6)   
 
Bringing the right leader or executive into the organization requires rigorous 
reflection and decision making on behalf of the board and consists of several key 
practices, including but not limited to establishing consistent criteria based on the charter 
school’s or CMO’s needs and goals, conducting an anonymous review of applications, 





committee can assess the candidate’s goodness of fit for the organization’s context and 
environment (American Institute of Research, 2012). When the right leader or executive 
has been brought in, the board’s work does not end: it must establish clear expectations 
regarding performance monitoring as well as evaluation, both formative throughout the 
year and summative as an annual occurrence (National Consensus Panel on Charter 
School Operational Quality, 2009). 
Exemplary Governance 
Recruiting top talent for charter and CMO leadership is challenging enough for 
boards of directors. As for the composition of the board itself, the same dilemma often 
applies. Charters and CMOs not only struggle with recruiting directors who are familiar 
with the public education sector, but also find it challenging to successfully secure 
directors with general board governance experience (Butler et al., 2008; Grignano, 1999; 
Smith et al., 2007). Board leaders must ensure that they attract and retain directors with 
the appropriate technical competencies, especially in the areas of finance, management, 
and administration, as well as with tight mission and values-alignment (Butler et al., 
2008; Eadie, 2003; Grignano, 1999). It is often difficult to pinpoint talented leaders who 
have the time, desire, and stamina necessary to manage through the change that a 
growing charter/CMO is pursuing. In addition, the policy and political environment for 
charters continues to become increasingly complex, as do the internal politics of many 
charter/CMO boards. These are sometimes plagued by competing individual interests, 
especially when there is confusion about roles and responsibilities or deliverables with a 
corresponding timeline for board directors (Butler et al., 2008; Grignano, 1999; Smith et 





qualified people, local charter authorizers should appoint board directors or at least assist 
in creating a qualified pool of potential candidates (Butler et al., 2008). Other experts in 
the field have argued that this practice directly conflicts with the spirit of charters, which 
seek autonomy from the political and nepotistic patronage of traditional school district 
governance (CBP, 2014). While this patronage can and does exist in charter and CMO  
boards regardless of which board members join the organization, charter and CMO 
leadership is fundamental in driving the board to be as positively impactful as possible.  
Once again, charter and CMO leadership must closely partner with board 
leadership to drive the development of a streamlined system that will support the board in 
operating effectively (CBP, 2014; Eadie, 2003). Smith et al. (2007) went so far as to 
suggest that such collaboration results in actual individual and collective training via 
either an internal or external source for board members, especially in the areas of bylaw 
compliance, fiscal oversight, and fundraising (Grignano, 1999). Perhaps even more 
importantly, charter and CMO leadership should invest a significant amount of time in 
building out a formal, comprehensive program for board partnership (Eadie, 2003). In 
other words, organizational leadership needs to “manage up” effectively to the board by 
developing a division of labor and a committee structure that turn planned priorities into 
actions and, thus, create a board that provides oversight (a traditional approach to 
governance) and positively benefits the organization and its current and future plans for 
growth (Eadie, 2003). Training and preparation of board members at the onset of their 
tenure with the charter or CMO are also preventative measures for board oversight issues, 






Strategic Thinking and Accountability for the Board 
Charter and CMO boards must avoid another pitfall in practice—over- 
involvement in the day-to-day operations of and programmatic implementation within the 
school or CMO (Eadie, 2003; Grignano, 1999). Rather, boards must always plan and 
execute strategically, both in the traditional sense (formulating a strategic plan) and in a 
broader sense (consistently thinking strategically outside the formal planning process) 
(Grignano, 1999). The strategic planning process, especially for schools, consists of 
several steps. Assuming that mission and vision exist, conducting a needs analysis is key 
for understanding the organization’s strengths and areas for improvement and ensuring 
alignment between the strategic priorities or goals it will create over the course of the 
next 3 to 5 years (Eadie, 2003; Grignano, 1999). From there, the board must establish not 
only the strategies or overarching methods to accomplish its goals, but also the objectives 
or annual action plan to implement strategies and set timelines for evaluating progress 
against these goals and objectives (Eadie, 2003; Grignano, 1999). Frumpkin et al. (2011) 
argued that the systematic use of the balanced scorecard is a method of tracking key 
quantitative metrics and qualitative indicators commonly used in the private sector; it is 
also one of the most effective ways the board can hold itself accountable to strategic 
goals and objectives. Important to keep in mind is that annual board evaluation, which 
differs from regular progress monitoring via the balanced scorecard, is best executed 
every 2 to 3 years: according to Schlesinger (as cited in DeHoff, 2011), “Board self-
assessment is too comprehensive of a process to be carried out every year. Performance 
assessment can be particularly useful just before the board engages in strategic planning 





In formulating a board that is well equipped to think and act strategically, board 
and school/CMO leadership should consider providing additional training to transform 
board members into visionary strategic thinkers who embody and emulate several 
important character traits: board members ought to be (or be open to developing in such a 
way that they become) forward-thinking, entrepreneurial systems-thinkers who are 
inclined to take (calculated) risks and communicate effectively (Grignano, 1999). Board 
members must also be keenly aware that the lens through which they strategically think 
and execute reflects not only the context of the charter school/CMO nonprofit but also the 
public sector, because of the public funding the organization receives to educate students 
(Butler et al., 2008). Awareness and understanding of this dual identity of the charter 
school or CMO can better prepare directors to strategize through the complicated issues 
that this duality often triggers related to governance. These prepared directors can then 
also fit more effectively into the broader public education context and relationships with 
external partners/authority figures, such as the authorizer (the state-recognized local 
education agency or school district, etc.); government entities (i.e., the mayor’s office, the 
city council, etc.); and funders (i.e., investors, private foundations, etc.) (Grignano, 
1999).   
Resource Allocation and Fiscal Management 
Charter and CMO boards must also provide careful oversight and accountability 
for the allocation of resources and general fiscal health (Frumpkin et al., 2011; Grignano, 
1999; NACSA, 2013). Allocations and/or spending should be aligned with the 
organization’s strategic priorities, emphasizing a direct link between spending and 





Regarding fiscal health, management and oversight are twofold: board members must 
consider “near-term” measures and long-term sustainability measures (NACSA, 2013). 
Near-term measures include “current ratio (assets divided by liabilities),” cash balances, 
the impact of enrollment fluctuation on revenue (since students are often transient during 
the school year), and any default issues regarding debts to lenders or creditors (Frumpkin 
et al., 2011; NACSA, 2013). Sustainability measures include “total margin (net income 
divided by total revenue),” the ratio between debt and assets, “cash flow,” and debt 
service (Frumpkin et al., 2011; NACSA, 2013). Information from annual and more 
frequently occurring audits, as well as quarterly and monthly financial statements, are the 
best means by which the board can review both near-term and long-term metrics that are 
indicators of fiscal health (Asae, 2009; NACSA, 2013).   
Board members must also realize the importance of creating clear goals, along 
with a clear structure and strategy, for fundraising (Grignano, 1999; New York City 
Center for Charter School Excellence, 2006). A diverse board should have an extensive 
network that enables access to a variety of financial resources; monetary and in-kind 
support should come from a number of different types of donors, partners, companies, 
and organizations (Grignano, 1999; New York City Center for Charter School 
Excellence, 2006). Board members should also organize themselves in such a way that 
they either directly engage in grant writing or support a member of the organization’s 
staff in this particular funding stream (Grignano, 1999; New York City Center for Charter 






Legal Oversight and Compliance Monitoring 
Members of a charter school or CMO board are the ethical and legal stewards of 
the organization (Frumpkin et al., 2011; Grignano, 1999). Oversight related to legal 
matters and compliance with the authorizer’s regulations varies from charter to charter 
depending on state and local policies; however, most boards provide oversight in the 
following areas under the legal and regulatory umbrella: “(1) Corporate law, internal 
policies, and procedures and contracts with third parties; (2) Local, state, and federal laws 
and regulations; and (3) Risk management” (Grignano, as cited in DeHoff, 2011). 
Additionally, as is standard across corporate law for 501(c)(3) organizations, all board 
members must adhere to and exhibit the duties of care as an advocate for and champion 
of the organization, obedience as a means of compliance with all rules and regulations, 
and loyalty to the organization as it makes decisions in the best interest of the students 
and families that the charter school/CMO serves (CBP, 2014; Grignano, 1999). 
These six standards for quality charter governance should support the board as it 
seeks to make strategic decisions about the type of organizational structure that will 
produce the best outcomes for students. While the pioneers of the charter movement first 
began the work of creating an alternative choice to traditional school options available to 
families, they likely imagined small learning communities in intimate school settings. 
However, with single-campus charters seeking to replicate and smaller CMOs 
ambitiously planning to expand the number of campuses in the networks they support in 
what seems like a relatively short span of time (a few years at most), organizational 
structure—especially through the lens of teaching and learning quality—becomes a 





Research from the National Study of Charter Management Organization (CMO) 
Effectiveness (Lake et al., 2010) framed organizational structure as a spectrum of 
autonomy along which single-campus schools and CMOs move, depending on the 
authority and oversight of the organization’s central office and the range of site-based 
decision making afforded directly to individual school leaders and their teams. There is a 
cause-and-effect relationship between quality board governance and effective 
school/executive management. The relationship is to be collaborative and strategic rather 
than characterized by micromanagement, and often the stronger the strategic 
collaboration is, the better the performance of the school/executive management is. As 
for school administrators and CMO senior leadership, more detailed oversight and 
direction (not necessarily micromanagement) tend to come into play as most of these 
leaders lean toward a “prescriptive” approach rather than a “permissive” one (Lake et al., 
2010). The prescriptive approach provides detailed directives across a school or network 
of schools, with all teachers/teacher teams utilizing the same curriculum, instructional 
resources, interim assessments, social-emotional learning strategies, and systems for 
behavior management and discipline; the permissive approach allows individual sites the 
freedom to choose how to teach and what resources to use (not necessarily what to teach, 
since the curricular scope and sequence are fundamental to a charter’s/CMO’s academic 
model) (Lake et al., 2010). Charter and CMO boards have the authority and responsibility 
to influence and advise upon organizational structure—the continuum of autonomy for 
site-based decision making—as needed, and they often base their decision making on 






Financially Sustainable Charter Schools and CMOs 
The Financial Risks and Benefits of Growing to Scale 
The public perception that charters steal students and, in turn, money that 
rightfully belongs to traditional public schools in the local district or jurisdiction is 
gravely incorrect. Charters open doors to some of the most significantly behind students, 
yet the irony is that local policy already puts charters behind financially—at a deficit 
(Aldeman et al., 2009; Frumpkin et al., 2011). Obstacles include a reduced amount of 
state revenue, a reduced amount of facilities funding, and increased restrictions on 
spending at the mercy of local politics and anti-charter interests (Frumpkin et al., 2011). 
As Frumpkin et al. noted, “According to the Center for Education Reform, charter 
schools across the United States receive state funding at only 61 percent of the amount 
received by their district counterparts, averaging $6,585 per pupil compared to $10,771 
per pupil at conventional district public schools” (p. 115).   
With less coming in, charters carry a heavy financial burden as their operations 
costs become ironically greater—lack of cost sharing for back-office operational support 
that exists in traditional systems; increased fixed costs since most charter philosophies 
believe in smaller class sizes for better academic results (charters actually lose money on 
small schools); a demand for wraparound services given the immense needs of serving an 
already severely underserved population; and higher legal expenditures to navigate 
unfavorable legislation, negative press, and lawsuits (Aldeman et al., 2009; Frumpkin et 
al., 2011). Charters also miss out on special subsidies for capital money to build new 
facilities, student transportation, and ELL and special education (Aldeman et al., 2009; 





inequities in state policy and the instability and hostility of the local political landscape 
leave charters and CMOs searching for answers to the financial sustainability question.  
This issue of financial sustainability and the following discussion regarding charter 
school finance comprise the internal component that is designated in the study’s 
conceptual framework (Version 1) as “Finance”. 
One of the top solutions for developing long-term financial viability is to grow to 
scale, to replicate the number of campuses in order to increase the number of students 
and, in turn, the amount of per-pupil funding received. This then can greatly increase a 
charter’s or CMO’s ability to cover overhead operating costs, pay for capital 
improvements, and even offer competitive compensation for teachers (Farrell et al., 2009; 
Frumpkin et al., 2011; Wohlstetter, Smith, Farrell, Hentschke, & Hirman, 2011). The 
long-term planning for growing to scale over the course of 7 to 10 years is inherently 
risky, as the charter or CMO takes on significant debt or practically usurps what little 
cash reserves it has to open more campuses and creates a central office that supports the 
growing network in implementing the academic program and day-to-day school 
operations between the third and fifth years (Aldeman et al., 2009).   
This model/action plan assumes that funds spent on all the start-up costs can be 
recovered via aggressive fundraising and the courting of corporate and individual donors 
between the fourth and sixth years (Aldeman et al., 2009). In Years 5 through 7, the 
addition of even more campuses, while still spending as leanly as possible per student, 
assumes that all schools combined will finally, for the very first time, yield a cash 
surplus. After the seventh year, the network of schools generates an even greater positive 





organization’s total revenue, and minimal fees charged to students’ families pay for the 
cost of opening any additional new campuses or expanding operational, plant-related, or 
information technology infrastructure (Aldeman et al., 2009). Current practice includes 
the pursuit/receipt of funds from several sources, including federal, state, local LEA, and 
school sites—sources that are governmental (Wohlstetter et al., 2011).  
Major Funding Streams in Charter School Finance  
Several reports and peer-reviewed research articles have indicated that charters 
and CMOs have sought significant support and are sometimes over-reliant on 
philanthropic funds (Farrell et al., 2011; Frumpkin et al., 2011; Wohlstetter et al., 2011). 
With “[a]t least 9 of these CMOs spend[ing] more than $1,000 per pupil beyond the 
amounts allocated from public sources and four CMOs spend[ing] more than $4,000 per 
pupil more” (Lake, Bowen, Demeritt, & Hill, 2012, p. 19), the significant dependence on 
private monies to supplement the often inequitable per-pupil amount received from the 
state or local LEA is justified. In fact, the primary funding source for replication and 
expansion for charters and CMOs continues to be private and foundational gifts, 
including those from national foundations like Broad, Charter School Growth Fund, the 
Gates Foundation, New Schools Venture Fund, and the Walton Foundation, as well as 
state or local foundations, private and corporate giving, and individual gifts (Wohlstetter 
et al., 2011).  
Fortunately, foundations and private donors are perhaps the strongest advocates 
for the work of charters and CMOs, other than parents and employees of the charter 
organizations themselves. This advocacy is evidenced by the millions of dollars that 





Venture Fund’s charter accelerator investment totaling upwards of $40 million over the 
course of only 24 months in the early 2000s (Lake, 2007). Some charters and CMOs 
indicate that a particular giving stakeholder is denoted as the primary or “anchor funder” 
(Aldeman et al., 2009; Wohlstetter et al., 2011). 
The variety of funding sources does not necessarily guarantee that funds from 
particular donors, foundations, or other sources last indefinitely; in fact, there is great 
uncertainty and anticipation around philanthropic giving regarding the status of its 
frequency as well as its amount (Wohlstetter et al., 2011). Frequency can range from a 
single gift or grant, to a gift given over a prescribed period of time or given provided the 
charter or CMO re-apply (as in the case of foundational funding) (Wohlstetter et al., 
2011). Donations also vary by amount, from a few thousand dollars to millions 
(Wohlstetter et al., 2011). The fluctuation makes the charter budgeting process very 
unpredictable; thus, making projections often seems futile because any number of 
external or internal factors, as well as funder agendas, interests, requirements, 
expectations—essentially the “strings” tied to the donations, directly impact financial 
planning.   
These funding restrictions are especially daunting given that funders sometimes 
make demands that philosophically conflict with a charter’s or CMO’s general approach 
to education and sometimes even with its mission, thereby causing the aforementioned 
notion of mission creep or mission drift. A number of restrictions or requests often 
accompany a grant or gift. Donors concerned about how the charter/CMO is spending its 
money request that they be granted membership on the organization’s board of directors 





capital projects—either the construction of a brand new building or the addition of a new 
building wing—rather than for operational costs, which is one area where charters and 
CMOs often incur their greatest expenses (Frumpkin et al., 2011; Wohlstetter et al., 
2011). 
Other gifts and/or the reoccurrence of the donation are directly tied to 
organizational performance—namely student achievement, with a heavy emphasis on 
dramatic growth required in a shorter span of time (Wohlstetter et al., 2011). Even so, 
donors and foundations have demanded that specific start-up strategies be implemented 
in creating new schools, including the full all-grade enrollment of a school in its first 
year, despite research suggesting that growing new schools a few grades at a time is 
better for student achievement (Wohlstetter et al., 2011). Even government agencies have 
had specific stipulations at a level of detail that directly, and sometimes negatively, 
impact enrollment and lottery procedures as well as the ability of students to move up to 
middle and high school campuses located in the same network of schools (Wohlstetter  
et al., 2011). 
Achieving Sound Financial Management and Stability 
Faced with the added complexity produced by restrictions, along with the 
uncertainty around amounts and funding streams, it is easy for charters and CMOs to 
become easily caught in financial pitfalls. However, there are several recommendations 
for behaviors and strategies that promote sound financial management and develop the 
financial stability that many charters and CMOs so fervently seek and that is absolutely 
necessary when an organization attempts to grow to scale (Farrell et al., 2009; Frumpkin 





An intentionally thorough financial planning process is imperative and should 
include “multiyear budgeting and cash flow forecasts, annual audit, and monthly careful 
review of the three critical financial statements: income statement, balance sheet, and 
cash flow statement” (Frumpkin et al., 2011, p. 117). Charters and CMOs must also 
exercise prudence and maintain a conservative approach in “managing costs, incurring 
major expenses only after the revenue picture is sufficiently strong to keep the school on 
a sound financial footing or after financing is available on competitive terms” (Frumpkin 
et al., 2011, p. 117). Some charters and CMOs have even gone so far as not to budget 
grant money received—“surplus” monies used for supplemental purposes only (Farrell et 
al., 2012; Wohlstetter et al., 2011). Financial officers and business administrators should 
pay careful attention to factors that have the greatest impact on the organization’s 
outlook, including changes in incoming revenue and expenditures, as well as any budget 
variances, fluctuations in student enrollment figures, and annual increases that inevitably 
occur as the organization grows to serve more students. This then will require additional 
teacher salaries, additional instructional and curricular resources, and funds for 
innovative initiatives that accompany the opening of new schools or the scaling of an 
academic model/approach (i.e., technology devices utilized for a blended learning pilot, 
etc.) (Frumpkin et al., 2011). According to Frumpkin et al. (2011): 
     Sector research also suggests that [s]ince charter schools operate in an 
environment of financial constraints as well as political uncertainty and risk, 
administrators need flexibility in making resource allocation decisions that reflect 
the actual needs and dynamics of the school and judgments about how they can 
most effectively focus resources to “move the needle” on student achievement.  
(p. 118)  
 
A number of studies also underscore the importance of diversifying funding 





any one funder or small group of funders threatens the long-term financial viability of the 
organization because funds are not always guaranteed, especially in light of the nation’s 
continued recovery from the economic recession of the last several years. Since 
government funds will not satisfy the financial needs of charters and CMOs, they must 
ensure that their overall funding strategy considers multiple funding opportunities from a 
variety of sources, including individual, foundation, corporate, and nonprofit organization 
donations, as well as potential income earned through the sale of services or goods (i.e., 
renting school gymnasium or auditorium facilities to outside entities in the evenings and 
on weekends, providing curricular consultation services to other education organizations, 
etc.) (Farrell et al., 2009; Frumpkin et al., 2011).   
As mentioned in the previous section on board governance, charters and CMOs 
must invest board members in actively contributing to the long-term financial health of 
the organization, whether through direct fundraising or leveraging other partnerships or 
relationships with the potential to generate revenue or garner monetary support (Eadie, 
2003; Farrell et al., 2009). Charters and CMOs must also discern the types of funds they 
want to pursue in such a way that funding strategies are aligned with the organization’s 
mission, vision, strategic priorities, and especially students’ needs (Farrell et al., 2009; 
Frumpkin et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2007). Frumpkin et al. (2011) suggested a specific set 
of criteria for charter leaders to utilize when considering whether or not a certain funding 
opportunity is a good fit for the organization:  
• Level of Freedom in Use of Funds: How able the [organization] is to do what 
it wants with the revenue. 
• Level of Reporting Required: How much the giver of the revenue wants 
reports back on the use of funds. 





• Tendency to Cause Mission Drift: How likely the revenue stream will cause 
the [organization] to move away from its core mission in [future] pursuit of 
additional revenue from the source. 
• Resources Required to Pursue: How much time, effort, and money [are] 
required by the organization to pursue the revenue item. (pp. 119-120) 
 
Furthermore, regarding mission drift, experienced charter financial executives should 
avoid the practice of “chasing money and changing our strategy” (Farrell et al., 2013,  
p. 90).   
Charters and CMOs must also assess the financial and social implications/impact 
of the initiatives and programs they undertake in order to develop an effective strategy for 
resource allocation. Those initiatives and programs that have both a high level of 
financial impact (generates revenue for the organization) and a high level of social impact 
(directly strengthens or contributes to positive student outcomes) are those which greatly 
benefit the organization (and its funders that invest in them) (Frumpkin et al., 2011). 
Other financial best practices that charters and CMOs should apply include building up a 
significant cash reserve (up to 6 months’ worth of cash) over time in case unforeseen 
expenditures arise. Moreover, they should ascertain that any debt (often incurred with the 
construction of new facilities) does not impede the organization’s ability to prioritize 
spending in such a way that supports the effective implementation of the academic 
program (National Consensus Panel on Charter School Operational Quality, 2009).   
Financial stability is a driver for operational stability, especially when an 
organization finally achieves economies of scale. The “back office” or central office in a 
charter or CMO is often lean, but the operational infrastructure and systems these teams 
build are critical for schools. They allow school leaders to focus less on administrative 





of time coaching teachers to improve classroom effectiveness and create a positive school 
environment that nurtures and encourages student learning (Lake et al., 2010). 
The Relationship Between Charter/CMO Finance and Facilities  
Even when charters and CMOs reach a certain level of operational stability, the 
greatest unknown within their operations revolves around the physical plant—facilities 
(Aldeman et al., 2009; Farrell et al., 2012; Frumpkin et al., 2011; National Consensus 
Panel on Charter School Operational Quality, 2009). Both finding and funding a space to 
house a school often become a problematic process for charters and especially CMOs 
since they are multi-campus operators. In the same way that either the availability or 
scarcity of financial resources directly impacts an organization’s planning, the search for 
and acquisition of a building or buildings has a similar effect. Research has shown that 
the lack of a facility can cause the organization to delay a new school’s opening by as 
much as 2 years or to relocate a campus geographically to a new neighborhood—both 
possibilities being disruptive to continuity of learning and school environment for 
students (Aldeman et al., 2009; Frumpkin et al., 2011).  
The National Consensus Panel on Charter School Operational Quality (2009) 
encourages organizations to design and do their best to adhere to a master facilities plan 
in order to align funding strategy to rental needs, capital improvement projects, and new 
construction initiatives. Charters and CMOs place great value on constructing their own 
facilities, thus eliminating the uncertainty that can sometimes accompany acting as a 
lessor in a rented space (Farrell et al., 2009).  
Financing the building for its own facilities usually includes courting prospective 





to utilize not-for-profit bonds as another means to obtain the revenue needed up front to 
construct a new school plant (Farrell et al., 2009; National Consensus Panel on Charter 
School Operational Quality, 2009). In states and jurisdictions where they are available, 
new market tax credits, which create incentives for investors who are willing to fund real 
estate projects in underserved communities, are another means for financing new 
construction (Farrell et al., 2009; Internal Revenue Service, 2010).  
When new construction is not an option, other means for acquiring space for 
school include collaborating with the authorizer, local education agency (local school 
district), or another external partner to either cohabitate and share space with another 
program or charter school, or petition the local school district for the use of an unassigned 
school facility that would otherwise remain empty (Farrell et al., 2009). These particular 
methods often require a memorandum of understanding or contract that stipulates terms 
of use as well as responsibilities for facilities maintenance, utilities, and upgrades.   
Ongoing Challenges and Issues in Charter School and CMO Finance   
At this stage in the charter movement, charters and CMOs still continue to grapple 
with several relevant issues as they seek to grow. While one of the key ideas behind 
CMOs was to improve the capacity of education reform leaders to replicate successful 
charter schools, fiscal factors (as detailed in the next section) continue to be one of the 
primary obstacles to realizing this vision (Lake & Demeritt, 2011). Not one single charter 
school or CMO in the United States can claim that it is financially self-sustainable: even 
if there were other more efficient and reliable ways to fund replication, many charter 
leaders and experts in charter finance diligently argue that inequities in start-up, per-





philanthropic dollars would never be tolerated or implemented in other sectors (Lake & 
Demeritt, 2011).   
In replicating, charters and CMOs also aspire to achieve economies of scale. 
However, Lake and Demeritt (2011) described how exponential growth leads to the 
unintended consequence of behaving and executing much more like a traditional public 
school district. This occurs in the development of a larger central office that serves 
schools with top-down directives that are usually a “one-size-fits-all” solution or strategy 
failing to take into account school and learning community-specific contexts and needs. 
The danger of old school bureaucracy is imminent as the diseconomies of scale plague 
not so much the fiscal health of an organization, but rather its ability to deliver the type of 
high-quality support services that ensures the organization’s primary service—teaching 
and learning—is effective and highly impactful (Lake & Demeritt, 2011).   
While funding and facilities inequities between charter and traditional public 
schools remain a topic of major contention and debate, it is still not clear whether public 
funding levels are the sole cause of challenges in the scaling-up process (Lake & 
Demeritt, 2011). Charters and CMOs have much to improve in the area of efficient and 
effective spending as well as basic money management. The most extreme argument 
suggests that the issue of funding inequity is no longer relevant, especially for charter 
schools and CMOs that are determined to serve large numbers of students in the current, 
tumultuous policy environment (Lake & Demeritt, 2011). Other sector experts have 
advocated for figuring out the maximum number of schools a CMO could effectively 





and collaborate with funders and investors around a more finite plan (Lake & Demeritt, 
2011).   
CMO practices and policies, as well as their funding strategies and financial 
planning, are so vastly different that it is difficult to determine any real costs or benefits 
to the approaches leaders continue to take in managing schools and growing to scale 
(Lake & Demeritt, 2011). From student enrollment (growing grade by grade versus 
opening full enrollment), to human capital strategy (hiring younger, less seasoned 
teachers because their salaries are lower), to length of school day and school year 
(extended day and year versus a traditional day and year), it is not likely that CMOs will 
move to align their practices soon. However, experts and leaders agree that some sort of 
analysis comparing similar practices and their costs and benefits will be helpful for 
planning the fiscal future of the entire charter sector and the growth expected by a variety 
of stakeholders, from parents to funders (Lake & Demeritt, 2011).   
Replicating School Models and Maintaining Quality 
Replication is the process of opening new schools based on a single-school model 
or academic program (NACSA, 2009). Single-campus charters and CMOs seeking to 
replicate must possess a proven model evidenced by a significant track record of student 
achievement results (Aldeman et al., 2009; Lake, 2007; NACSA, 2009).  This internal 
component is designated in the study’s conceptual framework (Version 1) as “Academic 
Program”. 
Because of the autonomy afforded to them via federal/state law and local 





and school models that are characterized as much more rigorous and demanding than the 
average traditional public school and that aim to close the achievement gap by creating 
“targeted instructional programs to [specific, high-needs] groups of students” 
(Wohlstetter et al., 2013, p. 71; also see Lake, 2007). Some of the foundational 
components of charter school academic models that produce higher numbers of students 
who have grown to meet or exceed expectations on standardized assessments (the 
primary indicator of student growth and attainment) include more months during the year 
spent in school and more hours than a typical school day, coupled with inquiry-based and 
project-based approaches to learning and effectively differentiated instruction (Aldeman 
et al., 2009; Frumpkin et al., 2011; Wohlstetter et al., 2013). 
A small body of research has shown that while these models consistently produce 
results that have created pockets of success nationwide in the form of high-performing 
CMOs like KIPP, Achievement First, and YES Prep, charter models are not as innovative 
as the sector’s reputation and self-proclaimed overall mission lead one to believe 
(Frumpkin et al., 2011; Wohlstetter et al., 2013). Consistent implementation, greater time 
allocation to learning, and rigorous expectations, as well as partnering more closely with 
parents, are often the driving factors in effectiveness. Otherwise, some of the practices of 
the sector’s best schools and networks are relatively similar to those of the traditional 
schooling structure that has followed society into the 21st century (Lake, 2007; 
Wohlstetter et al., 2013). 
Maintaining Quality of School Model and Academic Program During Replication 
In addition to presenting mission, governance, and financial challenges, 





model and its academic program across multiple new sites. One of the most serious 
obstacles in this part of the replication process is ensuring that: 
     the original design or model school is replicated faithfully. In many cases, 
organizations fail to insist on faithful replication and struggle with how much to 
allow sites to adapt the model to fit local desires. As a result, “replicated” charter 
schools are often of uneven quality, reflecting poorly on the original school or on 
the umbrella management organization. (Lake, 2007, p. 2) 
 
It is important to note that fidelity to the model is not just for the sake of 
continuity or general quality, but most especially for consistency of results (Center on 
Reinventing Education, 2007; Lake, 2007). When school leaders and teachers have 
difficulty understanding the school model and academic program, they begin to change it, 
as commonly occurs in other sectors as well (Center on Reinventing Education, 2007; 
Lake, 2007). Lake (2007) encouraged charters and CMOs to examine the practices of 
other sectors, namely the private/corporate sector, to better understand successful 
practices for carefully contemplating and executing replication. Surprisingly, the 
corporate sector’s many encounters with attempts at replication and expansion have 
demonstrated that: (a) the act of actually pinpointing an effective organization’s “DNA” 
is a challenging task in itself, and (b) stakeholder mindsets and dispositions towards the 
act of replication are actually more critical than the replication process itself. In this case, 
overconfidence can act as a means for model drift, as people begin to change and adapt 
the model in order to “improve” it (Lake, 2007). 
Lake’s (2007) research presented five key “lessons” for effective business 
replication. First, “Make sure you are trying to replicate something that can be copied and 
is worth copying” (p. 3). In business, data and metrics are used to determine the 





and whether or not the model needs to be tweaked to achieve even better results (Lake, 
2007). 
Lake (2007) also suggested that leaders “[o]bserve the original model directly”  
(p. 3). While founding leaders may seem like the best resource for understanding what 
practices and organizational components have led to the company’s success, those 
contemplating replication must see this for themselves in order to conduct a sound 
evaluation that will act as a springboard for their replication plan (Lake, 2007).   
As a third lesson, it is imperative to copy the original model in as exact a manner 
as possible (Lake, 2007). While replicating organizational components is necessary, more 
paramount is copying exactly how these foundational elements fit together. By doing this, 
the lead replicator increases the opportunity of the new site team to examine more closely 
the less obvious ways in which elements interact (Lake, 2007).   
Fourth, replication leaders should only adapt the model after they have 
accomplished acceptable results (Lake, 2007). According to Lake, “[c]ustomizing or 
adapting might be acceptable and even appropriate given local contexts, but the template 
must be right before adapting it” (p. 3). 
The final lesson for consideration suggests that as replication leaders eventually 
move into the adaptation phase, they should never disregard the original model’s 
“template” or blueprint (Lake, 2007). Mistakes and less-than-perfect outcomes are almost 
guaranteed throughout this process because a misstep was likely in the “copying” 
process. Thus, leaders should use the model’s blueprint to engage in troubleshooting and 





Given these lessons from the private sector, charters and CMOs should execute 
the following:  
• Insist on third-party evaluations and test-score analysis before investing in 
replicating what appears to be a success story for the students currently 
enrolled. 
• Consider pairing founders with outside observers to identify successful 
practices. 
• Outline the expected level of fidelity to the original model in a school’s 
charter, contract, or memorandum of understanding, and also create sufficient 
flexibility to allow for “tinkering” with the model when it is appropriate.  
• Emphasize the point that innovation should never be for the sake of 
innovation alone, but only to improve on what others have failed to achieve. 
In that way, the right to innovate should be earned and justified on the basis of 
better student outcomes. 
• At least initially, insist that charter replication efforts involve hard-nosed 
critiques and objective analyses to identify whether and how a replica school 
has strayed from the original model. (Lake, 2007) 
By considering institutional knowledge and foundational practices while being open to 
adaptations after fully implementing the model, charter schools and CMOs can increase 







Human Capital Challenges and Opportunities 
The Human Capital Challenge 
Staffing, especially at schools, of building leaders, teachers, and instructional and 
administrative staff, is the most significant expense for charters and CMOs, averaging 
about 80% of overall spending in the course of a single school/fiscal year (Aldeman  
et al., 2009). Other than financial capital, human capital, or people, are the organization’s 
most valuable asset. However, the most serious challenge here is that there is simply not 
enough talent available for charter schools and CMOs in the midst of rapid replication 
(Aldeman et al., 2009; Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; Doyle & Steiner, 2011; Farrell et al., 
2013). “Human capital demands have been identified as a critical factor that sets the pace 
for growth of high performing charter operators” (Farrell et al., 2013, p. 9). In fact, access 
to a pool of high-quality or attractive candidates often shapes or informs a charter’s or 
CMO’s actual overall growth strategy—especially the timeline for opening new 
campuses or increasing central office capacity (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; Doyle & 
Steiner, 2011; Farrell et al., 2013). This internal component is designated in the study’s 
conceptual framework (Version 1) as “Human Capital”. 
Insufficient Talent Pools 
While single-campus charters and CMOs differ in academic model and general 
plans for growth, research has highlighted a trend among replicating organizations 
regarding the criteria that signify a “highly qualified” candidate (Doyle & Steiner, 2011; 
Farrell et al., 2013). Attractive candidates include Teach for America (TFA) corps 





recruited from competitive universities and are required to commit to a 2-year residency 
in the classroom. Other desirable candidates have matriculated from highly-selective 
undergraduate institutions and graduate schools of education, especially those serving in 
education leadership positions within charter schools or CMOs (Doyle & Steiner, 2011; 
Farrell et al., 2013). 
One of the most common challenges of human capital for charters, then, becomes 
the often limited pool of talent. The scarcity of these candidates leads charters within the 
geographic region (often a city) to compete for top talent. This competition plays out as 
prospective teachers and school leaders navigate a rigorous application and selection 
process that weeds out lower-quality candidates while engaging and motivating higher-
quality candidates to succeed through the selection stage (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; 
Doyle & Steiner, 2011; Farrell et al., 2013). 
 
Job Sustainability and Retention 
Other human capital challenges have less to do with availability and accessibility 
of top talent. Instead, charters and CMOs face the problem of ensuring that the work of 
teaching and providing support to schools is sustainable and not mutually exclusive of 
people’s other life goals. This capacity challenge often arises when staff members 
become too thinly spread across a wide range of responsibilities, not only at the building 
level but most especially at the home or central office (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; Doyle 
& Steiner, 2011; Farrell et al., 2013).   
Closely related to capacity is the challenge of retaining the most talented team 
members in the wake of burnout, work-life imbalance, the demands of a rigorous 





what charters and CMOs can afford (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011). Maintaining staff 
morale and investment to prevent turnover is difficult, even from a financial standpoint. It 
is simply less expensive to hire younger, less experienced teachers (Chadwick & Kowal, 
2011; Higgins & Hess, 2009; Lake & Demeritt, 2011). Charters and CMOs must 
determine how to make working in their organizations more manageable, especially in 
relation to the division of labor between providing operational leadership and 
instructional leadership and particularly at the building level (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011). 
Whether via central office support or site-based supports, the organizations that assist 
school leaders and teacher teams with budget management, procurement, facilities, and 
compliance-reporting support often succeed in creating a working context that can sustain 
instructional staff and allow them to focus on strengthening teaching and improving 
learning (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011). In the long run, high turnover continues to hurt 
charters and CMOs because of the high cost of continuously recruiting, inducting, and 
indoctrinating new teachers every year (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; Higgins & Hess, 
2009; Lake & Demeritt, 2011).   
Opportunities to Overcome Human Capital Challenges 
Despite the myriad human capital issues charters and CMOs face, these 
organizations can pursue several opportunities that will better prepare them to recruit and 
retain the talented leaders they need to sustain the organization throughout the replication 
period. Organizations should staff earlier on in order to prepare for scaling; they should 
avoid the commonplace last-minute, rushed decision making that leads to poor hiring 
choices (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; Doyle & Steiner, 2011; Farrell et al., 2013). This 





appear more costly to bring on teacher candidates well in advance of the upcoming 
school year, this is a good up-front investment to give leaders adequate time to prepare 
and select their own teams carefully (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; Doyle & Steiner, 2011; 
Farrell et al., 2013). 
Building Talent Pipelines  
Charters and CMOs need to ensure that they build strategic pipelines of talent, 
both externally and most especially internally. Partnerships with schools of education, 
teacher training programs, and other teacher recruitment organizations are often 
beneficial for increasing the size of the candidate pool, but do not automatically 
guarantee quality (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; Doyle & Steiner, 2011; Farrell et al., 2009, 
2013).   
As a result, many charters and CMOs have invested in creating internal leadership 
pipelines, designed not only to retain top-performing teachers but also to mold them as 
the organization’s future leaders, especially at the school level (Chadwick & Kowal, 
2011; Doyle & Steiner, 2011; Farrell et al., 2009, 2013). The benefits of growing and 
cultivating talent from within, whether via a residency program or a mentoring 
partnership program, include developing the type of quality leader who is completely 
aligned with the organization’s mission and values and already indoctrinated with the 
organization’s norms, systems, and overall organizational culture (Chadwick & Kowal, 
2011; Doyle & Steiner, 2011; Farrell et al., 2009, 2013). 
The pinnacle of human capital innovation in charters/CMOs transcends the 
aforementioned development of internal talent pipelines. Some organizations have 





higher education. For instance, High Tech High, a network of 13 charter schools in 
California, houses “a comprehensive adult learning environment including a Teacher 
Credentialing Program and the High Tech High Graduate School of Education, offering 
professional development opportunities serving national and international educators” 
(High Tech High, 2017, para. 1). The Graduate School seeks to unite theory and practice 
through learning that takes place on site for adult students across the CMO’s 13 campuses 
(High Tech High Graduate School of Education, 2017). In addition, the Graduate School 
offers a fellowship for aspiring school leaders who wish to open their own charter school 
based on High Tech High’s values of equity, deeper learning, and shared leadership 
(High Tech High Graduate School of Education, 2017).   
Similarly, in 2005, Uncommon Schools co-founder Norman Atkins and KIPP co-
founder David Levin established the Relay Graduate School of Education (Whitmire, 
2016). With intentions to train teachers and leaders to lead students in urban schools 
successfully to excellent learning outcomes, the Relay method for assessing its pupils’ 
preparedness for the classroom was grounded in demonstrated mastery of proven 
teaching techniques rather than an accumulation of course credits, proving somewhat 
controversial among traditional schools of education across the country (Whitmire, 
2016). Yet, in the spirit of the charter school movement’s roots, both High Tech High’s 
Graduate School of Education and Relay have continued to innovate around adult 
learning and development specifically for educators. 
Organizational Culture as a Means of Attracting and Retaining Talent 
Charters and CMOs need to build a positive, growth-oriented, and dynamic 





teachers and leaders (Higgins & Hess, 2009; Kardos, Johnson, Peske, Kauffman, & Liu, 
2001). A culture that focuses not only on long-term professional growth but also on 
building its team members’ capacity across a wide range of skills is one of the most 
effective internal organizational contexts that charters and CMOs can create. This is 
especially critical for human capital issues that the charter sector continues to face 
(Higgins & Hess, 2009; Kardos et al., 2001). 
More specifically, charter and CMO missions often create not only a well-defined 
brand, but also a very precise set of characteristics and behaviors that all team members 
across the organization harbor—also known as an “organizational career imprint” 
(Higgins, 2005; Higgins & Hess, 2009). These qualities—a certain set of “capabilities, 
connections, confidence, and cognitions” (Higgins & Hess, 2009, p. 2)—is almost like an 
organizational “DNA” of sorts (Higgins, 2005). As charters and CMOs seek to grow to 
scale and consider the potential of its current human capital, replicating this DNA 
becomes critical in ensuring that a single campus or small network of schools that has 
produced outstanding results can be scaled successfully to a number of campuses that can 
do the same (Higgins, 2005; Higgins & Hess, 2009). 
External Partnerships, Competing High-Quality Charters, and Pipelines 
Charter organizations should also garner the support of a “facilitator” to prioritize 
the talent pipeline (Doyle & Steiner, 2011). A facilitator is “a city-based entity that funds 
and coordinates human capital initiatives, identifies gaps in the talent supply for charter 
schools, and launches initiatives to fill those gaps” (p. 2). Nonprofits or charter 
support/advocacy organizations often fulfill the role of talent facilitator in urban settings 





In addition to working to establish its own pipelines, charters and CMOs should 
partner with local and national talent providers such as Teach for America (TFA) and The 
New Teacher Project (TNTP) because these organizations seek to attract exactly the type 
of high-quality candidates that many organizations want (Chadwick & Kowall, 2011; 
Doyle & Steiner, 2011). Because of their size and national reputations, organizations 
such as TFA and TNTP tend to offer additional supports for developing talent after they 
have secured employment; these supports include executive coaching, instructional 
coaching, and even principal preparation (Doyle & Steiner, 2011). 
As another opportunity/strategy, growing charters and CMOs should rally around 
the results of their high-performing, more established peers in the jurisdiction (Doyle & 
Steiner, 2011). The presence of charters with proven track records that are both 
regionally and nationally recognized drives talented candidates to gravitate to the general 
geographic area—the types of candidates that are game for innovation and hungry to 
make significant professional contributions in a reform-oriented environment/context, 
especially through the incubation of new schools (Doyle & Steiner, 2011). 
Aligning Resource Allocation With Talent Pipeline Development 
In the previous section detailing charter finance, best practices regarding 
philanthropic support encouraged charters/CMOs to seek out funding for a specific 
purpose. Another opportunity to address the talent gap is guiding funders in 
understanding that “human capital development” is one primary way they can support 
charter organizations, especially those in the process of or contemplating replication 
(Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; Doyle & Steiner, 2011). More specifically, charters and 





“(1) Create new, local organizations that help build a talent pipeline within the sector;  
(2) Fund external talent providers to directly recruit talented teachers and leaders; and  
(3) Become a catalyst for new solutions by conducting research, holding conferences, and 
networking with other organizations that are committed to improving the talent pipeline” 
(Doyle & Steiner, 2011, p. 8).  
The more a charter or CMO does to invest in its human capital capacity—even 
prior to team members coming on board, as evidenced in the opportunities/strategies 
described above—the better it prepares itself for the rate at which it desires to grow. This 
is because talent has an immense influence on the organization’s ability to scale. 
External Factors That Potentially Impact Growth 
Federal and State Charter Policy Environment 
Broad overarching federal policies often impact charters in both similar and 
different ways compared with traditional district schools. The ESEA (formerly NCLB) 
can support replication if the single-site school or schools in a smaller CMO are all 
meeting or exceeding performance indicators. However, these same policies can pose an 
obstacle to growth when a single-site school or some schools in a smaller CMO 
demonstrate inconsistent or poor academic results (Farrell et al., 2012). In these 
instances, single-site operators or CMOs invest time and resources in correcting mediocre 
performance rather than focusing on continuing or pursuing their designated replication 
plans.   
Charter and CMO growth decisions, especially as related to geographic decisions 





charter laws and policies are (Farrell et al., 2009). Charter leaders consider not only the 
actual level of autonomy, but also the processes supporting and holding charters and 
CMOs accountable, including appeals processes in the case of corrective action from the 
designated authorizer (Farrell et al., 2009). In addition, the cap on the number of charter 
schools in a certain region or jurisdiction is another factor impacting a charter’s or 
CMO’s growth plan as well as the per-pupil funding formula (Farrell et al., 2009). This 
external factor is designated in the study’s conceptual framework (Version 1) as “Federal 
and State Charter Policy Environment”. 
Since 1991, states across the country have created and enacted charter school 
laws, some more quickly than others. At present, 44 states and the District of Columbia 
have laws in place allowing for charter school operations and, in several of those states, 
charter school replication and expansion (NAPCS, 2018). In 2009, Todd Ziebarth of the 
NAPCS created the report A Model Law for Supporting the Growth of High-Quality 
Charter Schools. The purpose of A Model Law was to identify a set of fundamental 
components that shape the ideal environment for the most effective charter schools to 
flourish, regardless of jurisdiction:  
• Supportive laws and regulations (both what is on the books and how it is 
implemented);  
• Quality authorizers;  
• Effective charter support organizations, such as state charter school 
associations and resource centers;  
• Outstanding school leaders and teachers; and 
• Engaged parents and community members. (Ziebarth & Palmer, 2018, p. 5) 
 
Starting in 2010, Ziebarth began to release an annual report evaluating each 
state’s policy “performance” against the criteria set forth in A Model Law (Ziebarth & 





second edition of A Model Law, emphasizing that the best policy environment for 
charters/CMOs promoted “equitable support for charter school students, more flexibility 
for charter schools, and strengthened accountability for charter schools and their 
authorizers” (Ziebarth & Palmer, 2018, p. 8). In addition, Ziebarth (2018) asserted that 
there are 21 essential components comprising what he termed a “strong charter school 
law”; of note, especially for this study on charter replication and expansion, are no cap on 
the number of charter schools in a state (Component One); the allowance of multi-school 
charter contracts under the governance of a single board (Component Fifteen); equitable 
funding for operations (Component Eighteen); and equitable access to facilities and 
capital funding (Component Nineteen). 
The 2018 report delineated that 23 of 44 states currently have no cap on charters, 
while only 19 states allow multi-school charter contracts (Ziebarth & Palmer, 2018). In 
addition, last year, only four states enacted laws that promoted equitable funding for 
operations, and only eight states had regulations in place for equitable access to facilities 
and capital funding (Ziebarth & Palmer, 2018). The report also assigned a point value to 
each individual state according to a rubric based on the 21 components. In 2017, Indiana 
ranked number one with the strongest charter law, while Maryland ranked in last place 
(Ziebarth & Palmer, 2018).   
Authorizer Context 
Since the authorizer provides direct accountability to charters and CMOs, the 
authorizer’s policies as well as the number of authorizers available within a state, region, 






     CMOs in certain states found it easier to grow to scale when the state law 
allowed for multiple authorizers instead of a single authorizer. Particularly, if the 
single authorizer was not charter-friendly, CMO leaders reported having difficulty 
opening new schools. . . . On the other hand working with multiple authorizers, 
particularly when paired with a multi-district or multi-state approach can be 
challenging as well. (p. 515) 
 
Authorizers with sound policies and processes for new school application, 
approval, and opening are ideal, as are authorizing entities such as private institutions 
(i.e., local university) that do not have a competing interest throughout the authorization 
process (i.e., the local school district where schools are competing for the same financial 
and facilities resources as well as student enrollment) (Farrell et al., 2012). However, 
some charter schools and CMOs have found it valuable and even beneficial for 
replication through authorization via the local school district. In these cases, likeminded 
leaders across both entities were able to create a broader platform and universal agenda 
for education reform within a specific region, city, or jurisdiction (Farrell et al., 2012). 
This external factor is designated in the study’s conceptual framework (Version 1) as 
“Authorizer Context”. 
Market Demand  
Charters and CMOs often do careful research—“market analysis”—to gauge the 
need and desire for a school in a specific community or neighborhood (Farrell et al., 
2009, 2012). The strategy around these decisions is not solely based on increasing the 
number of schools within a charter organization by a certain date according to a strategic 
plan. Rather, many CMOs evaluate their concrete ability to make a direct impact on 
students immediately. CMO leaders reflect upon such questions as “Should we move into 





districts where there’s still plenty of need but we may serve only one to two percent of 
the population?” (Farrell et al., 2012, p. 19). The “market demand” for new, high-quality 
public education in a specific state, region, or jurisdiction often dictates a charter’s or 
CMO’s growth trajectory (Farrell et al., 2009; Frumpkin et al., 2011). In Farrell et al.’s 
(2009) interview with the leader of a large CMO, the executive simply stated: “Our CMO 
has grown in response to what the community and the parents have asked us to do. With 
this approach, we’ve ensured that students will show up the first day the school opens” 
(p. 20).  
In addition, charters and CMOs often seek to align their growth decisions with the 
critical issues in traditional public schools other than the quality of educational services, 
including the alleviation of school overcrowding. Several larger urban districts/ 
authorizers, including the Chicago Public Schools, continue to allow charters and CMOs 
to replicate in city neighborhoods where district schools are over-enrolled and class sizes 
have become too large. This external factor is designated in the study’s conceptual 
framework (Version 1) as “Market Demand”. 
Funding Opportunities and Investor Dispositions 
Depending on a charter’s or CMO’s financial model and access to varied funding 
streams, many charter schools and CMOs depend on philanthropy for a significant 
amount of their incoming revenue, some as much as 13% of their total operating costs 
(Wohlstetter et al., 2011). While finances and financial sustainability can be considered 
internal factors for a charter or CMO, there are two notable external controls around the 
money that organizations provide to support expansion and replication. First, finite 





CMOs to determine their own timelines for becoming financially self-sustainable. This 
has fueled what has become a constant search for new funders and regular changes in 
funders that characterize a charter’s or CMO’s financial operations (Frumpkin et al., 
2011; Wohlstetter et al., 2011). Second, the dispositions or preferences of specific 
funders and investors often drive how charter schools and CMOs utilize monetary 
donations. In this case, leaders adjust strategic plans and even initiatives that directly 
impact the classroom to cater to the detailed restrictions or directives—“the strings 
attached”—that come with philanthropic and sometimes even public funding/financial 
support (Frumpkin et al., 2011; Wohlstetter et al., 2011).   
Of additional critical note is the per-pupil funding amount that charters and CMOs 
receive as public education institutions. However, in most cases, local policies dictate 
that charters and CMOs will only receive a certain percentage (often less to significantly 
less) of the standard per-pupil allocation allotted traditional public schools (Farrell et al., 
2013; Frumpkin et al., 2011). Charters and CMOs are more inclined to scale successfully 
from a financial standpoint if the per-pupil allocation in a particular state, region, or 
jurisdiction is robust enough to support growth (Farrell et al., 2013).   
Despite historically heavily reliance on philanthropic funding, the federal 
government has also played a major role as a robust funding source for charter schools 
and CMOs, especially those seeking to scale. The federal Charter Schools Program (CSP) 
was established in 1994 as an amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act (ESEA) (U.S. Department of Education: Charter Schools Program Grants for 
Replications, 2017). The CSP has sought to provide significant financial support for not 





replication and expansion of high-quality charter schools (U.S. Department of Education: 
Charter Schools Program Grants for Replications, 2017). Since 2010 through 2017, CSP 
has awarded 61 grants (each award dispersed over a 5-year period) to CMOs across 18 
different states and the District of Columbia, which when all periods are fulfilled will 
total nearly $525 million dollars solely for replication and expansion (U.S. Department of 
Education: Charter Schools Program Grants for Replications, 2017).  
The CSP’s Grants for Replication and Expansion of High-Quality Charter Schools 
noted several characteristics critical for its applicants. The grant’s “absolute priorities” 
are “experience operating or managing high-quality charter schools” and service for a 
“low-income demographic” (“Application for New Awards,” 2017). The CSP also seeks 
applicants who already have an established track record of academic results with 
underserved students and families (“Application for New Awards,” 2017). Additionally, 
the application gives “invitational priority” to those charters/CMOs that are “novice” and 
“engage in rigorous internal evaluation” (“Application for New Awards,” 2017). While 
the CSP has certainly awarded a number of grants to top-performing, multi-state/region 
CMOs across the country, it also has a vested interest in those charter organizations that 
have not yet applied to pursue the funding that is available (“Application for New 
Awards,” 2017). Finally, the CSP promotes ongoing evaluation of internal practices, both 
instructional and operational/fiscal, which aligns with this dissertation study’s primary 
finding (further discussed in Chapter IV) regarding the need for CMOs to engage in an 
in-depth assessment of its proficiency in a number of internal factors that are critical for 
successful scaling (“Application for New Awards,” 2017). The CSP also operates 





to provide technical and financial assistance in the form of sub-grants to charter schools 
and CMOs, especially as it pertains to facilities acquisition or construction of new 
facilities (U.S. Department of Education: Charter School Program State Education 
Agencies, 2017).   
With the establishment of the ESSA (Every Student Succeeds Act), significant 
charter sector investments are scheduled to continue through the end of the current 
decade. In fiscal year 2015, CSP was funded at $253.2 million, and the following year, 
2016, at $333.2 million (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2016b). CSP has 
also been funded for 2017 and 2018 at $270 million and at $300 million for 2019 and 
2020 (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2016b). The ESSA has also impacted 
the CSP in programmatic ways. SEAs, which provide oversight for charter authorizers in 
their states, now have flexibility to utilize funds to support quality authorizing practices 
(U.S. Department of Education: Charter School Program State Education Agencies, 
2017b). As well, state charter boards and state governors are now eligible to apply for 
funds to support the replication and expansion of charter schools and CMOs (U.S. 
Department of Education: Charter School Program State Education Agencies, 2017b).   
According to the NAPCS (2014), other federal laws and policies have also played 
a role in spurring charter and CMO expansion. The Race to the Top and Investing in 
Innovation (i3) grant programs, as well as the All Students Achieving Through Reform 
Act, promoted (a) charter/CMO incubation of innovative educational practices, (b) 
eventual scaling if these innovative practices were proven effective, and (c) charter 
expansion by taking over failing schools, including traditional district schools (NAPCS, 





laid the foundation for updates to the CSP to streamline the program’s dissemination of 
funds for replication and expansion.  
Another major source of federal legislation, the New Markets Tax Credit Program 
(NMTC, 2017), has also served as another incentive for charter school expansion and 
replication. Established in 2000 under the Community Tax Relief Act, the NMTC 
program provides tax credit incentives to those entities or organizations, including charter 
schools and CMOs, seeking to revive communities or neighborhoods stricken with 
poverty (NMTC, 2017). According to the New Markets Tax Credit Coalition, 
approximately 4% of the financing available via the NMTC program is allotted to charter 
schools or CMOs (NMTC, 2017). Both charters/CMOs, as well as the aforementioned 
external organizations that provide charters with technical assistance, have benefited 
from the nearly 40% return on investment in those communities most in need (NMTC, 
2017). This external factor is designated in the study’s conceptual framework (Version 1) 
as “Funding Opportunities and Investor Disposition”. 
Political and Community Interests 
According to Farrell et al. (2012):  
     education has long been governed by local actors and policies. . . . CMOs 
[often] identified a wide range of local actors who were instrumental in helping 
their CMOs expand, including district superintendents, local school board 
members, mayors, county supervisors, city councilmen, and community and 
church leaders. (p. 18) 
 
Of notable positive impact are mayors and other governing administrations, especially in 
jurisdictions where mayoral control of the local traditional school district and the mayor’s 
100% support for charter schools equated to a replication-friendly environment (Farrell  





influence were also able to champion the expansion cause for a number of charters and 
CMOs seeking access to a new community or neighborhood (Farrell et al., 2012).   
However, charters and CMOs have also faced great opposition to their growth 
plans from politicians, local traditional school district officials, and community leaders 
with whom developing relationships has been difficult or the charter or CMO is 
competing for resources, including facilities and especially bodies (not just classroom 
teachers but also actual students for enrollment) (Farrell et al., 2012; Frumpkin et al., 
2011). CMOs have often had to navigate the ever-changing local context when broader 
changes, like a new mayoral administration or a new school district superintendent, 
suddenly shift general attitudes towards charters from positive to negative and vice versa 
(Frumpkin et al., 2011). This external factor is designated in the study’s conceptual 
framework (Version 1) as “Political and Community Interests”. 
Facilities 
As the number of charters and CMOs seeking to replicate expands in those areas 
where market demand is most promising, these organizations often begin competing not 
only with the traditional school district for sound facilities to house schools, but also 
begin to contend with each other for physical plants that need little repair and are 
available at a relatively low cost for rent or purchase. Charter and CMO leaders have said 
the availability of facilities in ideal locations—those fostering the organization’s capacity 
to become a true anchor in the community or neighborhood where it seeks to serve 
families and children—often dictates timelines for expansion as well as geographical 
decision making for replication (Farrell et al., 2012). Because of the aforementioned 





overhaul repairing spaces to make them into schools, facilities are one of the most 
significant obstacles to replication. Even the purchase of facilities or the construction of 
new school buildings presents its own challenges because these particular strategies 
absolutely demand that charters meet or preferably exceed their student enrollment 
projections in order to generate enough revenue to pay mortgage costs or finance other 
forms of debt service (Farrell et al., 2012). This external factor is designated in the 
study’s conceptual framework (Version 1) as “Facilities”. 
Prospective Partnerships 
Scaling Up Charter Management Organizations: Eight Key Lessons for Success 
elaborates on charter schools and CMOs building relationships—specifically those that 
will support the replication of the organization (Farrell et al., 2009). There are three key 
areas for partnership development: (a) other education organizations or institutions,  
(b) public-private relationships, and (c) connecting with other organizations who will 
make “good planning partners” (p. 44).   
According to Wohlstetter and Smith (2010), “[e]xemptions from many district 
and state regulations enable charter schools to seek partnerships more readily than 
traditional public schools can” (para. 3). Charter schools and CMOs can benefit from the 
very valuable fiscal, human, political, and organizational resources that non-traditional 
partners offer (Wohlstetter & Smith, 2010). These partners are considered non-traditional 
in that they may be private and hence have little to no experience in the public 
(education) sector; however, many community-based, for-profit, and faith-based entities 
have found that partnership with public charter schools can be mutually beneficial 





partnerships often result in a level of technical support and capacity building within the 
organization that not only helps the charter/CMO achieve results, but also enables 
organizational growth and expansion (Wohlstetter & Smith, 2010). 
Partnerships with other education organizations or institutions, especially 
universities and other institutions of higher education, provide a source of ongoing 
professional development for both instructional staff like teachers and administrative 
staff, including school leaders. In addition, these types of partnerships often create a 
direct “pipeline” for human capital, as the charter school or CMO hires teachers and 
leaders trained in the university’s education program (Farrell et al., 2009, 2012).  
A robust combination of private or public relationships—those with private sector 
companies, not-for-profit organizations, and even government organizations—can also 
drive and support charter and CMO replication (Farrell et al., 2009, 2012). These types of 
relationships often provide charters and CMOs access to a variety of donated resources 
that can be utilized directly in the classroom. They can also offer membership in a 
broader national web of CMOs that can provide support and guidance for one another, 
working jointly to promote the replication of high-quality charter schools across the 
country (Farrell et al., 2009, 2012). Some CMOs have even formally partnered with labor 
organizations to build credibility with and garner support from local and national 
teachers’ unions, who have traditionally vehemently opposed the expansion of charter 
schools (Farrell et al., 2009, 2012). Moreover, partnering with any other type of public  
or private organization also seeking to grow to scale, such as a community-based 
organization or foundation, can provide the charter or CMO access to operational 





Finally, creating connections with consulting companies that can advise the 
growing organization on overarching strategy, infrastructure, operations, and 
communications—the business components of operating a charter or CMO—can also 
foster successful replication (Farrell et al., 2009). These types of partnerships have 
ensured the sustainability of many charters and CMOs through change management 
situations and crises, as well as assisted organizations in proactively planning ways to 
avoid the common pitfalls that come with scaling school/smaller organizational models 
(Farrell et al., 2009). This external factor is designated in the study’s conceptual 
framework (Version 1) as “Prospective Partnerships”. 
Prevalent Causes for Failed Charters and CMO Replicators 
While more and more charters and CMOs seek to replicate, the sector continues to 
experience closures of single campuses and (less frequently) small networks of schools. 
The Center for Education Reform has cited that historically, the annual rate of charter 
closure has held steady at nearly 15% (2011). These closures underscore several 
prevalent causes for charters and CMOs that are seeking to replicate, especially in the 
areas of effectiveness of academic program, fiscal oversight, and board governance. 
Charters and CMOs must continue to hold themselves internally accountable in these 
areas, rather than rely on the oversight that most charter authorizers are required to 
provide by law (Center for Education Reform, 2011). It is important to note that the 
causes that follow are embedded in this study’s conceptual framework (Version 1), more 
specifically the internal components “Academic Model”, “Finance”, and “Board 





Poor Academic Performance 
Lack of student achievement and, in turn, the quality and effectiveness of the 
academic program trend as the leading causes of charter and CMO failure (Carpenter, 
2008; Center for Education Reform, 2004; Gau, 2006). The challenge of academic impact 
is even more tenuous for smaller CMOs, who must set up systems and support to ensure 
consistent results in their own networks of schools. Whether single campus or CMO, 
consistent underperformance—not meeting the expectations for student growth and 
attainment on state-mandated tests—over the course of several years causes authorizers 
to revoke the charter organization’s contracts (Carpenter, 2008; Center for Education 
Reform, 2004; Gau, 2006). Financial troubles, both mismanagement and malfeasance, 
have been another driver for charter and CMO shuttering, with 41% of closures attributed 
to this particular factor (Carpenter, 2008; Center for Education Reform, 2004; Gau, 
2006).  
Poor Fiscal Management 
Charter organizations who do not have a long-term financial plan in place or 
proper oversight structures intact begin to spiral towards closing for a number of reasons. 
These reasons include lack of leadership capable of managing finances; lack of 
infrastructure to manage basic financial business processes such as accounts payable, 
poor credit ratings, and debt management (for organizations that have sought financing to 
fund new construction for school facilities); and even serious ethical infractions (i.e., 
embezzlement, conflicts of interest regarding vendors, etc.) (Carpenter, 2008; Center for 
Education Reform, 2004). Some charters and CMOs simply cannot maintain consistent 





aforementioned inequities that exist in charter funding in most states across the country 
(Center for Education Reform, 2004). 
Poor Board Governance 
Finally, ill-governed charters and CMOs have also faced closure (Carpenter, 
2008; Center for Education Reform, 2004; Gau, 2006). Carpenter (2008) explained that 
boards with the following characteristics had an overall negative impact on the 
organization and its performance, both academically and financially:  
• dominated by founder or management company; 
• infractions against bylaws detailing duties of loyalty, obedience, and/or 
oversight; 
• lack of internal cohesion and/or role confusion; 
• excessive board member turnover; and 
• unprofessional behavior (micromanagement) towards organization’s staff.  
It is important to note that for both charters and CMOs, some have actually been able to 
replicate and open more campuses even while facing difficulties in the areas of 
performance, finance, and governance (Center for Education Reform, 2004; Gau, 2006). 
Again, while some would hold that authorizers are responsible for allowing this to occur, 
these particular cases highlight the responsibility that charters have to assess their own 








General Principles of Organizational Health and Assessment 
 The researcher believed it was necessary to include this brief overview of 
organizational health and assessment since the study’s conceptual framework (both 
Version 1 at the end of this chapter and Version 2 in Chapter 5) represent the evaluative 
process so critical to charter/CMO decision making regarding readiness for scale.  
 
Organization Basics 
Daft (2008) defined the organization as a social entity that is goal-oriented and 
structured in such a way that it achieves both its goals and purpose. The term structure 
implies specific design components or structural dimensions—the internal components of 
an organization, including:  
• Formalization: The amount of documented policy and procedure; 
• Specialization: The division of labor among teams, groups, or departments; 
• Hierarchy of authority: The amount of control management possesses;  
• Centralization: The level at which decision-making authority lies;  
• Professionalism: The credentials, experience, and track records of team 
members;   
• Personnel ratios: The number of people assigned to specific functions. (Daft, 
2008) 
Organizations measure success or effectiveness based on how well they perform 
against their goals (Daft, 2008; Keller & Price, 2011; Lencioni, 2012; Stanford, 2013). In 





CMOs fall, success is also defined by the fulfillment of the organization’s mission (Daft, 
2008; Stanford, 2013). 
Organizational Health  
The concept of organizational health falls within the broader field of 
organizational theory and design (Keller & Price, 2011; Stanford, 2013). Field experts, 
including those who study organizations rooted in the private sector, have described 
organizational health in a variety of ways. The Organizational Health Development and 
Diagnostic Corporation asserted that “[o]rganization health is an organization’s ability to 
function effectively, to cope adequately, to change appropriately, and to grow from 
within” (Stanford, 2013, p. 9). Keller and Price (2011) explained that “[h]ealth is the 
ability of an organization to align, execute, and renew itself faster than the completion so 
it can sustain exceptional performance over time” (p. 5). Lencioni (2012) shared that 
healthy organizations possess minimal politics and confusion, low levels of turnover, and 
high morale and productivity, all driven by a set of very specific behaviors that include 
establishing a unified leadership team working to ensure clarity of direction and 
expectations as well as clear communication. The unifying idea among the various 
research studies that exist is that the healthier an organization is, the better its 
performance and the more likely it is to achieve its desired outcomes (Keller & Price, 
2011; Lencioni, 2012; Stanford, 2013). 
Healthy organizations also tend to succeed not only in meeting their goals, but in 
achieving maximum efficiency in a number of areas elsewhere in the organization, 
including branding, finance, and its members’ capacity to innovate and contribute to the 





expectations (Lencioni, 2012). From an organization’s start, establishing long-term health 
should be a goal of its leaders—board members, executives, and managers alike (Keller 
& Price, 2011; Lencioni, 2012; Stanford, 2013). This laser focus on organizational health 
greatly increases the organization’s sustainability, in turn lengthening the life cycle and 
strengthening the capacity of the organization to expand (Keller & Price, 2011; Lencioni, 
2012; Stanford, 2013). In the case of charters and CMOs, this focus allows them to grow 
to scale through replication. 
The integration of an organization’s major structural components, from 
mission/vision to people (human capital) and the systems which comprise these 
components, is paramount to long-term health (Keller & Price, 2011; Stanford, 2013). 
The longer an organization remains in existence, the greater the likelihood that it will 
need to continue to change. This change often brings about the unintended consequences 
of dysfunction, confusion, and bureaucracy, leading to the breakdown of the 
aforementioned components and their corresponding systems (Daft, 2008; Keller & Price, 
2011; Stanford, 2013). 
While the components and systems that are indicators of health vary from 
organization to organization (arguably, a very specific set of components related to 
charters and CMOs, as discussed in Chapter I), an organization’s leaders must know “the 
indicators of good health and how to optimize these, [as well as] understand where poor 
health is developing and the extent of any presenting health issues” (Stanford, 2013,  
p. 23). Leaders develop this level of understanding when they are open to learning and 
adapting their practice (Keller & Price, 2011; Stanford, 2013). Stanford (2013) cited how 





particular event, especially in times of crisis. However, it is much more beneficial to be 
proactive when it comes to organizational health. In fact, “a better approach is to 
introduce a rigorous process for regularly accessing health in order to take any action to 
prevent untoward events occurring . . . regular organizational health assessment leads to 
actionable information” (p. 23).  
Organizational Assessment 
Organizational assessment is one of the most useful tools, not only for diagnosing 
health but also for charting a course for transformation, which often includes growth or 
expansion (Keller & Price, 2011; Levinson, 2002; Perkins, Nightingale, Valerdi, & 
Rifkin, 2010; Stanford, 2013). Keller and Price (2011) took the notion of organizational 
assessment one step further. They highlighted that after an organization determines where 
it wants to go (in the case of charters and CMOs, an aggressive growth goal), it must also 
check if it is actually ready to begin pursuing that path. Assessment ensures that an 
organization not only has the “skills” but also the actual “will”—the authentic desire—to 
reach its transformative destination (Keller & Price, 2011). Organizations must be both 
prudent and deliberate when contemplating growth as it relates to organizational health:  
     For most leaders, once they’ve set their performance and health goals, it’s 
tempting to move straight into action . . . this is seldom wise, and often 
counterproductive. Organizations that succeed in their change efforts take the 
extra time to assess how ready they are for change. That means working out 
whether they have the capabilities and mindsets to fulfill their performance and 
health aspirations. . . . [O]rganizations that rigorously assess their change 
readiness as part of their transformation effort are 2.4 times more likely to be 
successful than companies that skip this change. Here’s further evidence that slow 
means fast when you’re laying the groundwork for a successful transformation. 






Organizational health assessments vary widely in both method and form (Keller 
& Price, 2011; Levinson, 2002; Lowman, 2005; Perkins et al., 2010; Stanford, 2013). 
Assessments can be executed/administered in a number of ways. First, they can be solely 
through an external entity that already possesses a prefabricated diagnostic tool, like a 
consulting company. Second, they can be in partnership with an external entity, which 
creates a hybrid type of dynamic where the organization is much more involved in 
shaping the development of the diagnostic tool as well as the process for administration. 
Finally, they can be through self-assessment, which allows an organization to drive the 
entire process, often including the creation of the diagnostic tool and both the 
development and coordination of the administration process (Perkins et al., 2010; 
Stanford, 2013). 
Assessment form, or the scope of the diagnostic tool, ranges from more traditional 
formats that compartmentalize and assess specific organizational components, to less 
traditional formats whose design acknowledges the fluidity existing among the 
components of an organization as a dynamic organism (Perkins et al., 2010; Stanford, 
2013). Assessments can also be brief in their form, assessing more superficial elements, 
or they can be extremely detailed and specifically tailored to either certain individual 
organizational components or the unhealthy parts of the organization (Levinson, 2002; 
Lowman, 2005; Perkins et al., 2010). The most comprehensive form of this diagnostic 
tool calls for an inclusive health assessment that examines several major organizational 
components, including beliefs and goals, structure, and care for team members 
(Levinson, 2002; Lowman, 2005; Perkins et al., 2010; Stanford, 2013). Additionally, the 





quantitative; either way, an in-depth analysis must be performed to make interpretations 
and determine readiness for transformation/growth (Levinson, 2002; Lowman, 2005; 
Perkins et al., 2010; Stanford, 2013).  
While organizational health assessment is a positive, proactive tool, 
implementation is not without its own set of obstacles (Lowman, 2005; Perkins et al., 
2005; Stanford, 2013). Since the needs and aspirations—specifically for charters and 
CMOs, the desire and preparation for replication—differ greatly among various 
organizations, many entities, especially those with unique missions or goals, are hesitant 
to engage in the assessment process for fear that a general diagnostic tool will fail to 
measure its strengths and weaknesses adequately (Perkins et al., 2010). Additionally, 
within organizations, various members place value on different components or 
characteristics related to performance and health. This can sometimes cause conflict or 
disagreement among members (and sometimes the external partner who leads or assists 
with assessment administration) throughout the process (Lowman, 2005; Perkins et al., 
2010).  
Another added layer of complexity that the health assessment process incites is 
the conflict that can actually begin to occur between an organization’s leadership and the 
assessment tool. As Perkins et al. (2010) stated: 
     Organizational assessment may highlight different foci than the leadership 
intends, or may be tailored or executed in a way that simply reflects the 
leadership’s desired outcome. Hence an important challenge to good assessment 
is commitment at multiple levels of the organization, both to the assessment tool 
and its role in the broader transformation process. (p. 3) 
 
In many ways, organizational health assessment is analogous to a family therapy session. 





unit, including authority and hierarchy issues, as well as threat to loss of power or status, 
especially in front of other family members or, in this case, colleagues or subordinates 
(Levinson, 2002; Lowman, 2005). 
After completing the assessment, interpreting the results also raises the issue of 
whether the findings can be linked directly to any particular cause (i.e., certain events, 
specific decisions, organizational habits or practices, etc.) (Levinson, 2002; Lowman, 
2005; Perkins et al., 2010). Organizations engaging in a health assessment must examine 
results through a correlative lens rather than a causal lens. Trends or patterns of 
relationships often exist between healthy/unhealthy components in the organization and 
typical organizational behaviors. However, it is often difficult to determine the exact link 
between a weakness/strength and a precise cause (Levinson, 2002; Lowman, 2005; 
Perkins et al., 2010). 
Conceptual Framework 
This study’s conceptual framework takes the form of a logic model. Similar to a 
decision-making tree, the model is oriented toward two ultimate outcomes: the 
charter/CMO is either ready or not ready to scale. To arrive at one of these outcomes, the 
charter organization needs to conduct both an internal and an external assessment, a 
thorough investigation to determine: (a) its health or proficiency in the five major internal 
components the framework presents, and (b) the optimality of the six major external 
components the framework presents. As the review of literature suggested, there are 
various relationships among the five internal components as well as among the six 





Proficiency or maximum health in all internal components, combined with 
optimality within the external factors, indicates that the charter or CMO is prepared to 
begin the replication process. Lack of proficiency or unhealthiness in any of the five  
 





internal components, as well as non-optimality in the six external components, indicates 
that the charter or CMO is not prepared to begin the pursuit of a growth plan. Instead, it 
must take measures to become healthier in the designated component(s) and/or predict 
the timing of or attempt to influence optimality in the external factors in order to move 
forward with expansion.   
The researcher purposefully utilized a logic model to highlight the linear nature of 
deciding readiness for replication and to underscore that any ambiguity or uncertainties 
should be explored and any areas that lack proficiency and/or optimality be remedied in 
order to execute replication successfully. It is important to note that the researcher created 
a second version of the conceptual framework, which is included in Chapter V. This 
updated version was designed to represent the study’s findings, detailed in Chapter IV. 
Conclusion 
Tom Torkelson, Founder and CEO of IDEA Public Charter Schools—a network 
of schools founded as a single campus in 1998 that has grown to scale and now 
encompasses 30 campuses serving over 15,000 students across central Texas and  
the Rio Grande Valley—acknowledged the direct impact that becoming a healthy 
organization can have on students and their achievement. As he stated, “Our work around 
organizational health is literally giving kids the opportunity to go to college. We finally 
have the team, the culture, and the systems in place to work through the inevitable 
challenges we must overcome to achieve our goals” (Lencioni, 2012, Real World 
Testimonials section, para. 11). A number of research resources have further emphasized 





health in those key areas—mission and identity, board governance, finance, academic 
program, and human capital—that are most critical not only to an organization’s overall 
sustainability but also to its readiness for expansion and growth. Additionally, research 
resources have also underscored the importance of the optimal state of certain external 
factors—federal and state charter policy environment, authorizer context, market 
demand, funding opportunities and investor dispositions, political and community 
interests, facilities, and prospective partnerships—that allow charters and CMOs to be 










RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
Education leaders consistently seek to improve their practice via a wide range of 
methods, including the utilization of qualitative research (Merriam, 2009). Qualitative 
research provides a systematic approach to the collection of data so that the researcher 
can make meaning of a specific context or phenomenon that the study’s subjects are 
experiencing (Merriam, 2009). While the research in Chapter II indicated that charter 
schools and CMOs do not necessarily engage in the innovative practices to which the 
sector’s reputation lays claim, the spirit of the charter movement still aims to build an 
alternative, high-quality system of public education. To create a system requires scaling, 
and to scale effectively, charter organizations must assess their health, as well as factors 
in their external environment, to determine if they are fully prepared to grow. The 
relatively young charter sector has witnessed both success and failure when it comes to 
scale, and there is much to be learned, examined, and explored from the practitioners in 
the field who have achieved the level of scale to which many single-campus charters and 
smaller CMOs aspire. Since the design of this particular study’s product—Ready to 
Scale: A Readiness Assessment Tool for Charter Schools and Charter Management 
Organizations—was grounded in the proven practices of such accomplished practitioners 





interpretation. Once again, sector and education experts have viewed authorizers as the 
primary entities responsible for holding charters and CMOs accountable, and have seen 
external factors as the primary drivers that shape a charter organization’s trajectory. An 
organizational assessment tool specifically designed according to the needs of charters 
and CMOs—the first of its kind—calls on charter organization leaders to take ownership 
of the growth process by also carefully considering and inspecting a number of internal 
indicators whose health will promote not only successful replication, but also responsible 
replication. 
Research Questions 
This study and the development of the Ready to Scale assessment tool were 
grounded in three primary research questions:  
1. To what extent do charter school and charter management organization 
leaders value the notion of “readiness” when growing to scale?   
2. Which internal organizational components and external factors have the 
greatest impact on a charter school’s or charter management organization’s 
readiness for replication?  
3. How do we define proficiency in those internal organizational components 
and optimality in those external factors that are crucial in determining a 
charter’s/CMO’s readiness to scale?  
This chapter details the major components of this qualitative study, including (a) research 





analysis, (e) limitations and delimitations, and (f) the researcher’s ethical considerations 
for the process.   
Research Design 
This qualitative study’s design, as well as the development of Ready to Scale: A 
Readiness Assessment Tool for Charter Schools and Charter Management Organizations, 
were based on a modified version of Borg and Hall’s (1989) Educational Research and 
Development (R&D) cycle. This version of R&D requires the researcher to conduct 
preliminary field testing and operational field testing while also engaging in operational 
product revision and final product revision. The steps of this adjusted version of R&D are 
as follows:  
• Step 1: 
o Research Information Collection  
§ Literature Review 
§ Interviews 
§ Research Analysis  
• Step 2: 
o Product Planning 
o Product Design 
• Step 3: 
o Preliminary Assessment Tool Development 






• Step 4: 
o Field Testing for Validity  
o Survey to Collect Assessment Tool Feedback 
• Step 5: 
o Assessment Tool Revision  
o Defense and Dissemination  
The timeline for the researcher’s execution of these steps was January 2014 through May 
2017. 
The researcher completed a portion of Step 1 by conducting a thorough review of 
the small body of literature currently existing on charter and CMO readiness to scale. 
While the researcher explored several internal and external factors believed to be critical 
for successful charter and CMO replication in Chapter II, she also continued to note other 
important factors for consideration as common themes and ideas emerged throughout the 
process of conducting the study and writing the remaining chapters.  
Step 2 required the researcher to consider the design, structure, format, and 
administration process of other research-based organizational health assessment tools that 
exist not only in the field of education but also in other fields, including the private and 
government sectors. The researcher considered the major elements of the following 
organizational health assessment tools already in existence:  
• Good to Great Diagnostic Tool (based on Jim Collins’s 2001 publication 
Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap . . . and Others Don’t) 





Most importantly, the themes that emerged from data collected from interviews also 
informed the researcher’s determination of the major components that the product will 
assess regarding both organizational health (internal factors) and external factors.   
Step 3 required the researcher to determine whether the assessment tool would be 
solely rubric-based or if the tool would require the development of some sort of scoring 
formula to indicate level of health (i.e., poor, basic, average, excellent, etc.). 
Additionally, the researcher considered whether the tool needed to be housed through an 
application, whether an online survey application or Microsoft Excel.  It is important to 
note that, based on her findings, the researcher’s design evolved from a rubric to a 
guiding protocol in workbook format. 
Step 4 required the researcher to compose and administer a survey of the 
assessment tool’s usefulness and applicability in the context of charters and CMOs that 
are aspiring to scale. This survey was administered via an online application utilizing a 
Likert-type scale for end users to rate not only the tool’s helpfulness, but also its format 
and structure, its content (the specific internal and external factors the tool seeks to 
assess), and its process for administration. A section of this survey also allowed end users 
to provide additional comments on any of the aforementioned characteristics of the 
assessment tool. Step 4 also required the researcher to conduct an expert panel as a 
second round of validation to gather even more detailed, nuanced feedback from sector 
specialists regarding specific portions of the tool.  
Finally, Step 5 required the researcher to take into account the feedback from Step 
4’s validity survey and expert panel in order to improve the assessment tool and make 





possesses a fairly extensive network of charter practitioners and plans to share the final 
product with those charters and CMOs that are contemplating the pursuit of replication in 
the 2017-2018 school year and beyond.   
Study Participants 
As delineated in Step 1 of the process, the researcher needed to solicit and secure 
the participation of those charters and CMOs in the United States that have successfully 
grown to scale. In the context of this study, she considered three factors when 
determining “successful scaling”: (a) the number of years the charter/CMO has been in 
existence (at least 5 years); (b) the number of campuses the charter/CMO currently 
operates (at least 10 schools); and (c) the organization’s overall academic performance 
against national standards (including making AYP on state assessments). Participants 
included the following high-performing charters and CMOs; these particular 
organizations vary in community context, most being situated in urban environments. 
The researcher determined whether any high-performing charters or CMOs have 
successfully scaled in suburban or rural contexts and sought those organizations out as 
well.   
After finalizing which organizations would participate in the study, the researcher 
also determined the key team members to interview at each organization. While each 
organization likely possesses different structures, the researcher focused on interviewing 
individuals who were in executive leadership or senior management roles, such as chief 
executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief human capital 





officers who provide oversight and support to a cluster of schools in a specific geographic 
region. Additionally, if the founder or co-founders were no longer employed at the 
organization, the researcher attempted to seek out these individuals for interviews, given 
their roles in starting a charter or charter management organization. The researcher also 
attempted to engage the president or chairperson of an organization’s board of directors, 
but only with permission from or at the recommendation of the organization’s executive 
leaders. It is important to note that the researcher’s intent was to focus primarily on those 
individuals in the organization who not only had authority/decision-making jurisdiction 
over issues of growth, replication, and scale, but also provided day-to-day management 
and leadership. 
Interview Methods and Questions 
Regarding interview methods, because prospective study participants were 
dispersed across the country, the researcher conducted interviews via online video 
conferencing or telephone. Participants received all interview questions at least one week 
in advance as well as a summary of the study, including purpose, major research 
questions, and an overview of the literature on charter and CMO readiness for replication. 
With the permission of all participants, all interviews were audio-recorded and lasted 
approximately 45 to 90 minutes.  
The study’s three major research questions shaped the development of the 
following interview questions and prompts:  
• What has your role been in the growth—specifically the increase in the 





• At what point in the organization’s strategic planning did growth become a 
priority and why? 
• What role, if any, did the board of directors play in determining the 
organization’s growth trajectory?  
• How important (if at all) was the organization’s internal readiness for growth 
in your planning of the timeline for expansion?  
• If internal readiness was a factor, how did you know that the organization was 
in fact ready for replication? What internal factors/areas or evidence acted as 
indicators of readiness? How did you measure proficiency within these areas? 
• At the time that you decided to pursue a growth trajectory, what were the 
organization’s strengths?  
• At the time that you decided to pursue a growth trajectory, what were the 
organization’s weaknesses?  
• What short-term and long-term impacts did/do these strengths and weaknesses 
have on the actual execution of the growth plan?  
• What interventions, if any, were put into place to address weaknesses?  
• As an executive/senior leader of a charter organization, how do you define 
organizational health in the particular context of operating charter schools?  
• Have you ever conducted or considered conducting an organizational health 
assessment? Why or why not?  
• Has replication had any impact on your organization’s health? How so?  
• How did the state of the mission and/or the organization’s identity affect your 





• How did the state of board governance affect the organization’s capacity to 
replicate? 
• How did the state of the organization’s finances affect your capacity to 
replicate?  
• How did the state of the organization’s academic model/program affect your 
capacity to replicate?  
• How did the state of the organization’s human capital affect your capacity to 
replicate? 
• Reflecting on your organization’s growth experience to date, is there anything 
you would have done differently in regards to internal organizational 
components, systems, or structures?  
• If you could give two to three pieces of advice regarding internal readiness to 
single-campus charters or small CMOs that are contemplating replication, 
what would you share?  
• Are there any other lessons learned regarding readiness to replicate that you 
would like to share? 
Data Collection 
After the proposal was approved, the researcher obtained permission from the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Teachers College to begin conducting the study’s 
research. The researcher corresponded with prospective study participants via e-mail and 
telephone to gauge their willingness to participate. Once the final list of participants was 





methodology mentioned in the previous section. Permission was obtained to use 
participants’ or organizations’ names as needed in the research, findings, and 
implications sections of the study.   
Data Analysis 
During each interview, the researcher took detailed notes. In addition, with the 
permission of the study participants, each interview conversation was recorded. The 
interviews were then transcribed verbatim by an outside professional transcriber. Next, 
the researcher performed a detailed analysis of the data according to standard methods in 
qualitative research (Merriam, 2009) by reviewing and coding both notes and transcripts. 
She then searched for patterns and trends in the participants’ responses that signified the 
primary themes the researcher planned to highlight in the findings section of this study 
and utilize to build the organizational assessment tool. These themes also assisted the 
researcher in determining the major internal and external charter/CMO components the 
tool was meant to evaluate as related to preparedness for growth and expansion.  
Survey Instrument and Expert Panel for Product Validation 
The researcher invited a wide range of charter and CMO practitioners to 
contribute to the validation of the study’s product, Ready to Scale: A Readiness 
Assessment Tool for Charter Schools and Charter Management Organizations. She sent 
these invitations via email and included the link to the online survey in order to collect 
the validators’ specific feedback. 
The survey asked the validators to consider several questions about each section 





researcher’s findings. The researcher’s internal factors were: (a) The “Why,”  
(b) Organizational Identity, (c) Human Capital, (d) Board Governance, (e) Fiscal Health, 
(f) Infrastructure, and (g) Growth Mindset and Strategy. The researcher’s external factors 
were: (a) Need and Demand; (b) Funding; (c) Facilities; (d) Political Context, Climate, 
and Policy; (e) Parent and Community Relations; and (f) Collaboration and Competition 
Inside and Outside the Sector. As the validators reviewed each section of the assessment 
tool, they rated the section according to the prompts/statements below via a 5-point 
Likert-type scale with the following designations: [1] Strongly Disagree, [2] Disagree,  
[3] Neutral, [4] Agree, [5] Strongly Agree:  
• This section adequately covers and discusses topic.  
• This section’s guidance is relevant and helpful.  
• This section is well organized.  
• This section is clear and easy to read.  
• Based on my knowledge, the material in this section is accurate.  
• The product’s overall organization and design ensure that its users will have 
the opportunity to meaningfully reflect on each factor.  
The survey also included a section in which validators were encouraged to respond to the 
following open-ended questions:  
• Which portion of the section is most helpful?  
• Which portion of the section is least helpful? How can this portion be 
improved? 
• Please share any specific questions that were confusing or leading. 





The researcher also conducted an expert panel as a second round of product validation. 
The expert panel was comprised of individual interviews that lasted up to 60 minutes 
each. The researcher facilitated interviews utilizing the following questions:   
• Which portion(s) of the introductory section best describes the need for this 
type of tool for charter organizations that are considering growth? Why? 
• How clear or unclear are the definitions of proficiency and optimality? 
Explain. If unclear or too general, how can these definitions specifically be 
improved for the product’s users?  
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen the Guidelines for 
Implementation of Workbook Protocol section? Why? 
• After reviewing the introduction, what portion(s) can still be improved? Be 
specific.  
• To what extent is it helpful to include the list of possible growth team 
members in this section? Explain.  
• Are there any specific questions in this section that are problematic? If so, 
please designate and share how the question can be re-tailored for 
improvement. 
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen this section? Why?  
• Each internal factor in this section contains example indicators of proficiency.   
• After the user answers the set of questions for each internal factor in this 
section, do you think it is helpful for the user to conduct an analysis of the 
organization’s overall strengths and weaknesses for the designated factor? 





• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen this section? Why?  
• Each external factor in this section contains example indicators of optimality.   
• After the user answers the set of questions for each external factor in this 
section, do you think it is helpful for the user to conduct an analysis of 
opportunities and threats for the designated factor? Why or why not?  
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen this section? Why? 
• Are there any portions of this section that may cause confusion for the user? If 
so, which ones and why? What can be done to improve these portions?  
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen this section? Why? 
• Given the product’s purpose, to what extent is this section helpful? Explain.  
• Are there any portions of this section that cause confusion? If so, which ones 
and why? What can be done to improve these portions?  
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen this section? Why?  
• As a charter expert, to what extent do you believe the product will be useful to 
fellow practitioners in the field? Explain. 
• There may be other similar tools already in existence to support charters in the 
growth decision-making process. What, if any, elements make this product 
unique or more useful than other similar tools? Explain. 
• As a charter expert, what about this product appeals to you the most? Why? 
• As a charter expert, what can be changed or adjusted to make the product 
more helpful? 
• As a charter expert, would you recommend that fellow practitioners utilize 





• What specific problems might charter organizations encounter when using this 
tool? Explain. 
Limitations and Delimitations 
It is necessary to keep in mind that the research methods for this study have  
both limitations and delimitations. Regarding limitations, the researcher’s previous 
professional experiences in scaling charter organizations had the potential to create a 
certain level of bias and subjectivity, especially in determining the organizational 
components that Ready to Scale will assess. This same subjectivity may also impact the 
analysis of the data collected and, in turn, the development of the organizational 
assessment.   
This study’s delimitations were twofold. First, at present, all study participants 
were charters or CMOs existing in primarily urban environments. The researcher was not 
able to find or solicit a broad enough assortment of charters or CMOs that operated in 
rural or suburban environments. 
Also, the time needed for those individuals taking the validation survey was a 
delimitation as well. The window for the survey’s administration should be sufficient, but 
ensuring that validators had enough time to consider the questions for each section of the 
assessment tool carefully was challenging. 
Ethical Considerations 
The researcher willingly complied with all Teachers College ethical requirements 
in conducting this study and in building the final assessment tool. As previously 





IRB approval from Teachers College. She also completed the online IRB training 
requirements to further ensure an ethical approach to the study and the human subjects 
that the research encompassed.  
In addition, the researcher purposefully ensured that all individuals participated in 
this study of their own volition. Each participant provided consent via the appropriate 
forms, which also stipulated the terms of participation, including that subjects would not 
be compensated in any way for their involvement in the study.   
If at any time during the study a participant requested anonymity in relation to the 
future publication or dissemination of the study’s findings, the researcher honored this 
request. All individuals who completed the validation survey also remained anonymous; 
the researcher created the survey and utilized privacy controls in the online application to 
ensure this. All data collected, including notes and recordings, were stored in either a 
secured Cloud application or on the researcher’s PC hard drive.  
Summary 
The researcher aimed to develop Ready to Scale: A Readiness Assessment Tool 
for Charter Schools and Charter Management Organizations utilizing R&D qualitative 
research methods. She followed an ethical course of action throughout the study, 
including obtaining IRB approval from Teachers College in order to conduct research. 
The primary method for conducting research was interviews with the study participants 
who were executive leaders and senior managers at charters and CMOs who have 





The researcher carefully organized all data collected and performed an in-depth 
analysis to discover any emerging themes. The analysis and themes, along with a very 
brief of examination of already-established organizational health assessment tools from 
other sectors, provided the foundation on which the researcher then developed the Ready 
to Scale assessment. She also conducted a survey to validate this assessment tool, 
collecting detailed feedback in order to improve the product, ensure its usefulness and 












The purpose of the Ready to Scale study was to create an assessment tool that will 
enable charter and CMO leaders to determine the proficiency of critical internal factors 
and the optimality of external factors when deciding whether to begin expansion—
opening additional campuses to a flagship in order to create a network of schools. While 
the currently existing literature highlights a general group of organizational components 
and external factors that impact a charter’s/CMO’s capacity to scale successfully, the 
researcher conducted a qualitative study to collect the specific insights of 12 current or 
former executive-level leaders from successful CMOs across 10 different states regarding 
the study’s primary research questions:  
1. To what extent do charter school and charter management organization 
leaders value the notion of “readiness” when growing to scale?   
2. Which internal organizational components and external factors have the 
greatest impact on a charter school’s or charter management organization’s 
readiness for replication?  
3. How do we define proficiency in those internal organizational components 
and optimality in those external factors that are crucial in determining a 





Many of these leaders were often the founders of their CMOs; some were actually 
the original principals of flagship campuses anywhere from 5 to 19 years ago. Table 1 
provides more information about these leaders as well as their respective organizations, 
including years of operation, the current number of schools in their CMOs, and the 
current number of students their CMOs serve.  
Table 1 
 







Years of CMO 
Operation 
Current Number 
of Schools in 
Network 
Current Number 
of Students Served 
1 CEO 17 18 11,000 
2 CEO 15 10   4,200 
3 CEO 19 14   8,900 
4 CEO 18 16 11,600 
5 Co-CEO 18 32 10,000 
6 Chief of Staff 19 15   8,000 
7 CEO 16   6   1,700 
8 CEO 19 40 16,000 
9 Chief of Schools 15   4      600 
10 Executive 
Director 
  5   2      800 
11 CEO 16 51 30,000 




The researcher conducted 12 interviews with the aforementioned leaders either 
via videoconference or telephone. After the interviews were transcribed, the researcher 
performed a detailed analysis of the data according to standard methods in qualitative 
research (Merriam, 2009). This method included reviewing and coding both notes and 





corresponding data, searching for patterns and trends in participant responses in order to 
determine the primary themes that are highlighted throughout this chapter.  
Are We Ready? 
When the researcher inquired about level of readiness for CMO growth during the 
opening of each interview, leaders agreed that preparing was incredibly important, but 
responses were mixed regarding the actual process of preparing. While some leaders of 
CMOs pursued growth aggressively with a “figure it out as we go along” approach, 
others shared that they intentionally waited for 5 or more years to ensure they were 
“getting it right” at their flagship campuses before considering scaling. One founding-
principal-turned-CEO mentioned that she did not want any other CMOs to make the 
“massive mistakes” she had committed while increasing the number of schools in her 
network, which was precisely why she agreed to participate in the Ready to Scale study. 
Some of these missteps led to schools in her network where student achievement results 
were not as strong as they should have been in their first several years of operation. 
Other leaders expressed how expansion work was still new in their particular 
jurisdictions a decade or more ago, and so in some ways, it was almost impossible to 
actually prepare at a level that would have made the process much more efficient. One 
leader shared, “[I]t was the wild west, nobody had figured out the rules. . . . [W]e didn’t 
know what we were doing at all, and we were lucky that nobody else did either. And so 
we just figured it all out.” Another leader stated, “[T]here were times that we opened up a 
school kind of by the seat of our pants. I mean, we opened up eight [schools] in five 





could say that it was like a restaurant where the kitchen is chaos, yet all the plates are 
getting out.”  
Another CEO’s reflection indicated that he might not have chosen to grow his 
CMO given the numerous obstacles he has faced over the last 15 years, including a 
critical new school construction project running several months behind with the first day 
of school only a few weeks away: “Well, in hindsight, I was completely naïve (laughs) of 
the challenge, and if we had known how hard it was going to be, we probably wouldn’t 
have done it all.”  
As leaders shared their various expansion experiences, which are further 
discussed in the sections that follow, it became evident that these individuals had made 
conscious efforts to contemplate the decision to grow carefully. They had also taken 
stock of the limited margin for major mistakes, given the educational needs of their 
students. One leader shared, “We wouldn’t have wanted to expand before we were ready 
. . . in fact, we didn’t expand until our sixth year because there were so many elements to 
ensure we had in place to do right by kids.” Another leader in the same city declared: 
“[Y]ou only have one, in my opinion, shot at this. You must get out of the gate strong. 
Otherwise, if you have a hiccup along the way and you’re really small, it’s hard to 
recover.” This final statement highlights the urgency around preparing for scale. 
Critical Factors for Growth Planning and Execution 
The researcher asked leaders to offer and justify factors, both internal and 
external, that mattered most as they created and executed growth plans for their 
respective organizations. Throughout the interviews, leaders candidly shared a variety of 





strategies as well as failed practices pertaining to each of the factors below. The 
researcher also asked leaders to define proficiency and optimality as they discussed their 
factors throughout their respective interviews.  
Internal factor 1: The “why.” The common and critical theme of intent was 
prevalent among the interviews. Leaders certainly highlighted overflowing waitlists and 
lack of seats to offer families during annual lotteries, which is categorized as an external 
factor (Demand and Need) later in this chapter. However, all 12 leaders emphasized how 
transforming the quality of public education in their city, their state, or their geographic 
region of the country was “the why” for deciding to grow their organizations:   
     I think the decisions have to be very deliberate. They can’t be accidental. They 
can’t be because someone else wanted you to do it. And they can’t be because 
someone’s paying you to do it. It has to be in the core of you and your people at 
your school, wanting to replicate for the right reasons. Money is not the reason, 
power is not the reason, politics is not the reason. National exposure, notoriety, 
fame are not the reason. The reason is you are going to go in and challenge the 
status quo in order to serve more underserved kids better.  
 
Common values across the school or CMO supported its teams in further 
clarifying “the why” for growth. CEOs stressed how they truly valued educational choice 
for families in their respective cities, states, and regions. One leader asserted that he 
found it hard to remain a single-campus operator while so many students suffered 
through what he deemed a “sucky public education.” Other leaders expressed a deep 
organizational value for creating competition within the current system of public schools, 
encouraging other schools to raise academic expectations and outcomes for students. 
While “the why” applied across an entire organization, the connection between 
expansion and a leader or group of leaders’ ties to a specific city, state, or region was 





geographic areas in which they had familial roots, taught in the classroom, or 
encountered other formative experiences. One co-founder shared that she and her 
colleagues, who have been working together for almost two decades, shared a collective 
desire to effect change in a specific area of the New England region where they started 
their very first school: 
     I live here in [this city]. We started here [in this state]. Emotional is not the 
right word, but it’s close enough to describe our regional commitment to this 
place. And that has driven a strategic decision that we think we can have more 
impact by going deep in our communities and being real community partners and 
institutions instead of spreading ourselves out. So I think we are a particular, 
major force in [our state] as it relates to education reform and advocacy and that’s 
because we’re in the big three cities where we serve almost half of the charter 
school kids in the state. . . . I mean, kids now—families have multiple choices of 
high-quality schools and more and more kids are going to schools with a track 
record of closing the achievement gap. I mean that—just our hope over time is, if 
you believe as we do in the power of education to be transformative, that over 
time that we’ll be transformative not just for the individual kid but for the whole 
communities of [these cities]. 
 
The notion of intent is not only “the why,” but is also directly connected to the 
scale of impact a charter organization aspires to have from its very inception. While most 
of the leaders included in this study opened one school first and then eventually 
considered and pursued expansion, one founding CEO stated how his organization was 
built to grow from “the get-go”:  
     So when we built the organization, we didn’t build an organization where we 
built one school and then tried to figure out how to do two schools. We built our 
original business plan to grow a hundred schools. That was the idea. So our 
conversation in the very early days was do we do one school in a hundred 
different cities [across our state] or do we do ten schools in ten different regions 
of [our state]. So we knew from day one that the only way to make an impact in a 







“The why,” especially the values that drive an organization’s intentions to grow and open 
more schools, is closely related to the next internal factor, which many leaders described 
as “who we are.”  
Internal factor 2: Organizational identity. Beyond “the why,” leaders were 
emphatic regarding a CMO’s organizational identity and offered several key elements to 
consider when ensuring that the organization has firmly established “who” it is. These 
elements include, once again, common values as well as the organization’s brand, 
organizational culture, school design/academic model, academic quality, and a common 
understanding of which areas the CMO is willing to be flexible in (if at all), should any 
type of change to its model be necessary (which all 12 leaders cited would definitely 
occur during the scaling process).   
Mission, vision, and values. As one leader put it, “Know who you are, period.” 
Lack of a clear understanding about the organization’s mission, vision, values, norms, 
and even organizational culture often led leaders to experience intense internal conflict, 
especially among executive management and middle-management team members. One 
CEO regretted not calibrating with her team more before starting the scaling process: “I 
wish we had done more thinking together as a team about what’s important to us. I think 
it would have saved us some really painful staff transitions.” According to leaders, rifts 
over organizational identity among staff and “mission creep” would have been avoidable 
if teams intentionally set aside time to ensure a common understanding of values and had 
continued to facilitate these discussions on a cyclical basis as their respective 
organizations encountered growth challenges. One leader shared that she hosted “mission 





members to share problems with implementing the CMO’s mission and model. In this 
way, she was able to keep the dialogue and calibration going.  
Brand. In addition to mission, leaders emphasized the importance of the 
organization’s brand. Leaders learned that throughout the expansion process, they needed 
to work to ensure that the entire organization understood and could articulate the CMO 
“elevator speech.” Some CMOs developed and ingrained into its employees (and 
students) slogans or mantras that were representative of their mission and values, such as 
“College for Certain” or “Academic success is not a hope; it is an expectation.” Other 
CMOs constantly reiterated to internal stakeholders (and held them accountable to) those 
pillars or anchor characteristics that were fundamental to their identity, such as small 
schools or a highly structured but warm school culture.  
As one leader, who has been with her CMO for over 10 years, stated, the school 
or schools need to have their brand absolutely solid from an internal standpoint. This 
allows the organization to offer itself as a true quality choice from among all the options 
families have for their children’s education. She went on to assert that the more work 
leaders do on the brand internally—ensuring that everyone in the CMO understands “how 
your organization does school” and then actually executes it that way—the stronger it 
should become as the network expands and adds more campuses. Families will seek and 
expect a specific brand of school experience for their children, regardless of individual 
campus.  
Organizational culture. Another common sub-theme of identity that several 
leaders highlighted was organizational culture. Defined in the interviews as the “people 





organizational culture should be established and “indoctrinated” into everyone on the 
team, regardless of their roles. One founding CEO underscored the importance of 
building and fervently maintaining a culture that was student-focused and, in turn, drove 
excellence in people and in schools:    
     We had a pretty clear picture of how important culture was, and that in our 
minds, culture was essentially everything. If you don’t get culture right and you 
don’t get it right early and you don’t protect it jealously throughout the growth of 
your organization, you wind up with all kinds of challenges that you could avoid. 
So we were very clear about this, and I’ll tell you how clear we were. I mean, I 
gave up a four-year rollover contract as a superintendent and we all became at-
will. This was all about the kids we wanted to serve, and I’ll give you some 
examples of that. We were very clear from day one that we were a team, not a 
family, and we made a very clear distinction between the two, and that in a 
family, you will always be loved and there’ll always be a place for you. At [our 
CMO], we’ll always love you but there might not be a place for you (laughs). You 
are relentless in the interest of the kids and in the interest of others, and we built a 
culture that said everyone worked to make sure that every single person in our 
organization was a stunning colleague.  
 
Across their respective organizations, leaders made similar efforts to build organizational 
cultures where trust, respect, and open communication characterized interactions between 
employees. Additionally, the ideas of teamwork and collective problem solving also 
drove the development of positive collaboration among adults.   
Leaders shared that every action on their part was a strategic way to “drive home” 
other critical elements of their organization’s culture. Competitions among teachers for 
the best student-centered alternative assessment drove innovation and creativity. Teacher-
leaders executing professional development for peers at other campuses in the network 
established a community of learners. Creating smaller networks of schools within the 
broader CMO encouraged knowledge sharing among school leaders and prevented 
schools from “reinventing the wheel.” Inviting staff to give input on critical, high-level 





A few CEOs underscored that even language, the way employees spoke to one 
another, was crucial to developing and promoting the organization’s culture. One leader 
referred to “plusing,” which was a method his team used to engage with one another: 
“[I]f you and I were in a conversation and you spoke and I was going to follow your 
thought, I started by complimenting what you said and then built off of it, so that we 
showed each other that we listened and that we cared, which was important to our 
culture.” 
In terms of scale, leaders also connected organizational culture to human capital 
(another internal factor that will be discussed in the next section). One leader stated:  
     Culture is truly the identity of who you are, and I think that organizational 
culture has to be strong because that’s going to drive who the people are that are 
going to come in and work for your organization and be part of that expansion. If 
there’s not a defined culture, then how can you evaluate someone for the right fit? 
I don’t think you’re going to get the right people in place to help you with the 
expansion, the kind of people you really need.  
 
Leaders charged themselves and their executive teams, as well as middle managers, like 
principals, as “curators of organizational culture,” especially during scaling when new 
talent would inevitably need to be brought into the CMO to staff additional campuses or 
support them centrally. According to one founding CEO, the executives on his team who 
supported expansion were those team members who “bled purple, who bled our 
organizational culture.”  
Academic model and quality. Another organizational identity element that was 
common across interviews was academic model and quality. As one leader put it, “What 
are you trying to replicate and is it good enough to actually replicate?” Academic models 
across each leader’s CMO incorporated not just curriculum and pedagogical components, 





noted that they made every effort over the expansion period to keep them in place: 
college preparatory curriculum, project-based modules, inquiry learning, highly-
structured school culture, socio-emotional learning integrated into daily classroom 
instruction, extended day and year, and so on. Some leaders shared they learned the hard 
way that their original academic models were not easily scalable due to their complexity 
or to the needs of various groups of students as more campuses were added to the 
network of schools. One West Coast CEO highlighted this:  
     We built our model on a sort of very constructivist project-based learning, 
multi-age structure . . . which is very difficult to do. We built it on a set of 
interdisciplinary units that we developed. We did a rite of passage experience at 
various stages in students’ lives. And a twelfth grade Capstone project with an 
early college model. Today, all of our high schools still have early college, but we 
have had to make some other shifts elsewhere as we moved to opening three to 
five schools at a time, as we were growing. And let me tell you some of the shifts 
we made were painful, but they were what we had to do. 
 
He went on to note, as did several other leaders, that he was able to keep early college 
and other foundational elements of his academic model in place over the course of 16 
years, with front-loaded intensive training for school leaders and teachers; heavy 
coaching through frequent school walkthroughs with clear “look-fors”; detailed 
handbooks that described the design of the model and provided technical guidance for 
school-based teams regarding implementation; and finally, some “tinkering.” 
Tinkering was best defined across the leaders’ interviews as continuing to 
improve the implementation and effectiveness of their respective academic models. 
Leaders and their teams worked to address gaps in curriculum quality and add elements 
to their academic model to serve new populations, such as English Language Learners, 






The quality of academic models was the primary driver for the tinkering, 
adjustments, and shifts. Results seemed to trump actual design in this case. One Midwest 
region CEO supported this with his statement: “It does not necessarily matter what the 
model is, but what matters is that you have it defined, that its scalable, and most 
importantly, that it works.” Leaders cautioned that academic quality was not just about 
their CMO’s current results and student achievement averages. Rather, quality was 
defined by excellent results over a prolonged period of time. Another Midwest region 
CEO shared:  
     Academic quality can be measured in a lot of different ways, but I think that 
there needs to be a proven track record of producing results that you have 
promised within the mission of your school. I think it’s debatable on how long 
you need to have proven those results. I would say one year is not enough. You 
have to be able to show over time that you have quality instruction based on 
outcomes.  
 
A CMO leader who grew a network of high schools added to this idea of results 
over time, quantifying student achievement over a 4-year stretch:  
     We needed four years to see the results. If we had expanded in our second 
year, we never even would have graduates from our system in this state. We had 
to make sure our students were successful, so we looked at our results at the 
beginning of the fifth year actually. . . . Our first class had graduated and gone off 
to college and we felt confident about these results.   
 
Beyond academic quality over time, leaders stressed the need for CMOs to define 
academic quality, not just by averages of test scores across a group of schools, but by the 
individual results produced at each campus, as well as how students fare in the long term 
beyond high school graduation. One Mid-Atlantic CEO stated: 
     To be completely candid . . . it’s not just test scores. You know, we’ve been at 
this long enough that it’s about the long-term success of our kids primarily in 
college, but also in life, and that is it. And I think in the context of our network of 





all the schools. And so even if you have an average that’s high but a third of your 
schools are really not great for kids, that’s a tremendous failure.   
 
Leaders concluded that academic quality was directly connected to the effectiveness of 
their academic models and the fidelity with which school-based teams implemented 
them. This notion of fidelity was another common theme among interviews, which 
revealed that leaders differed in their thinking and experiences regarding replication.   
Replication: Starbucks or McDonalds? While all leaders acknowledged 
adjustments in their academic models over time in response to student achievement data 
and student needs, a sub-group of leaders insisted that the time for model changes in their 
CMO’s existence had passed. These leaders believed that, at this point in their growth 
trajectory, time and effort should be spent on effective implementation of their model’s 
non-negotiables. One Southwest region CEO asserted:  
     We’re not just opening a new school. We’re replicating an existing model and 
we have a very tight model that we are trying to replicate exactly. . . . We’re very 
clear with people that we have a highly specific program model, the course 
sequence is very specific, the syllabus is really specific, the assessment, the data 
gathering tools . . . that’s just part of how we do things at [our CMO]. . . . I’ve 
seen other organizations where every school was kind of the same and all teachers 
kind of did their own thing and everything was kind of like a reinvention of the 
wheel, and to me, that didn’t make any sense. Like I don’t know why you’d 
bother growing if you’re not replicating your actual program model. . . . I think 
that’s like a fool’s errand, right? . . . Starbucks is Starbucks, no matter what city 
you’re in . . . the product, like our results, is the same. 
 
Another sub-group of leaders stressed the importance of autonomy for school 
leaders and their teams. After creating a framework of “must haves,” these leaders 
allowed flexibility and creativity because they believed this would enable school teams to 
adapt to the detailed needs of the communities in which their schools were located. As 





innovate their own ways to best engage and teach the students in those communities and, 
in turn, produce outstanding outcomes.   
Another leader, who has worked at the executive management level in two 
different CMOs that both implemented growth plans during her tenure, shared an analogy 
to highlight the decision facing leaders when expanding the number of schools in their 
networks:  
     There are two kinds of philosophies. When you want to replicate what you do, 
think of a Starbucks. We have a recipe, it’s award-winning. You go to any part of 
this world . . . and order a pumpkin spice latte, and it tastes exactly the same! 
Because Starbucks transports everything to ensure the same exact ingredients are 
used. Nothing changes. Everything is tempered and you apply the exact same 
process. You’re going to get the exact same product. The other philosophy is 
you’re going to be more like a McDonald’s. We have some standard things on the 
menu, but you’re going to use local grown ingredients and you’re going to have 
some specialty items on the menu. At Starbucks, you get the same product and it 
tastes good. At McDonalds, you get a little bit of a different product, but it tastes 
just as good. . . . Are you going to be a Starbucks who’s going to replicate 
everything exactly cookie-cutter? Or are you going to allow for a McDonald’s and 
allow some components to be flexible and cater to the environment that your new 
school is in? . . . Both types of systems can be successful at the end of the day if 
there’s a tight accountability system in place for the students, teachers, school 
leaders, and central office. 
 
This leader’s analogy and the notion that both products “taste good” were supported by 
the fact that two of the CMOs who participated in this study—one a “Starbucks” and the 
other a “McDonald’s”—have both won the prestigious Broad Prize for Public Charter 
Schools, which recognizes CMOs for best practices that promote student success.  
Regardless of replication philosophy, another founding CEO claimed that growth 
and expansion would inevitably change a CMO as it shifts from a “one-school identity” 
to a “replication identity”:  
     We’re settling into our replication identity, as I like to call it. Like identity as a 
network, which is very, very different than one school . . . so when you start one 





school into many. Back in 2006 when we opened [our first campus], I just wanted 
to make a good school for kids that nobody had bothered to pay attention to 
before in this way, and I wanted to create, you know, I was really mission-driven, 
which I think a lot of founders are. Like I wanted to create a college prep model 
for an alternative high school . . . and I wanted to get them into community 
college and kind of show the world that it’s possible to serve alternative kids in a 
different way. And we only cared about that, and I kept my head down. And then, 
I think what happened, that happens a lot, is we were successful with these kids. 
And then you’re really at a critical point when you’re successful with your 
mission at first. You can either continue to try to do it and try to get your 
numbers, results, profits, whatever you do, better. You can expand it and sort of 
footprint it out there and try to do it exactly the way that, you know, you’ve done 
it in the first place to serve more people. In our case, we wanted to serve more 
off-track youth. Or you can leverage what you’ve created to try to start asking 
interesting questions and try to do different things. We have now moved beyond 
the one-school identity into a “Hey, wait a second, we’re actually an organization 
that cares about producing the best results for off-track youth, and we want to 
start schools in different areas that need a school for off-track youth, that need 
kind of a model for thinking about these young people differently.” This 
replication identity, mission, compels us, to think outside of the charter box.  
 
Several leaders affirmed this shift in identity. This change did not necessarily occur with 
regard to specific components of their CMO model, but rather, as one leader stated, it was 
“a change in how you view the world and the system your schools are in.” From this 
particular theme, leaders delved into growth mindset and organizational evolution during 
the scaling process, which the researcher highlights later in this chapter as a separate 
internal factor. 
Internal factor 3: Human capital. Human capital was one of the most dominant 
and robust overarching themes across interviews. CMO expansion is absolutely 
impossible without the type of talent that is needed to drive and sustain it at every level of 
the organization, from executive leadership, to teachers, to employees in support roles 
such as operations. One leader summed up the interviewees’ attitude towards future and 
current employees: “It’s all about talent. We are obsessed with talent.” Leaders shared a 





significantly in (a) recruitment and selection as well as (b) retention and development. 
Additionally, leaders were particularly concerned with two types of key people who 
directly contribute to a CMO’s scaling process: (c) principals and (d) executive leaders, 
especially CEOs.  
Recruitment and selection. Leaders cited that when expanding, the candidate 
pool for school leaders and teachers was a critical factor in determining whether or not 
their CMO could successfully open a new campus. Some leaders shared that limited 
talent pools actually delayed the opening of a campus in their respective networks, 
underscoring, as one Southwest region CEO stated, “the supposition that your success is 
based on the quality of your people, and that the quality of your people is not just a stroke 
of luck or having the good fortune of just hiring the right people.” In turn, the majority of 
CMOs invested significant financial and human resources into building external pipelines 
with local and national education schools and alternative certification programs to get the 
highest-quality adults into their buildings. In addition, leaders mentioned how their 
recruitment teams used the “prestige” of their CMO brands, their track records of results, 
competitive compensation and benefits packages, an emphasis on upward mobility, and 
even referrals from current employees to attract and acquire external top talent. 
A sub-group of leaders cautioned against using external talent pools for key 
positions (founding school leaders, executive leaders) during the scaling process due to 
the lack of new employees’ understanding of mission, brand, identity, organizational 
culture, and academic model. But others offered that external pools and pipelines were 
beneficial as long as CMOs utilized them strategically. For example, one leader shared 





more sense for him to hire a founding, experienced principal with “deep roots and 
community connections” in that particular jurisdiction rather than bring in an “outsider” 
from the CMO’s home state.  
This notion of experience in a CMO’s talent pool also highlighted leaders’ 
thinking around the number of years a candidate has in a classroom teacher role or 
leadership role, as well as whether or not the candidate has taught in a charter school 
setting or a traditional district setting. While some leaders valued years of experience, 
others were more concerned with work ethic and capacity for being open to and adopting 
the CMO’s mission:  
     If you’re hiring, as we are right now, young green but eminently trainable, 
work their ass off, like twenty- to thirty-year-olds including school leaders, they 
don’t know what they’re doing, but they’ll do it, you know? . . . But if you want 
to hire seasoned leaders, one of the problems is can you get them in line with your 
mission if it’s controversial, which ours is? It’s easier to get the younger crowd on 
board.  
 
Beyond work ethic and “coachableness,” leaders delineated key characteristics 
and attributes of the ideal candidate such as grit, flexibility, and integrity, as well as 
qualifications such as certification and college or advanced degrees. Most importantly, 
leaders had worked with their human capital teams to ensure that their selection process 
screened for these attributes and qualifications, and for candidates who would be the 
“best fit” for their organizations. A few leaders mentioned the implementation of more 
unconventional strategies to attract and hire new employees. One leader shared how his 
CMO allowed candidates to apply in pairs, assuming that one talented candidate would 
beget a peer who was equally capable. Another leader described how important it was for 





the candidate come to campus to teach a sample lesson, school leaders would travel to the 
candidate’s current school and classroom to evaluate teaching ability and fit.   
Retention and development. Leaders expressed that once talented people were 
hired into the organization, another set of resources and strategies were employed to 
retain and build the capacity of these team members. One leader said that executive peers 
at other CMOs were in disbelief at the number of financial resources he invested in 
building a team dedicated to the development of school leaders and teachers through 
large amounts of targeted coaching, feedback, and consistent evaluation. He believed, 
however, that the return on investment was worth it, especially to help team members get 
better at their jobs more quickly and move out those employees who were not effective:  
     It’s a really significant investment in terms of people and, you know, man 
hours, and financial resources. . . . [We’ve been] intentionally building and 
training and supporting and coaching, and having a really specific way of 
evaluating people to identify the best . . . but also to identify the least effective 
people and bombard them with high-quality coaching . . . and if they’re not 
improving with the coaching, we’re cutting them loose because . . . we just can’t 
waste our time on people who are not going to improve. But [we] have lots of 
evidence of people improving quite rapidly and they always get to stay with [our 
schools]. . . . Our focus on people is not about firing, it’s about wanting our 
people to become more effective with lots of coaching and support.  
 
Other leaders emphasized the amount of time and energy invested in intensive 
professional development that is tailored specifically to the implementation of their 
academic models and curriculum. Teachers and school leaders in these CMOs responded 
positively to moving beyond general pedagogy and working with training teams to 
become content and inquiry experts.   
Several leaders connected employee retention to organizational culture. Through 
the use of surveys and brown-bag lunch sessions, leaders learned what principals, 





elements were incorporated into the overall “people culture” of the organization. Some of 
these common elements among the interviews included an environment characterized by 
respect in which teachers could truly be instructional leaders in their classrooms, in 
addition to an open, productive working relationship with an employee’s direct 
supervisor at every level of the organization.   
Beyond ensuring that staff turnover in schools remained minimal for students and 
families, talent retention and development were especially important to leaders growing 
their CMOs to scale. Leaders emphasized the crucial need to develop an internal pipeline 
of future school leaders and teacher-leaders who would comprise the founding teams at 
new campuses and the CMO staff who would support those new campuses. The majority 
of leaders explained how their internal pipeline programming operated. The process 
included the selection of the highest performers (usually according to individual student 
achievement results) and then inviting them to apply to selected tracks. One track was for 
aspiring school leaders, while another track was for a group of leaders who wanted to 
lead as dean or curriculum director. Accomplishment of these tracks included 
participants’ successful completion of some type of “scope and sequence” over the course 
of 2 to 3 years before CMO leadership evaluated their level of readiness for a new school 
or other leadership role.   
Leaders also highlighted that internal pipeline programs underscored the extent to 
which their organizations valued talent development and talent sharing. One CEO 
explained:  
     We are an organization that really hones in on talent. So . . . if you want to be 
promoted as principal . . . one of the biggest requirements [of the school leader] is 
that you are an exporter of talent. [As a school leader], you should be growing 





and reward and encourage just that sort of attitude. . . . You don’t create [this type 
of] positive culture so that people want to hide their good people because they 
don’t want you to take them away to launch new schools. . . . So we’ve really 
worked to get people bought in to this idea that it’s a success if your school 
produces new assistant principals or future principals every year. 
 
Even in creating such complex, robust systems for internal talent development, leaders 
worried that such programming was not enough to meet the rate at which their CMOs 
were growing to scale. In turn, leaders expressed the need to continue expanding the 
internal talent pool by inviting in external providers, thereby adding more capacity to 
internal pipeline development, especially for future founding school leaders. 
Key people: Principals. Of the numerous people it takes to plan and implement a 
CMO’s expansion, interviewees resoundingly expressed that the school leader was 
paramount to the opening of a new school in their networks. One East Coast region co-
CEO, who was the founding principal of her CMO’s flagship campus, underscored the 
power of the principal:  
     As hard as we worked on [our CMO’s] core program and curriculum, as well 
as specific strategies we use at schools, the truth is that a great principal still 
makes or breaks whether a school is going to be successful. . . . [It is] important 
that we have a principal that we have a high level of confidence in and who has 
completed our two-year principal-in-residence program. . . . There’s been times  
. . . that we have not opened new schools we otherwise intended to open because 
we felt we didn’t have a principal who was ready.  
 
Other leaders shared a common urgency around principal preparation and creating a 
strong pool for future campuses, with several noting that they currently had 15 or more 
principals-in-residence. Leaders partnered with graduate programs, bringing them in to 
offer principals-in-residence master’s degrees in education leadership. One CEO 
expressed how principals always take precedence even in the face of financial limitations: 





fund is a principal pipeline.” Another leader, who was also the former founding principal 
of his CMO’s flagship campus, detailed how much of his own time he dedicated to 
principal recruitment and retention while leading a network of 18 schools. He evaluated 
their capacity for entrepreneurial leadership, called their references himself, and even 
shadowed them for a whole day during the interview process.   
This same leader said he believed principal retention was also critical to ensuring 
the long-term success of new campuses. In his case, he used autonomy as one of his 
primary principal retention strategies. Another CMO leader shared that one of the key 
components to executing her scaling plans so quickly was a 90-plus percent principal 
retention rate: “That is a huge part of how come we’ve been able to get bigger and better 
at the same time. I think without that, we would have had to stop growth altogether.” 
Leaders worked hard to support founding principals so that these individuals would stay 
in their roles for at least 5 years, stabilizing their schools, ensuring a positive record of 
academic results, and anticipatorily training and readying an internal successor. Those 
leaders whose CMOs have been in existence for over 10 years acknowledged that they 
were now grappling with how to promote founding principals systematically into senior-
level management roles, while also ensuring the smooth transition of the successor at 
their respective campuses. These leaders have had to begin yet another cycle of talent 
development to prepare their most effective principals for senior or executive leadership 
within their CMO. Fortunately, with their CMOs’ continued pursuit of fairly aggressive 
expansion goals, current leaders discovered that their best founding principals were prime 





Key people: CEO and executive leadership team. Several of the leaders who 
participated in this study were the founders of their current organizations, either as 
principals, executive directors, or CEOs. When pursuing expansion, these leaders shared 
how their role, as well as the role of their currently existing executive team or the one 
they had built, were also critical to scaling successfully. Leaders actually assessed their 
own readiness for this work with their boards of directors. One founder provided more 
insight into this process as well as into the characteristics she believed are necessary to 
make the leap from founder to CEO: 
     [The founder] has to continue to be excited about the work . . . my job has 
dramatically, like seismically changed over the past eleven years. Now, today, 
I’ve got to deliver fifty thousand dollars’ worth of investment towards this 
[fundraising] match we’re driving towards. I didn’t have that pressure on me 
before. . . . We had a conversation at the board level about whether you could go 
from me, an executive director, on-the-ground founder, to being a CEO who 
could grow the organization. . . . [U]ltimately, we decided that we were going to 
let me try and I was successful. . . . But if you don’t have a leader that is 
interested in growth, is a little arrogant, very tenacious, and is able to take a few 
blows, you’re not going to grow (laughs). . . . It’s awful and you have to raise a 
lot of money and sometimes chameleon yourself into a lot of different sorts of 
characters to get people on board to do the work of growth.  
 
Other leaders who were founding principals and executive directors-turned-CEOs 
highlighted that the “heavy lift of scaling” could not have been done without bringing 
aboard other key members of their senior leadership teams. One leader explained how 
founder thinking is often characterized by this notion of “I can just keep pulling this off, 
me and my band of believers,” which can only bring the organization to a certain point. 
Scale requires sophisticated thinking and individuals in roles like the chief operating 
officer, chief financial officer, and chief strategy officer to “complement founder 





invests time and effort in his working relationships with them in order to ensure his CMO 
not only grows but also improves its operations and outcomes:  
     I’m only as good and I’m only as effective as my senior leadership team, so I 
spend a lot of time with my direct reports, and I got a lot of people reporting to 
me . . . like ten . . . and other people are like “Oh, that’s too many people,” but the 
way I manage them and . . . create an environment where everybody on the senior 
team works exceptionally well together. . . . This trickles out to how they lead 
their teams, too, making us better overall. 
 
Ever anticipatory, although they did not indicate that they were leaving their CMOs 
anytime soon, the CEOs who participated in interviews also highlighted the importance 
of training their own successors and creating a good “bench” of talent among middle-
managers, like highly effective principals, to move into senior and executive positions 
when the time came. 
Internal factor 4: Governance. Depending on a CMO’s board composition, this 
group can provide what one leader termed the “money, power, and permission” necessary 
to grow an organization, especially at the ambitious rate that so many leaders who 
participated in this study already have. Leaders reiterated that the types of individuals on 
their boards and their dispositions, as well as the manner in which their boards provided 
oversight, accountability, and support, had a direct impact on their expansion.  
Board composition and attributes. One founding leader explained that he built 
his board to be full of “stars”—successful individuals who were “a remarkable group of 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and educators” to ensure that as he grew the CMO, the 
organization would remain “smart.” Other leaders echoed similar efforts, working to 
recruit professionals from a variety of sectors who were “area experts” who could advise 





example, one leader shared how his board brought on a particular type of expert when his 
CMO was planning to open schools in a new geographical region:  
     One of our board members said to me, “A plane is not a car. You are going to 
have to begin flying back and forth. This is multi-regional retail, and we don’t 
have anyone on our board who understands it. So let’s find someone who is 
experienced at multi-regional retail who can show us how to get to this new 
region.” So I went out and found a guy who grew a donut company from four to 
forty. He came on our board and he basically taught us how to do multiple 
regions. He listed fifteen things we should do. We did thirteen of them and they 
all worked perfectly and our first expansion into a new region was a success 
because of it. 
 
Another leader praised the financial and business acumen that several of her board 
members provided, given that managing a multi-million dollar operation was very 
different than the $800,000 budget she first began with as a founding principal.   
Beyond individuals, leaders shared several common board member attributes or 
dispositions that they believed supported successful organizational expansion, including 
mission alignment, accessibility, investment, temperance, and loyalty. One leader spoke 
to the difference her board chair made in her leadership of the organization and her 
professional growth:  
     I love my board. Our chair . . . his loyalty and commitment to me have really 
sort of been the wind on my back. He’s also tough, real tough, and he’ll tell me 
when I’ve made a bad decision, but he also provides wise counseling that has 
gotten me and the organization through some really tough situations.  
 
Another leader shared that he, too, had an outstanding board that was “very involved and 
invested,” to the point that board members would tour prospective new geographical 
regions with him. 
The sub-theme of board member tenure was also another common connection 





dedication to the organization, one leader in particular warned that an original board 
could actually stifle a CMO’s expansion and improvement:  
     Founder boards are great, I had one, but you keep a founder board and they 
just do whatever you want to do as the founder. So the CEO gets all kinds of 
leeway and sometimes they get too much leeway and you don’t feel the discipline 
for growing . . . don’t keep your founder board around for as long as you might 
normally think.  
 
Board operations. In addition to the aforementioned high levels of interaction, 
leaders distinguished between the particular ways their boards operated, governing rather 
than managing. Along with oversight, several leaders mentioned how their boards 
protected them, especially when making a decision that was in the best interest of 
students but perhaps not as popular with the general public. Advocacy in the political 
arena as well as crisis prevention were also characteristic of leaders’ board operations. 
One CEO described how his board operated using fatal flaws theory: 
     [F]atal flaws theory is a philosophy that inside any organization is a flaw, 
which if you don’t find, it will kill the organization. Like if you don’t get it, if 
there’s something going on in your system and it’s going to erode you or destroy 
you, you have to find out where it is . . . so our board always focused on that and 
advised me on how to design our policies and operating procedures to avoid 
lawsuits and even terrible, ridiculous real estate deals.   
 
Other leaders shared how they worked with their board chairs to keep their boards 
“in shape,” putting into place a set of operating norms and strict structures to keep the 
board focused on mission and strategic goals. Finally, leaders highlighted how critical it 
was to ensure that they educated their boards about growth and executive management’s 
rationale for expansion plans, including moving to new cities or states or opening more 
than one new school at a time. These high levels of transparency around decision making 
continued to build board confidence, allowing leaders even more autonomy to continue 





Internal factor 5: Fiscal health. The leaders who participated in this study cited 
their fiscal responsibility for annual budgets ranging from ten million to just over four 
hundred million dollars. However, even the leaders with the largest budgets were 
adamant about maintaining not just good, but “superb” financial health as an organization 
that is scaling. One CEO summed up how important money management is: “It takes a 
significant amount of cash to grow.” 
The most prevalent sub-theme for this internal factor was the need for CMOs to 
keep a certain amount of cash on hand and actually build a significant reserve. One CEO 
stressed:  
     Reserves are a very important concept. We have them because at [our CMO], 
we budget to a surplus, not to break even or to a deficit. People think ‘cause 
you’re a nonprofit, that means you spend everything you make, right? So if 
you’ve got a million dollars that come in, you spend a million dollars out? No, 
absolutely not. You need that to produce a surplus to build your cash reserve. . . . 
What you don’t realize is that as you grow, you’ve actually got to create more 
cash because, guess what? Your fixed costs are significantly higher over time.  
 
Across interviews, leaders recommended having at least 2 to 3 months of cash reserves to 
address “unanticipated expenses.” For example, one CMO decided to build a new facility 
from the ground up; however, the construction was not completed in time and that CEO 
had to use his reserves to secure a rental space so that students could start the school year 
on schedule.  
Leaders also shared that they maintained excellent fiscal health during expansion 
through a few other key practices. Working with their boards and finance teams, leaders 
established several consecutive years’ worth of “clean” financial audits, free from any 
serious discrepancies in spending and totally compliant with financial guidance provided 





annually, assessing how well the CMO had met the budget it had committed to and 
targeting any areas of over- or underspending.  
Finally, several leaders stressed the importance of creating 3- or 5-year financial 
projections on an annual basis. The frequency of this process allowed CMOs to ensure 
alignment between financial planning and enrollment projections, actual student 
enrollment, and student retention tracking from year to year. One leader in particular 
shared that “economies of scale are deceptive.” He claimed that a CMO that was adding 
additional campuses did not necessarily mean its revenue was actually increasing or even 
remaining the same, especially if the organization’s student enrollment and retention 
showed any signs of trending negatively. 
Internal factor 6: Infrastructure. A CMO’s infrastructure must also grow to 
scale as the organization adds more schools, more school-based employees, and more 
students. A few leaders admitted being so focused on staffing and opening new schools 
that they failed to address the operational, human resource, fiscal, and programmatic 
support that many schools need even before they begin their site operations. Eventually, 
leaders determined how to meet schools’ needs by further defining the role of the CMO’s 
central office, developing sound standard operating procedures and systems, and, finally, 
expanding the organizational chart to include positions that would assist schools in the 
midst of continued expansion.   
Role of CMO as central office. As the number of schools increased, leaders 
indicated that CMOs became a central “hub” or “the central office” that supported not 
only operational and financial functions for schools, but also curricular and programmatic 





leaders had to address: a centralized versus a decentralized system and support versus 
accountability.   
Some leaders shared that because of internal talent development and pipelines, 
most employees, including school leaders, responded well and with fidelity to the central 
office directive: “Implement this model.” One leader noted that he began to allow a bit 
more autonomy to higher-performing schools, but this created a dynamic in which other 
school leaders questioned equity and began to push for more decentralization—an 
unintended consequence of his action. At the other end of the spectrum, those leaders 
who allowed for decentralization and more autonomy for schools explained that their 
central offices still provided the framework within which their schools were to operate 
and could innovate. 
Regarding support versus accountability, leaders indicated that the central office 
was first and foremost a support entity for individual campuses. One leader shared how 
she made this clear to central office staff because the principal role in her CMO is 
especially challenging:  
     We call our central office the network support team. . . . It’s a real support 
orientation, we’re very clear that the default answer to principals should be “yes.” 
We talk a lot about how hard the principal job is. We have also over-resourced 
our regional suites and really prioritized getting the [school-network support 
office] relationship right. We have a twice-a-year survey of all of our principals  
. . . we ask them to rate every department in the network support team, like 
operations or finance or external relations or curriculum . . . and then I respond 
with an overall memo from me, and then specifically to every single principal 
comment that was direct to a specific team. . . . I think when you’ve gotten to our 
size, it’s just, it’s just really important that the school network relationship be 
strong. 
 
Other leaders shared a similar philosophy, especially regarding the role of the central 





said that the central office’s role—his role—was to enact good management by clearing 
any obstacles that principals might encounter, such as breakdowns in operations or 
community relations. Another CEO said she responded to principals sharing with her that 
their jobs were “crushing” them, so she added as much support as her budget would 
allow. Full-time school operations directors allowed principals to focus on instructional 
leadership, and regional superintendents provided not only technical support but also 
coaching and emotional support to help school leaders do their jobs well.  
Systems. CMO infrastructure was not only comprised of central office staff, but 
also of the systems that made daily operations for schools much more efficient. Central 
office teams were responsible for building standard operating procedures for 
procurement, building maintenance, food service, and even student transportation.   
Leaders stressed they also needed to build out systems and develop standard 
operating procedures to implement their curriculum and academic program. One CEO 
explained the need for a common system to measure academic quality across the growing 
number of schools in his network; in turn, he pulled together a “hedgehog team” and 
developed a network-wide set of robust interim assessments in order to assess growth and 
academic improvement over time. Another leader, in her role as chief of staff, 
collaborated with the chief talent officer to establish not only a clear rubric for teacher 
coaching and evaluation, but also a system for collecting teacher classroom observation 
data for mid-year and end-of-year performance appraisals. In conjunction with the 
CMO’s data director, she built out teacher and principal/school dashboards with key 
student growth and attainment metrics so that campus-based teams could easily access 





progress monitoring during monthly principal check-ins. Partnering with the chief 
academic officer, she vetted and selected online applications in which to house the 
CMO’s curriculum maps and unit plans for every grade and content area, as well as to 
systematically administer CMO-created interim assessments tri-annually. 
Another leader shared that he believed his CMO was one of the most well-
managed charter organizations in the country because of a system of protocols he 
established for the organization’s strategic work as well as day-to-day transactional work. 
He described his “operating system,” which he had actually presented to peer CEOs at a 
recent gathering organized by a funder:  
     My system is a set of protocols. I have one specific protocol for surfacing the 
top issues with my management team and ensuring those issues get solved. . . . 
For my one-on-one check-ins with my senior team, I have a very, very specific 
protocol for how we spend that hour together and it’s super, super, super 
effective. . . . I’ve even got a really specific protocol around dealing with strategic 
issues on a monthly basis, as well as a protocol for what I do once a quarter for 
two days with the senior leadership team, and a follow-up looking at data and 
prioritization. Without my little operating system, there’s no way we could be 
growing to scale. . . . Because of our protocols, we’re able to always be focused 
on execution, execution, execution, and problem solving. . . . Our funders believe 
that this is what has enabled us to grow so quickly.  
 
Staffing and organizational chart. Another element of infrastructure that leaders 
had to consider was their actual organizational chart. All CMOs eventually added new 
positions to their organizational charts, both school-based and central office-based, 
depending on the needs of schools. Several leaders prioritized a recruiter for human 
capital purposes, while others opted for a director of external relations to execute 
community outreach in preparation for future school sites. Other leaders selected finance 
and accounting specialists to ensure the aforementioned need for maintaining fiscal 





Several leaders highlighted the financial challenges of adding central office staff 
when growing from one or two schools to at least five or six. At this point in a CMO’s 
financial modeling, there usually are not enough revenues to justify overhead costs like a 
recruiter, a curriculum writer, or a special education director, even though schools need 
this support. In turn, these leaders shared how a few employees who served multiple 
functions manned their “very lean” central offices. One leader shared how, even at 
present with 16 schools in operation, her CMO still cannot afford a chief strategy officer 
or an innovation manager, which means she and several other colleagues “execute our 
regular jobs during the day, and switch into the growth and expansion strategy team 
between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.” 
Internal factor 7: Growth mindset and strategy. The final overarching theme 
across interviews for internal readiness was growth mindset and strategy. Leaders defined 
growth mindset as a willingness to not just continue to “tinker” for improvement, but to 
truly evolve to serve students in the best way possible using ethical or culturally 
considerate practices. Regarding strategy, leaders indicated that CMOs did need to have 
some type of concrete plan in place to guide their growth trajectory. In addition, leaders 
emphasized that growth happens in phases that CMOs must consider in creating their 
growth plans. Finally, leaders offered examples of concrete strategies that their CMOs 
enacted as part of their broader growth strategy. 
Growth mindset. Several leaders cautioned that, ironically, CMO expansion could 
cause an organization to become stagnant in its practices. Such practices might also 





track record of academic success. One Southwest region CEO explained this 
phenomenon:  
     I think a lot of CMOs . . . they have this formula from when they first started 
that they think works, and to go outside of that model or formula seems very 
foreign or risky because they’ve always been successful doing it this way. But as 
we’ve seen historically over the charter movement in our country, there’s a lot of 
qualms with some of those approaches . . . like the number of disproportionate 
Black boys that are suspended each school year . . . or kids that are expelled from 
charter schools at age four. . . . These practices are problematic. . . . We as [CMO 
leaders] have got to lead our organizations in abandoning those practices. . . those 
practices that at the time we put in place ‘cause we thought that’s what we needed 
to do, but now we realize there’s some negative effects and that they’re actually 
not good practices or culturally competent at all. . . . How will we evolve to find 
better practices to serve our kids?  
 
Along similar lines, other leaders shared how they believed it was their responsibility to 
address one of the prevailing criticisms of charter schools—that charters exclude specific 
sub-groups of students in their service populations. A leader reflected on this particular 
point, explaining how he committed to improving his programs in order to serve special 
education students, immigrant students, and even undocumented students. Several leaders 
said that historically, their schools had served either a predominately Latino or African 
American population, and their future growth plans included expansion into new 
neighborhoods or cities with a different ethnic demographic make-up, in an effort to 
serve all students.   
Plans and phases. All leaders agreed that their teams needed to create some type 
of roadmap for scaling that included, at minimum, overarching goals and timelines. 
However, leaders had different responses about the level of detail to include in these 
plans. One leader expressed the need for decreased effort in planning and increased effort 





     I’ve seen a lot of people put tons of energy into these really detailed growth 
plans and they’re like ninety pages, a hundred pages, and they’ve got all this info 
about what they’re going to do in the future. I’ve just never seen us as able to do 
that. I mean, we put a plan together because everybody who gives us money 
wants to see it. But I don’t look at that plan. I look at the number of schools we’re 
going to have, the number of students we’re going to serve, and when we’re 
running up against obstacles, it’s like, oh, what’s the root cause of this? How do 
we have to change to be more efficient or effective here? This is the real planning, 
in real time we are creating plans that are solving real problems and real issues 
that we’re having.   
 
Whether a CMO’s plans were complex or more streamlined, leaders 
acknowledged that growth happens in a series of phases. During the exploratory phase, 
the CMO conducts research on the need for its school and community outreach. The 
design phase includes any adjustments to the school or academic model for the purpose 
of improving student achievement outcomes. Implementation is the actual opening of the 
new school(s). 
CMOs who were further along in the execution of their plans and moving towards 
increasing their number of schools to a total of 20 or more in the next 2 to 3 years noted 
that they are moving into another type of phase, one focused on capacity building across 
the organization. One CEO explained this growth stage in more detail: “It feels like 
another founding stage in a way . . . our goal is to pull off a better replication that feels 
easier for all the staff involved.” 
Several leaders noted that their CMOs had to set aside additional financial 
resources for the growth planning process, especially in acquiring the external support or 
technical assistance of a consultant or firm to aid in the process. As one leader said, “You 
have to figure out a way to pay for all of the actual steps leading up to that first opening 





Concrete strategies. Some leaders highlighted how specific strategic approaches 
fueled the successful execution of their broader expansion goals. One leader reiterated 
her CMO’s commitment to a specific geographical region; because of a well-reputed 
record of academic results, other communities in the same region have welcomed new 
schools opening in their neighborhoods. Another leader sought out neighborhoods in 
which other charter schools have actually failed, citing that families are mostly eager for 
a quality option.   
Regarding the actual preparation to open a new school site, another CEO shared 
his “launch pad” strategy:  
     The launch pad is really like all systems are a go, we’re ready to launch, the 
conditions are green. So about four years out, after some preliminary community 
work, as opposed to only a year out, we begin to negotiate the property and 
facility to ensure we pick the best one for the best price. We spend two years on 
that, and from there, we have another two years and we put together a plan to 
identify a leader and continuously engage the community. . . . This is a much 
better model than what we were doing before, which was like we only have a 
year, let’s just work like crazy to try to open a school.  
 
External factor 1: Need and demand. Leaders acknowledged that they had an 
obligation to address the educational needs of students and families in historically 
underserved areas. Through demographic research and the analysis of local school district 
data, students and families in need were either currently attending overcrowded 
neighborhood schools or experiencing a true lack of quality schools in the community. 
These needs led to demand. Several leaders shared their recollections of stressful 
lotteries, including one of the CEOs who had also been the flagship principal:   
     We were getting about eight applications for every open seat. So the 
lotteries—before computer-based lotteries, back then we were still in the old 
school version of putting all the names in a big box and shaking them up and 
pulling them out in front of a room full of people, and it was just awful to go 





Other leaders shared common sentiments, including a profound disappointment that so 
many families wanted an education at their schools but might never be able to get it. One 
leader in particular challenged the notion of demand as it pertained to charter schools, 
emphasizing that demand might not always be authentic:   
     It’s easy to canvass places and get people to sign off and say that they want a 
CMO to come in and open a school . . . and if you hire the right people to do that, 
they can get the signatures of anyone they want. . . . I think real demand is to look 
at your waitlists and see exactly how many people want to be in this school 
you’ve created. 
 
One leader indicated that it was not only his flagship school’s waitlist of hundreds of 
students that indicated to him that he should grow; it was actually the fact that so many of 
the families on the list were from neighboring communities. These families were willing 
to travel to his school. To him, this was demand, the impetus to grow. 
Demand beyond families and students. Other CEOs shared how the idea for 
growth was either ignited or fueled when they were approached by an external entity. In 
the case of one Midwestern CMO, the philanthropic community, including the Walton 
Family Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, offered a significant 
amount of funding for the single-site operator to begin scaling. 
Another CEO shared how the superintendent of a traditional school district who 
desired to use charters to build a portfolio of high-performing schools invited her to be 
part of his citywide reform: 
     I think the real decision to open more schools came when we met the 
chancellor of New York City, and he, along with Mayor Bloomberg, in his words 
set out to make New York City the Silicon Valley of education. . . . He was the 
one who proactively reached out to us and said, “You know, would you be 
interested in expanding to New York?” And when we understood what he was 
willing to offer in terms of funding and facilities and support at the highest level, 






Another leader recalled receiving a call that he was glad he did not send to his 
voicemail:  
     So in 1997, I was sitting in my office and my secretary said, “I think you ought 
to take this phone call.” And I said, “Who is it?” And she said, “It’s the White 
House.” . . . And indeed it was the Clinton Administration wanting to sign a piece 
of legislation that was going to create federal powers to help grow charter schools. 
So that September, the President, First Lady, and a variety of high-powered Dems 
came to [our school] and we did a national town hall with the press.  
 
This event led this particular leader to cross paths with his future partner who would help 
him actually shape state legislation (discussed in a later section in this chapter) and create 
the first-ever CMO in the country, which at present day operates 40 schools. 
External factor 2: Funding.  While working internally to obtain fiscal health, 
CMOs also secured revenue from external sources to fund their school and operational 
expenses. There was alignment in how leaders distinguished between two major funding 
streams and major challenges of bringing in money from each: public and private. 
Public dollars. Leaders matter-of-factly acknowledged that their jurisdiction’s 
school funding formulas, especially per-pupil allotments, dictated that charter schools 
would receive less money than traditional district schools. Some CMOs included in this 
study received nearly $3,000 less per student than their peer schools in the local district. 
A few leaders also acknowledged that they received little to no funding for facilities 
acquisition or capital expenses. One CEO shared how she and other CMOs in her city 
were “at the mercy” of the local district’s multi-million dollar budget crisis:  
     Whenever there was any type of budget cut, we’re talking fourteen percent, the 
funding disparity for the charters in the city became even more pronounced and 
we all had to operate even more leanly. We executed reductions-in-force at the 
central office and even had to take certain positions off of school budgets, which 





Another leader in the same city lamented: “Our state was broke. Our city was broke. Our 
district was broke.” 
Leaders shared similar thinking around the extent to which a CMO could truly 
rely on public dollars. For example, one leader shared how the local district and state 
provided school start-up funds for CMOs that were scaling and opening new schools. For 
years, her CMO relied on this $300,000 per new campus as a funding springboard to 
launch a new site. Then, one year, the district and state abruptly ended this offering. This 
delayed the CMO’s ability to open two new schools that fiscal year. 
Given the costliness of expansion, CMOs had to determine how to generate 
enough revenue for growth while also growing their cash reserves (or not, which leaders 
acknowledged as a significant negative effect on their organization’s financial 
sustainability). This led many leaders to pursue private dollars aggressively.  
Private dollars. Fortunately for many CMOs that participated in this study, the 
philanthropic community was eager to provide financial support specifically for scale. As 
an example, the Charter School Growth Fund and New School Venture Fund, both 
nonprofit ventures, proactively sought out several CMOs to assist with financial needs. In 
addition, these organizations also provided technical assistance in financial modeling to 
set CMOs on a “rapid growth trajectory,” enabling CMOs to open multiple schools a 
year. Many leaders shared a common set of well-reputed foundations that served as a 
major source of private fundraising for their CMOs, including the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the Walton Family Foundation, and the Ford Foundation.   
Leaders acknowledged that either they or a key member of their senior leadership 





strategies, applying for private grants and conducting appeals to individual donors. 
Fundraising anywhere from half a million to 50 million dollars required a significant 
investment of time and additional resources, and leaders acknowledged that, similar to 
public dollars, private dollars were not a “sure thing” either. For example, one leader 
noted that early on in her CMO’s existence, “we had very generous donors at the time 
and they said they’d cover the philanthropy gap, money we still needed to fundraise. . . . 
They did for the first three or four years, and now they don’t (laughs).” Another leader 
underscored her CMO’s strategic efforts to ensure a balance between revenue streams, 
building a financial model that did not rely too heavily on one stream or the other.   
External factor 3: Facilities. Facilities acquisition is, as one leader described it, 
“one of the most painful parts of being a charter, especially when you are trying to add 
more campuses to your CMO.” Several common sub-themes emerged from facilities as 
an external factor. Leaders agreed there has been and always will be a shortage of sound 
buildings in which to open new schools. CMOs also had to determine which approach 
they would take to finding and securing facilities. Some CMOs shared or rented space. 
Others chose to purchase and finance already existing buildings or construct new 
facilities after purchasing property. 
Shortage all around. Leaders highlighted a few external factors that led to an 
“all-around shortage” of quality, affordable facilities. Whether renting or buying, prices 
were exceedingly high, even in high-needs urban communities. One leader shared:  
     Our original plan was to open in Oakland. And then we realized we couldn’t 
afford to open in Oakland because the real estate market was so high. . . . We 
couldn’t afford to do it. So this forced us to look into other locations. We ended 
up finding a grocery store [in a neighboring community with similar needs] that 





cents a square foot, as opposed to Oakland, where one lease was a dollar thirty-
five a square foot.  
 
Other leaders shared that they could afford to lease or buy some buildings, except that 
they were in very poor condition and would require significant investment just to bring 
them up to code for occupation. CMOs were also faced with external stakeholders like 
ward council members or aldermen who politically blocked their acquisition of a 
particular building for a variety of reasons, including solidarity with the local teachers’ 
union or commitment to a different CMO.   
Leaders acknowledged that, when hard-pressed to open a new school due to long 
waitlists or pressure from funders, they found themselves considering facility availability 
over community need or demand. Poor in hindsight, leaders assumed they could easily 
transport students from the adjacent neighborhood into the community that had the right 
building. However, they encountered great resistance from the community that housed 
the building, citing how residents and other stakeholders said they did not need another 
school or did not want kids from another area of the city coming into their community. 
Share or rent. CMOs whose financial models allowed them to share or rent space 
proactively pursued partnerships with local school districts or other charter schools with 
currently existing buildings that were in good shape. While co-location was not ideal, 
especially due to differences in the way schools enact their academic and culture models, 
leaders explained some of the benefits of sharing space. Sharing space was often less 
expensive than renting space, allowing funds to be reallocated towards direct student 
costs rather than facilities. In addition, sharing space meant cost sharing for a variety of 
expenses, like utilities, waste disposal, and custodial services, generating additional cost 





negotiate ownership of capital improvements and building maintenance to the building 
owner—another significant cost savings.  
Several leaders mentioned pursuing relationships with their local Catholic 
archdiocese. Even with multiple buildings available, CMOs that pursued this facilities 
acquisition route acknowledged that they often ended up responsible for capital 
improvements, including costly renovations that ensured the school was handicap-
accessible or had an operable elevator. 
Purchase, finance, and/or build. CMOs whose financial models allowed them to 
purchase, finance, and/or build new construction schools shared that they wanted to be in 
total control of their facilities. One CEO explained how his facilities acquisition approach 
has allowed him to be independent while also taking advantage of lower interest rates 
when financing new construction projects:  
     We’ve been able to access the capital markets. . . . We finance all of our 
facilities construction from the ground up. We have an investment group rating 
from Standard and Poors. Our bonds are at a two or three percent rate and we just 
build our buildings from scratch. . . . We don’t have to go to districts for space. 
We’re not trying to find donated space . . . we’re just taking [facilities] on, we are 
able as an organization to fuel the expansion and make sure we have the funds to 
do it through our own fundraising of seventy million dollars of private money 
over the last seven years.  
 
Regardless of approach, leaders concluded that having a senior leadership team member 
or board member with facilities and real estate acumen sooner in their growth process 
would have prevented several mistakes. Leaders referred to “sunk costs” that were 
unrecoverable in buildings they occupied for only a short time. Others had difficulties in 
finding lenders who would be willing to finance renovation projects. Those who pursued 
new construction struggled to navigate the zoning and permit process. One CMO noted 





External factor 4: Political context, policy, and climate. While operating in a 
variety of different contexts depending on geographic location, CMO leaders 
acknowledged how political trends, local and state policy, and general charter climate in 
their respective jurisdictions sometimes supported growth or provided significant 
obstacles to scaling. In addition, leaders provided insight into the authority of and 
relationships with their authorizing entities. Another common sub-theme was the role that 
CMOs played in influencing politics and driving pro-student, pro-charter policies in their 
cities, states, and regions. 
Political context, policy, and climate for charters. The political arena is a 
complex web of power, relationships, and interests. Like it or not, CMOs have to 
understand how to navigate this dynamic web to actually survive, let alone grow. As one 
CEO from Chicago put it, “Politics can kill you.” Without cultivating the right 
relationships with “key players” and garnering “powerful allies,” several CMOs believed 
they would not have been able to pursue their expansion plans successfully.   
For those CMOs in mayoral-controlled contexts, this meant being in good 
standing with the city’s leader and members of the mayoral cabinet, including the local 
school district superintendent. One Midwestern CMO highlighted how his flagship 
school’s high-performing results won the attention and accolades of the mayor, 
effectively setting his CMO up to open several new schools with relatively little to no 
opposition:  
     Mayor Washington and [Superintendent] Smith created a climate that was ripe 
for [charter] expansion in [our city]. . . . Smith was bullish about our CMO 
growing . . . and because of Mayor Washington’s leadership and style, no one 
questioned him and everyone in the city followed his lead. . . . Back then, if 
Washington said this was happening, it was happening, of course because he 





other political stakeholders. . . . Everyone immediately got on board with [our] 
expansion.  
 
Another leader in a different part of the country explained that a public figure pushing for 
CMO expansion was a “positive,” even if the organization was not ready internally and 
since timelines “can always be negotiated.” This support provided a certain level of 
credibility and access to other political allies that he could call on when the CMO was 
finally ready to launch new school sites.   
The dynamics in a CMO’s political context often dictated what the policy 
environment and the general climate was for charters as well. Leaders shared how policy 
and climate impacted capacity to scale, their academic programs, and even some very 
organization-specific practices. For one CMO, her state education agency took over a 
district and offered her the opportunity to open a new school by acquiring a turnaround 
campus. Several leaders referred to charter caps at the state and municipal levels. As a 
result, new school contracts that a CMO’s authorizer had already granted were suddenly 
moot. One leader shared how his college preparatory model and demanding graduation 
requirements conflicted with his state education agency’s refusal to adopt Common Core 
Standards. In turn, his school leaders needed to figure out how to keep students from 
transferring to their neighborhood high school where the graduation requirements were 
not as robust. CMOs also found that their school discipline practices and level of 
compliance with teacher certification requirements also caused friction between their 
organization and their state-level agencies, forcing some CMOs to make adjustments to 
their models and operations.  
Leaders generally referred to the climate in their jurisdictions as either “charter-





narratives around charter schools and CMOs have provided non-allies with the political 
capital to form an organized opposition. Such narratives include, once again, that charters 
work to serve only a certain type of student or rob local schools of fiscal resources. The 
organized opposition for CMOs in this study included groups of anti-charter elected 
officials as well as local teachers’ unions. One leader cited that in recent years, these 
oppositional groups have become even more radical because CMOs like his, which went 
from serving 1,000 students to 10,000 students in his city, are now perceived as a threat 
in an already-unstable public education environment.   
Authorizers. Another sub-theme that emerged across interviews when discussing 
political context was the CMO’s authorizer. Whether the local school district, the mayor, 
a university, or the state, leaders identified authorizer relationships, replication process, 
accountability, and level of autonomy as major elements that affected their expansion 
plans.   
CMOs utilized positive authorizer relations to speed up their scaling process. One 
leader, whose schools are state-authorized, shared how easy it was for him to grow 
because of the relationship with the state education agency:  
     We have a very positive authorizer environment in [our state]. . . . We can 
pretty much open schools whenever we want and we’re charted directly by the 
state, so we don’t have to worry about districts getting in the way and meddling.  
. . . And because our performance is so high, we’re on this little fast track where 
we basically make a phone call and we can open up a school the next year. I 
mean, it’s a little bit harder, yes, but not much harder. This has been so helpful for 
growing quickly.  
 
Another CEO expressed difficulty in developing a relationship with his authorizer 
because of the instability within the entity. Since starting his schools 15 years ago, the 





much change, it’s hard to navigate . . . sometimes the new sup loves charters, the next 
person hates charters . . . and their policies for growth and oversight are always 
changing.” Other leaders shared similar accounts of changes in how their student 
achievement metrics were calculated or the process of applying to open additional 
schools. These fluctuations sometimes stalled CMO execution on new school openings.  
CMOs influencing politics and shaping policy. At some point in their growth 
trajectory, CMO leaders decided to increase their direct involvement in influencing the 
politics within their contexts. In addition, leaders made efforts at the state and local levels 
to shape the policies that directly impacted their organization’s capacity to open more 
school and serve more students, including equitable funding for charters. One CEO 
improved his ability to garner political support and become one of the key players in his 
arena by investing money and time to implement some specific strategies:  
     The reason we have such great political support isn’t just because we sat back 
and said, “Oh, we hope the people will keep supporting charters.” We hold 
fundraisers for elected officials, we tour them on our schools, we assign board 
members to manage relationships with them . . . a favorable [political] 
environment might be part luck, but you’ve also got to cultivate it. . . . Our team 
does specific political mapping where we rate every elected official from a 
negative three to a positive three. Negative three means they hate charters . . . in 
those cases, we’ve funded candidates to run against people who have not been 
supportive of us. . . . I realized that running schools was not enough. . . . The other 
side is relentless, methodical, and obsessed with killing charters. . . . We’ve got to 
be just as sophisticated as them. . . . I can’t be a boy scout with a knife while 
everyone else has hand grenades and machine guns. 
 
Leaders also pinpointed how they shared a valuable constituent group with their 
elected officials—parents. In turn, CMOs invested financial and human resources in 
organizing parents and even students to neutralize oppositional elected officials and 
advocate for pro-charter legislation at the local and state levels. When parents and 





increased equitable funding, underscoring one CEO’s statement that “the political 
environment directly impacts money for charters.” 
Another CMO worked at the state level to create a clear policy path for charter 
schools to replicate. This CMO’s founder explained how he and his co-founder filed a 
501(c)(3) nonprofit political organization for an initiative: “The bill that we created 
would change the state Constitution to allow for an infinite number of charter schools . . . 
and it actually passed eighty-nine to seven.” The growth process pushed CMO leaders to 
move beyond school operations and into advocacy.   
External factor 5: Parent and community relations. Leaders were aligned in 
their reflections on community and parent relations as another critical external factor that 
could accelerate or stall growth. There was a common conclusion among leaders that they 
should have prioritized community engagement much earlier on in the replication 
process. One leader explained how just in the last year, he finally hired a permanent 
director of community engagement. He executed this decision in response to feedback 
from families in one particular community that his CMO took a “We’re going to bring 
[our school] to you and do it our way” approach. He and his team realized that they 
needed to create a way to give the community a voice; his director of community 
engagement began to work on establishing a whole program anchored by an advisory 
board of diverse community leaders and a listening tour. These listening sessions with 
parents would ask for actual parental input and ideas with the hopes of deepening 
parental engagement and fostering the start of true parental partnerships. After a pilot, the 
leader reported that parents’ feedback changed drastically: “People’s feedback was like, 





we wanted versus like just coming, opening the school, and then operating the way they 
want to operate.’”   
One leader cautioned against being too open to input from community and 
parents; the purpose of his community engagement was to use data and student and 
parent testimony to turn parents and the community into “believers” that the CMO’s 
model could truly work for them, even if the high expectations and standards seemed 
difficult to adjust to at first.   
In the same way that CMOs needed to create internal systems for the development 
of effective infrastructure, leaders also emphasized the importance of creating systems to 
conduct an analysis of potential communities that could house a future campus. In 
addition to demographic information, one leader shared how she worked to create a 
comprehensive “profile” of prospective communities:  
     When it came to community, we always started from the top. Who are the 
leaders in that community? What are the politics like? What sub-groups comprise 
this community? What is housing like? And then you go into learning more about 
community agencies that support kids and families. You look at pre-K programs 
and childcare facilities. You check out local churches and other places of worship 
. . . you talk to the people at each of these places so you can start piecing together 
a profile of the community.   
 
Leaders underscored how a thorough, authentic understanding of the community aided in 
assessing if the school was a good fit for the community and if the school’s model could 
truly benefit the community. 
External factor 6: Collaboration and competition inside and outside the 
sector. Leaders expressed that formal external partnerships with service agencies and 






their growth plans. One Southwest region CMO established a formal partnership with an 
advocacy organization that specialized in assisting families in finding the school option 
that would best meet their students’ needs. As a result, this CMO created an enrollment 
pipeline; the leader explained that beyond a nominal fee, his team could re-direct some of 
the time and money spent on canvassing and advertising towards the work of his launch 
pads, further readying future new school sites.  
The founding CEO who partnered with Silicon Valley executives to create and 
grow his organization highlighted that CMO leaders needed to find ways to connect with 
other successful professionals from other sectors for synergistic purposes. His work as an 
education entrepreneur paired well with the venture capitalists who were interested in 
social entrepreneurship. This collaboration also allowed the CEO access to extensive 
non-charter networks for the type of funding and innovation backing that he would need 
to lead the CEO in replicating.  
Leaders were also aligned in their view of how fellow CMOs were not just 
competitors but also cooperative partners. One CEO enthusiastically expressed the 
knowledge sharing that occurred between him and other CEOs of large CMOs across the 
country:  
     It’s great. We share stuff all the time and it’s super helpful. A couple of our 
biggest funders get together frequently and we have an opportunity to present and 
discuss a problem of practice and we get feedback from peers. . . . I always call a 
lot of the other big CMOs. I’m always pumping their principals for information, 
their executives for information. . . . Whenever somebody’s beating us in a certain 
score, it’s like, all right what are they doing? Like how do we learn from it? . . . 







This type of knowledge sharing helped leaders and their CMOs continue to improve, 
increasing the impact of effective practices on even more students. Another CEO 
mentioned partnering with the KIPP regional office in his city; combined, the two CMOs 
served 20,000 students in their jurisdiction alone. The rationale for this collaboration was 
to offer more quality options to parents in their city and “put collective pressure on the 
entire district, the entire school system in our city to get better.”  
Other leaders did touch on the fact that sometimes CMOs competed for students. 
In instances where a geographic area was highly saturated with school choices, including 
multiple charter schools, CMOs found themselves in a “recruitment war.” Leaders said 
that academic track record did not always win over students and families when choosing 
between two high-quality options. Other elements like school culture, school discipline 
policy, extracurricular activities, and even before-and-after care came into play, and some 
CMOs found themselves having to, once again, evolve to make themselves more 
competitive with peer charters. 
Internal Proficiency and External Optimality  
One of the most significant insights that leaders offered across interviews was that 
because growth planning and execution was a complex and meticulous process, it was 
difficult to pinpoint exactly how to assess readiness for both internal and external growth. 
While they had offered lessons learned about those aforementioned factors that were key 
to determining readiness, some leaders voiced that a “cookie-cutter approach” to assess 
proficiency and optimality might be problematic since various CMOs existed and thrived 
in such diverse contexts and sets of circumstances. Instead, leaders offered that the key to 





A few leaders said they were still figuring out the “right formula” for readiness 
that made sense for their organizations, their political climates, their financial models,  
their revenues, and the needs of the communities they cared about most. Another set of 
leaders actually shared examples of readiness criteria or decision-making tools they had 
defined and created internally, only after several years of scaling and, as one leader 
termed it, “trial by fire.” 
Green light criteria. Two leaders explained that they worked with their executive 
teams and boards to create a set of “green light” criteria. If the organization met, mostly 
met, or was currently demonstrating strong performance in each criterion area, leaders 
had the “green light” to move forward with replication to open a new campus. The first 
leader explained her CMO’s set of criteria: (a) there is a school leader that the 
organization believes is ready to open a school; (b) the academic results across the 
network are consistently meeting or exceeding the CMO’s performance expectations; and 
(c) they are currently able to recruit or retain enough talent to sustain the school. 
Another leader’s CMO developed a rubric for its set of green light criteria. In this 
instance, the CMO utilized the rubric (Figure 2) to assess several elements in order to 
determine if a new geographic location was a good fit for a new school. This particular 
CMO’s criteria was as follows: (a) mission: student need; (b) mission: likelihood of 
catalyzing change; (c) availability of suitable facilities; (d) ease of quality control;  
(e) availability of philanthropic funding; and (f) favorable chartering environment. The 
CMO assigned a point value in each of the criteria areas. Additionally, each criterion was 






From Aspire Public Schools: An Approach to Opening New Schools by New Schools 
Venture Fund, 2007 (http://www.newschools.org/files/AspireSchoolOpeningCase.pdf). 
In the public domain. 
 
Figure 2. Location greenlighting criteria 
 
 
Growth discussions and greenlighting framework. Another leader shared a 
protocol that his CMO followed, entitled “Growth Discussion” (see Appendix A). As 
CEO, he met with his leadership team frequently to re-evaluate their current scaling 
plans. Using various data points, the team’s discussion had a clear objective and pushed 
members to anticipate potential risks and propose methods for potential mitigation. 
Eventually, the CEO and his team built upon the protocol by adding a scorecard, or what 
they called a “Greenlighting Framework” (see Appendix A). The CEO reflected on why 
the team added this tool to their growth discussions: “This scorecard wasn’t always in 
place, but we added it recently to help us consider our next phase of growth . . . our five-
year plan is to get to twenty thousand students.” The CMO team chose the following 
factors (termed “dimensions”) for its scorecard: (a) system performance (academic 
results), (b) human capital pipeline, (c) financial sustainability, and (d) new site details. 





Finally, the measures were assigned a quantitative value (i.e., greater than 90%, less than 
70%) or qualitative status (i.e., Behind, On Track, Ahead). The CEO further explained 
how each value or status was also categorized according to a color system: red (“No Go”) 
indicated that the CMO should stop growth; yellow (“Maybe”) indicated that the CMO 
should slow down and proceed with caution; and green (“Go”) indicated that the CMO 
should continue to pursue growth. The more measures assigned to the green category, the 
greater the CMO’s likelihood of success in their pursuit of the growth objective for that 
particular discussion. This was one of the primary protocols and tools for the CMO’s 
final growth decision making. 
Continued Growth Plans  
Every CMO that participated in this study indicated that it intended to continue on 
its respective growth trajectory. One founding CEO highlighted that as long as his results 
continued to improve, he would continue to lead aggressive expansion:  
     We’re at thirty thousand students this fall from, you know, one fifty only 
fifteen years ago. . . . Very few people have matched that expansion rate. And 
every year, our student performance has gotten better that the previous year. Our 
ACT scores are higher, AP scores doubled over the past three years. All of those 
metrics are heading in the right direction. We’re trying to grow exponentially 
while growing incrementally.   
 
Regarding “the why” for continued growth, despite some of the challenges and obstacles 
that come with preparation and execution, leaders expressed a common, still-fervent 
desire to impact the lives of more and more students positively. Leaders also expressed a 
general sense of confidence in their organizations’ capacity to sustain and execute 
successfully another phase of growth, especially with all the “scaling wisdom” they now 





Finally, one leader shared how he was going to continue growing while the 
growing was good:  
     We just have this great combination, for now, of a big waiting list, a lot of 
philanthropy, a great interest rate, a positive external environment. . . . I think we 
take this for granted. . . . I’m sure there will be a day when we have to figure out 
how to grow in the face of many more challenges . . . when this power 
combination of factors no longer exists or the factors just aren’t as positive 
anymore. . . . But that’s not where we are now, so we’re just gonna (laughs) keep 
it going ‘cause it won’t last forever. 
 
This reasoning is representative of the relationships that exist between the 
aforementioned internal and external factors. While the researcher highlighted a few of 
these connections, further exploration of the interconnectedness of factors is briefly 
discussed in the section on implications for further research in Chapter V.    
First-Round Validation: Survey Analysis 
Based on the study’s findings and the review of the literature, the researcher 
created an assessment tool for charter school and CMO leaders to utilize in order to help 
them determine their organization’s readiness to begin the scaling process. To ensure the 
product’s validity, the researcher used the field-testing method. More specifically, she 
asked charter school and CMO experts from across the country to conduct a review of a 
draft of the assessment tool. After this review, the experts provided their feedback, via an 
anonymous survey, on the tool’s validity and how the tool could be improved. 
The researcher sent email invitations to 20 potential survey participants, who 
included charter and CMO founders, executive leaders, and school-level administrators 





The researcher designed the tool as a workbook that contains a specific protocol 
and series of questions. The workbook contains six sections:  
• Introduction  
• Section A: The Growth Team  
• Section B: Internal Factors—Reflection and Analysis  
• Section C: External Factors—Reflection and Analysis  
• Section D: Determination of Our Overall Readiness to Grow  
• Section E: Drafting Our Green Light Criteria  
The expert participants reviewed the tool section by section, evaluating each for its level 
of comprehensiveness, relevance, usefulness, clarity, organization, and accuracy. The 
participants were required to answer these questions. For each section, they also had the 
opportunity to provide comments on the most and least helpful components in each 
section of the tool. Responding to these questions was optional. The final portion of the 
survey asked participants to provide their overall assessment of the tool and its potential 
effectiveness in helping future users meaningfully reflect on internal and external factors 
that are critical to growth preparedness. In addition, participants also had the opportunity 
to provide any general feedback or comments to help the researcher refine the tool.  
The researcher utilized an online survey application to design and administer the 
survey as well as to compile the results. The design encompassed the use of a Likert scale 
for the majority of the survey’s questions. Participants responded to these questions by 
choosing one of the following options: Strongly Disagree (Point Value = 1), Disagree 
(Point Value = 2), Neutral (Point Value = 3), Agree (Point Value = 4), Strongly Agree 





The statements below represent the survey’s overarching findings:   
• Charter and CMO leaders will often consider external factors when making 
decisions about scale, but must also execute an in-depth internal reflection to 
ensure their organizations can withstand the growth process. 
• Charter and CMO leaders can more effectively conduct their assessment of 
internal and external factors with explicit direction and guidance from a 
protocol like the one the tool offers.  
• Charter and CMO leaders must carefully consider the composition of the team 
of employees that make a charter’s/CMO’s growth readiness decision, 
including the areas of expertise and general disposition of each team member 
towards the organization’s capacity for growth.  
• Charter and CMO leaders must have a variety of data on hand—student 
achievement data, enrollment data, demographic data, financial data, and so 
on—to support the growth readiness decision-making process.  
The following paragraphs contain a more detailed analysis of the survey results 
according to each section of the tool. Each analysis contains a summary of responses to 
Likert-scale questions and a corresponding table with these data, as well as pertinent 
highlights from open-ended questions.   
Feedback Summary for Introduction  
In response to the prompt “Section Adequately Covers and Discusses Topic,” 
50.00% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of participants chose 
“Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.25. In response to the prompt “Section’s 





37.50% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.31. In response 
to the prompt “Section Is Well Organized,” 68.75% of participants chose “Strongly 
Agree” and 25% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.44. In 
response to the prompt “Section Is Clear and Easy to Read,” 75% of participants chose 
“Strongly Agree” and 12.50% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert 
score of 4.25. In response to the prompt “Based on My Knowledge, the Material in This 
Section Is Accurate,” 50.00% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of 
participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.25. Table 2 summarizes 
these responses and details the number of participants who responded to each question as 
well as the mean Likert score for each question.  
Table 2 
 
















0 0 1 6.25 0 0 7 43.75 8 50.00 0 0 4.38 
Section’s Guidance 
is Relevant and 
Helpful   
0 0 0 0 1 6.25 6 37.50 9 56.25 0 0 4.50 
Section is Well-
Organized 0 0 0 0 1 6.25 4 25.00 11 68.75 0 0 4.63 
Section is Clear and 
Easy to Read 0 0 0 0 2 12.50 2 12.50 12 75.00 0 0 4.63 
Based on My 
Knowledge, the 
Material in This 
Section Is Accurate  






The mean Likert scores across all sections indicated support for the Introduction’s 
design, content, and quality. Regarding the open-ended questions, the researcher analyzed 
these responses to determine any similar themes or other trends.   
In response to the question asking participants to designate which portion of the 
section was most helpful, the overarching theme across comments was that the 
Introduction provided sound purpose and context for the tool’s need. Supportive feedback 
included:  
• While much data, information, and documents exist from school districts for 
people seeking to expand/grow charters, none provide explicit guidelines on 
what to think about and how to organize “preparedness” for 
growth/expansion. 
 
• The purpose and overview were extremely clear and coherent. The rationale 
threaded throughout makes a clear case for the background of charters and 
their strategic positioning for growth. 
 
• The introduction’s context for charter schools growing to scale was helpful to 
get the user prepared for the sections and exercises that followed.  
 
In response to the question that asked participants to (a) designate which portion 
of the section was least helpful and (b) provide a concrete suggestion for improving this 
portion, two comments indicated that it would be helpful for the researcher to include 
more context on why charters/CMOs fail if they do not adequately prepare for the growth 
process:  
• Inconsistent results of charter schools are discussed but no causes of these 
inconsistent results are given. 
 
• The overview fails to make a case for why CMOs would need this tool. While 
I can easily agree that CMOs need a way to determine if they are ready to 
grow to scale, the overview doesn’t thoroughly make the case. What would be 
helpful here is information on CMOs that may have attempted to expand and 
have been unsuccessful in doing so. This would better highlight the “gap” and 






In response to this particular piece of feedback, the researcher utilized a portion of the 
literature review conducted for the study to provide specific reasons for why some 
charters and CMOs fail during the replication process.   
Feedback Summary for Section A: The Growth Team  
In response to the prompt “Section Adequately Covers and Discusses Topic,” 
25% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 62.50% of participants chose “Agree,” 
for a total mean Likert score of 3.75. In response to the prompt “Section’s Guidance Is 
Relevant and Helpful,” 50.00% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 37.50% of 
participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.00. In response to the 
prompt “Section Is Well Organized,” 62.50% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 
31.25% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.38. In response 
to the prompt “Section Is Clear and Easy to Read,” 62.50% of participants chose 
“Strongly Agree” and 31.25% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert 
score of 4.38. In response to the prompt “Exercise’s Questions Are Directly Aligned 
With the Section’s Topic,” 50.00% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of 
participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.25. In response to the 
prompt “Based on My Knowledge, the Material in This Section Is Accurate,” 50.00% of 
participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total 
mean Likert score of 4.25. Table 3 summarizes these responses and details the number of 
participants who responded to each question as well as the mean Likert score for each 
























0 0 1 6.25 1 6.25 10 62.50 4 25.00 0 0 4.06 
Section’s Guidance 
Is Relevant and 
Helpful   
0 0 1 6.25 1 6.25 6 37.50 8 50.00 0 0 4.31 
Section Is Well-
Organized 0 0 1 6.25 0 0 5 31.25 10 62.50 0 0 4.50 
Section Is Clear and 




With the Section 
Topic  
0 0 0 0 1 6.25 7 43.75 8 50.00 0 0 4.44 
Based on My 
Knowledge, the 
Material in This 
Section Is Accurate  
0 0 0 0 1 6.25 7 43.75 8 50.00 0 0 4.44 
 
The mean Likert scores across all sections indicated adequate support for Section 
A’s design, content, and quality. The researcher noted that one participant chose 
“Disagree” for “Section Adequately Covers Topic,” “Section’s Guidance Is Relevant and 
Helpful,” and “Section Is Well-Organized.” In turn, the researcher looked to the open-
ended questions for more specific feedback regarding this section. First, in response to 





helpful, participants acknowledged the benefit of including this type of thinking in the 
growth readiness decision-making process. Supportive feedback included:  
• Leaders don’t usually think about who should be on the team until after the 
growth starts, so making them think about it at the beginning is helpful.   
 
In response to the question asking participants to (a) designate which portion of 
the section was least helpful and (b) provide a concrete suggestion for improving this 
portion, the researcher looked for comments that might provide insight for why 
“Disagree” and “Neutral” ratings were given. Critical comments included feedback on 
the addition of more specific guidance for the Growth Team’s make-up and dispositions: 
• Although the responsibilities of the Growth Team should be determined by 
the members of the team itself, including examples may help guide the team. 
 
• Add more description of qualities of the team’s members. 
 
• As a school founder, my founding team—we were completely convinced our 
way was the “right way” and our model was good and that we could do 
anything—we lacked an impartial or better yet negative perspective about 
growth and preparedness to expand. I think schools should look for and 
embrace naysayer—but this would definitely require a strong facilitator to 
avoid school leader from slipping into defensive mode. 
 
The researcher addressed this feedback by adding more explicit guidance about the 
potential roles that would work well for the Growth Team’s purpose, highlighting how 
those team members likely possess area expertise in one or more of the internal and/or 
external factors. Additionally, the researcher also used a portion of the findings to detail 
the dispositions of Growth Team members.  
Feedback Summary for Section B: Internal Factors—Reflection and Analysis  
In response to the prompt “Section Adequately Covers and Discusses Topic,” 





“Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.19. In response to the prompt “Section’s 
Guidance Is Relevant and Helpful,” 62.50% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 
37.50% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.63. In response 
to the prompt “Section Is Well Organized,” 50.00% of participants chose “Strongly 
Agree” and 43.75% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.25. 
In response to the prompt “Section Is Clear and Easy to Read,” 62.50% of participants 
chose “Strongly Agree” and 37.50% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean 
Likert score of 4.63. In response to the prompt “Exercises’ Questions Are Directly 
Aligned With the Section’s Topic,” 50.00% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 
50.00% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.5. In response to 
the prompt “Based on My Knowledge, the Material in This Section Is Accurate,” 56.25% 
of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of participants chose “Agree,” for a 
total mean Likert score of 4.56. Table 4 summarizes these responses and details the 
number of participants who responded to each question as well as the mean Likert score 
for each question.   
The mean Likert scores across all sections indicated adequate support for Section 
B’s design, content, and quality. Regarding the open-ended questions, the researcher 
analyzed these responses to determine any similar themes or other trends. In response to 
the question asking participants to designate which portion of the section was most 
helpful, participants indicated approval for the inclusion of internal factors in the tool; 





























Helpful   
0 0 0 0 0 0 6 37.50 10 62.50 0 0 4.63 
Section Is Well-
Organized 0 0 0 0 1 6.25 7 43.75 8 50.00 0 0 4.44 
Section Is Clear 




With the Section 
Topic 
0 0 0 0 0 0 8 50.00 8 50.00 0 0 4.50 
Based on My 
Knowledge, the 
Material in This 
Section Is 
Accurate  
0 0 0 0 0 0 7 43.75 9 56.25 0 0 4.56 
 
 
• This internal assessment is vital to making a decision for a charter to grow. 
 
• [The inclusion of] [o]rganizational culture. We are always so focused on 
culture for students that we sometimes neglect the culture for the adults in the 
building or the company. 
 
• “The why” section [was helpful]. At its core, the organization needs to 






In response to the question that asked participants to (a) to designate which 
portion of the section was least helpful and (b) to provide a concrete suggestion for 
improving this portion, participants mentioned the density of this section and how that 
might get the user group off track because of the complexity of all the internal factors. 
Critical feedback included:  
• Section B is very dense. Perhaps splitting the internal factor exercises into two 
groups might be helpful.  
 
• As with each longer section of this analysis—there may be opportunities to 
pursue tangential issues and/or areas of consideration. I think some 
recommendations for how to allow for that and how to pull folks back to be 
on point would be useful. 
 
The researcher made some slight adjustments according to the constructive feedback, but 
could not incorporate all suggested changes, given the constraints of the study.   
Feedback Summary for Section C: External Factors—Reflection and Analysis  
In response to the prompt “Section Adequately Covers and Discusses Topic,” 
56.25% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of participants chose 
“Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.56. In response to the prompt “Section’s 
Guidance Is Relevant and Helpful,” 68.75% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 
31.25% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.69. In response 
to the prompt “Section Is Well Organized,” 62.50% of participants chose “Strongly 
Agree” and 3.25% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.38. In 
response to the prompt “Section Is Clear and Easy to Read,” 68.75% of participants chose 
“Strongly Agree” and 31.25% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert 
score of 4.69. In response to the prompt “Exercises’ Questions Are Directly Aligned 





participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.63. In response to the 
prompt “Based on My Knowledge, the Material in This Section Is Accurate,” 56.25% of 
participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 37.50% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total 
mean Likert score of 4.31. Table 5 summarizes these responses and details the number of 
participants who responded to each question as well as the mean Likert score for each 
question.   
Table 5 
 





















Helpful   
0 0 0 0 0 0 5 31.25 11 68.75 0 0 4.69 
Section is Well-
Organized 0 0 0 0 1 6.25 5 31.25 10 62.50 0 0 4.56 
Section Is Clear 




With the Section 
Topic 
0 0 0 0 0 0 6 37.50 10 62.50 0 0 4.63 
Based on My 
Knowledge, the 
Material in This 
Section Is 
Accurate  






The mean Likert scores across all sections indicated adequate support for Section 
C’s design, content, and quality. Regarding the open-ended questions, the researcher 
analyzed these responses to determine any similar themes or other trends. In response to 
the question asking participants to designate which portion of the section was most 
helpful, multiple participants cited the “Need and Demand” factor for various reasons. 
Supportive comments included:  
• “Need and demand” was most helpful. My network opened more schools 
without any students on our waiting lists, which ended up hurting us in the 
long run financially. 
 
• The Need and Demand section [was most helpful]. Along with “the why,” 
assessing need is important for growth. 
 
In response to the question that asked participants to (a) designate which portion 
of the section was least helpful and (b) provide a concrete suggestion for improving this 
portion, participants cited that this section would be even more helpful if the workbook 
suggested what type of data to use for the various analyses throughout the section:  
• I would add a data table to this section whereby the group has to record data 
on recruitment, open seats, demographics of their schools and the nearby 
schools, something to get the team to “see” the data right in front of them as 
they make these decisions. To my earlier point that often CMOs want to open 
schools but the needs of the community or number of students in the district 
do not support the need to more schools. 
 
• For Need and Demand, perhaps suggest more analysis of demographic data. 
In response to this feedback, the researcher added a suggested checklist of the 
types of data (and how many years’ worth) that the user group should have on 






Feedback Summary for Section D: Determination of Our Overall  
Readiness to Grow  
In response to the prompt “Section Adequately Covers and Discusses Topic,” 
50.00% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of participants chose 
“Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.25. In response to the prompt “Section’s 
Guidance Is Relevant and Helpful,” 51.25% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 
31.25% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.06. In response 
to the prompt “Section Is Well Organized,” 56.25% of participants chose “Strongly 
Agree” and 37.50% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.31. 
In response to the prompt “Section Is Clear and Easy to Read,” 62.50% of participants 
chose “Strongly Agree” and 37.50% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean 
Likert score of 4.63. In response to the prompt “Exercises’ Questions Are Directly 
Aligned With the Section’s Topic,” 53.25% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 
43.75% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.56. In response 
to the prompt “Based on My Knowledge, the Material in This Section Is Accurate,” 
56.25% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of participants chose 
“Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.56. Table 6 summarizes these responses and 
details the number of participants who responded to each question as well as the mean 
Likert score for each question.   
The mean Likert scores across all sections indicated adequate support for Section 
D’s design, content, and quality. Regarding the open-ended questions, the researcher 
analyzed these responses to determine any similar themes or other trends. In response to 





























Helpful   
0 0 0 0 2 12.50 5 31.25 9 51.25 0 0 4.44 
Section Is Well-
Organized 0 0 0 0 1 6.25 6 37.50 9 56.25 0 0 4.50 
Section Is Clear 




With the Section 
Topic 
0 0 0 0 0 0 7 43.75 9 53.25 0 0 4.56 
Based on My 
Knowledge, the 
Material in This 
Section Is 
Accurate  
0 0 0 0 0 0 7 43.75 9 56.25 0 0 4.56 
 
 
helpful, participants expressed that it was helpful to review a summary of all the factor 
ratings before making a final decision about growth readiness. Supportive feedback 
included:  
• It was helpful to see all the ratings together in a summarized form to help the 
users draw a conclusion. 
 
• The consolidation of reasons from the other sections [is] helpful for the team 





In response to the question that asked participants to (a) designate which portion 
of the section was least helpful and (b) provide a concrete suggestion for improving this 
portion, participants were most concerned with the next steps for those users who 
checked the “no” box. Critical feedback included:  
• Interesting moment where “yes or no” is checked after all of the exercise. If no, 
do we start all over in a year? Do we focus on the specific areas where we aren’t 
ready? 
 
• Does the overall rating have a corresponding green, yellow, or red light indicator? 
I see below you provide information for green lighters, however, what are next 
steps for organizations whose ratings may not be quite green light? What should 
they do? 
 
Feedback Summary for Section E: Drafting Our Green Light Criteria  
In response to the prompt “Section Adequately Covers and Discusses Topic,” 
50.00% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of participants chose 
“Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.25. In response to the prompt “Section’s 
Guidance Is Relevant and Helpful,” 43.75% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 
43.75% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 3.94. In response 
to the prompt “Section Is Well-Organized,” 56.25% of participants chose “Strongly 
Agree” and 31.25% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 
4.0625. In response to the prompt “Section Is Clear and Easy to Read,” 56.25% of 
participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 37.50% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total 
mean Likert score of 4.31. In response to the prompt “Exercises’ Questions Are Directly 
Aligned With the Section’s Topic,” 56.25% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 
37.50% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.31. In response 





50.00% of participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 43.75% of participants chose 
“Agree,” for a total mean Likert score of 4.25. Table 7 summarizes these responses and 
details the number of participants who responded to each question as well as the mean 
Likert score for each question.   
Table 7 
 





















Helpful   
0 0 0 0 2 12.50 7 43.75 7 43.75 0 0 4.31 
Section Is Well-
Organized 0 0 0 0 2 12.50 5 31.25 9 56.25 0 0 4.44 
Section Is Clear 




With the Section 
Topic 
0 0 1 6.25 0 0 6 37.50 9 56.25 0 0 4.44 
Based on My 
Knowledge, the 
Material in This 
Section Is 
Accurate  







The mean Likert scores across all sections indicate adequate support for Section 
E’s design, content, and quality. Regarding the open-ended questions, the researcher 
analyzed these responses to determine any similar themes or other trends. In response to 
the question asking participants to designate which portion of the section was most 
helpful, participants showed strong support for moving user groups immediately forward 
into growth planning through the creation of the green light criteria. Supportive feedback 
included:  
• Helping teams recognize that beyond being ready to grow they must also have 
key factors/components in place to actually grow is important.  
 
• The graphic organizer and criteria for moving forward with expansion gets 
teams moving on the growth work right away. 
 
• I like the framework for the users to create their own organization-specific 
criteria.  
 
In response to the question that asked participants to (a) designate which portion 
of the section was least helpful and (b) to provide a concrete suggestion for improving 
this portion, participants were concerned about the actual growth process and how 
organizations would navigate potential obstacles. Others asked for the workbook to 
designate how many green light factors an organization needed to meet in order to move 
forward with expansion. Critical feedback included:  
• Addressing challenges and solutions that may come up during expansion so 
there is less delay during expansion might be helpful to include in this section.  
 
• Is there a number of green light factors that schools say they need—a simple 
majority, 100% or all factors? Are there concrete recommendations about 
this? 
 
The researcher made several slight adjustments to this section, but did not incorporate all 





Feedback Summary for End-of-Survey General Feedback  
In response to the prompt “The product’s overall organization and design ensure 
that its users will have the opportunity to meaningfully reflect on each factor,” 75.00% of 
participants chose “Strongly Agree” and 25.00% of participants chose “Agree,” for a total 
mean Likert score of 4.25. Table 8 summarizes these responses and details the number of 

























reflect on each 
factor.  
0 0 0 0 0 0 4 25.00 12 75.00 0 0 4.75 
 
Participants also had the opportunity to provide general feedback on the tool 
overall. They demonstrated support for the clarity of the questions contained in the tool’s 
exercises, with three reviewers noting this in the positive comments section. Other 






• The tool is valid.  
 
• I think this kind of reflection is critically important for leaders to undertake.   
 
Regarding overall critical feedback, an overarching theme was the tool’s need to 
further define proficiency and optimality for the internal and external factors, 
respectively. Additionally, participants expressed a desire for how to share the results of 
the protocol with the broader team of employees outside of the Growth Team. Critical 
feedback included:  
• Consider adding a more detailed description of proficient, somewhat 
proficient, not proficient, optimal, somewhat optimal and not optimal.   
 
• I would like some ideas about how to present the “findings” of this analysis 
and how to share it with the invested parties so folks can understand how the 
work they are undertaking will look at the end . . . perhaps the “Green 
lighting” exercise is the place to expand on this? 
 
• The workbook should require the teams upon completion to publish or present 
their findings to allow for continual guidance during an expansion process.  
 
The researcher incorporated the piece of feedback on definitions by expanding the tool’s 
definition of proficiency and optimality section. 
Overall Survey Summary 
Table 9 summarizes the percentage of participants who responded “Strongly 
Agree” or “Agree” for each feedback area and section. The majority of the percentage 
figures were above 90%. Additionally, the average of each section’s overall score 
amounted to 94.46%. This figure indicates overall robust support for the tool and its use 








Percentages of Participants Indicating “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” Across All 
Feedback Areas and All Sections  
 

































93.75 93.75 93.75 93.75 93.75 87.5 
Section Is 
Clear and 
Easy to Read 








N/A 93.75 100 100 100 93.75 




93.75 93.75 100 93.75 100 93.75 
Averages 







Second-Round Validation: Expert Panel Interview Analysis 
Rationale and Methodology  
The first round of product validation that the researcher conducted was extremely 
helpful and, in turn, she made several critical adjustments to the first version of the Ready 
to Scale tool, as noted in the previous section. However, despite the validation survey’s 
open-ended questions, the researcher and her doctoral advisor discussed the necessity of 
further ensuring the tool’s credibility and gathering more targeted feedback through a 
second round of validation. Since scaling is such a nuanced process, as the research has 
already demonstrated earlier in this chapter, it made sense to utilize a different type of 
methodology for this second validation. The researcher sought richer conversations rather 
than a set of Likert-scale ratings to dive more deeply into the complex challenges that 
scaling presents as it pertains to the internal and external factors that are arguably so 
critical to the growth decision-making process.   
In turn, with her doctoral advisor’s approval, the researcher chose to execute an 
expert panel. More specifically, she conducted individual interviews with 10 
charter/CMO experts from nine different cities/geographical regions across the country. 
These conversations ranged from 35 to 60+ minutes in length, depending on each 
expert’s time constraints. Six of the 10 experts had actually participated in the first round 
of product validation. The researcher’s inclusion of a portion of participants from the first 
round was intentional, especially to seek in-depth feedback on the additions or changes 
she made to the first version of the product based on the survey responses. Prior to her 
conversations with each expert, the researcher shared the revised product for their review 





specific areas of the tool and elicit further suggestions for improvement. The interview 
questions were as follows:  
Product Introduction  
• Which portion(s) of the introductory section best describe(s) the need for this 
type of tool for charter organizations that are considering growth? Why?   
• How clear or unclear are the definitions of proficiency and optimality? 
Explain. If unclear or too general, how can these definitions specifically be 
improved for the product’s users?  
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen the Guidelines for 
Implementation of Workbook Protocol section? Why? 
• After reviewing the introduction, what portion(s) can still be improved? Be 
specific.  
Section A: The Growth Team  
• To what extent is it helpful to include the list of possible Growth Team 
members in this section? Explain.   
• Are there any specific questions in this section that are problematic? If so, 
please designate and share how the question can be re-tailored for 
improvement. 
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen this section? Why?  
Section B: Internal Factors  
• Each internal factor in this section contains example indicators of proficiency.   
o To what extent are these sample indicators helpful or unhelpful to the 





o Please indicate any specific indicators that are unclear or problematic and 
then offer specific suggestions for improvement. 
o As a charter expert, are there any sample indicators that are missing? 
Explain. 
• After the user answers the set of questions for each internal factor in this 
section, do you think it is helpful for the user to conduct an analysis of the 
organization’s overall strengths and weaknesses for the designated factor? 
Why or why not?  
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen this section? Why? 
Section C: External Factors  
• Each external factor in this section contains example indicators of optimality.   
o To what extent are these sample indicators helpful or unhelpful to the 
product’s users? Explain.  
o Please indicate any specific indicators that are unclear or problematic and 
then offer specific suggestions for improvement.    
o As a charter expert, are there any sample indicators that are missing? 
Explain. 
• After the user answers the set of questions for each external factor in this 
section, do you think it is helpful for the user to conduct an analysis of 
opportunities and threats for the designated factor? Why or why not?  






Section D: Determination of Our Overall Readiness for Growth and Next 
Steps 
• Are there any portions of this section that may cause confusion for the user? If 
so, which ones and why? What can be done to improve these portions?  
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen this section? Why? 
Section E: Drafting Our Green Light Criteria  
• Given the product’s purpose, to what extent is this section helpful? Explain.  
• Are there any portions of this section that cause confusion? If so, which ones 
and why? What can be done to improve these portions?  
• What other elements, if any, could be added to strengthen this section? Why? 
It is important to note that the researcher also sought to understand experts’ ideas 
about the validity of the product given any other similar tools that already existed in the 
field and to anticipate any potential obstacles the user group might encounter while 
implementing the product. In turn, the researcher included the following set of 
overarching questions:  
• As a charter expert, what about this product appeals to you the most? Why? 
• As a charter expert, would you recommend that fellow practitioners utilize 
this tool for their growth decision making? Why or why not?  
• There may be other similar tools already in existence to support charters in the 
growth decision-making process. What, if any, elements make this product 
unique or more useful than other similar tools? Explain. 






The researcher’s conversation with each expert was robust and she often asked a 
number of follow-up questions that were not included in the preceding lists in order to 
evoke the expert’s thinking when affirming or challenging specific portions of the 
product.  
Findings  
While each interview was different and experts commented on or responded to 
various portions of the tool, a number of common and important themes also emerged 
across the conversations. The following sections not only summarize these shared ideas, 
but also explain how they support Ready to Scale’s overall validity and justify the 
revisions made by the researcher, which resulted in the final product presented in  
Chapter V.  
Overall validation: Product usefulness and defining elements. While the 
researcher asked her general validation questions at the end of each expert panel 
interview, she included these findings first in the sequence of the second validation 
summary/analysis to underscore that all 10 experts overwhelmingly confirmed that Ready 
to Scale was a valid tool for use in the field. Experts expressed key reasons for the 
product’s usefulness and credibility in the form of several defining elements. First, 
experts affirmed that the tool is a clear, step-by-step roadmap (the first of its kind, which 
will be discussed later in this section) to the growth decision-making process that 
successfully takes the single-site operator or CMO—the user group—through the growth 
decision-making process from start to finish. According to the panel, the “start” is the 
user group fully unpacking “the why”—its rationale or motivation for growth—and the 





campus, which begins to lay the groundwork for the actual work of scaling. The 
roadmap-like structure also ensures that user groups do not become overwhelmed by the 
intricacies of the growth decision-making process. The tool is navigable and the sequence 
of its sections seeks to prevent user groups from getting “bogged down” or “stuck.” 
Experts also confirmed that the tool’s design and structure support the type of 
organization-wide buy-in needed to (a) make the growth decision and (b) actually execute 
the growth, as the following comment indicates:  
     What has to happen is that you have to get everybody in the organization 
bought in, right? And a defined roadmap is more likely to get people bought in 
than just presenting a rubric. If not everybody in the organization has bought into 
the idea of going through a process and really thinking about growth, then it’s not 
going to work. If you have a tool that’s helpful to get us clearly to a decision, then 
I think people are more likely to get on board with the idea of replication.  
 
Additionally, experts affirmed that while the tool’s roadmap requires the user 
group to consider a specific set of internal and external factors, its flexibility—in addition 
to being a roadmap, it is at the same time a guiding protocol—is responsive to the fact 
that charter replication is a highly contextualized process that very much depends on a 
school’s/CMO’s jurisdiction and/or geographical location. One expert in particular 
insisted that it is possible to implement “a flexible tool with fidelity” and this was 
especially appropriate for CMOs that sought to open and operate schools across multiple 
jurisdictions with different per pupil allocations as well as different political and 
community contexts. Another expert said that a rubric could create user perception that 
growth readiness decision making is merely a “really, really long checklist”; instead, 
Ready to Scale requires a charter’s/CMO’s ownership in the growth decision-making 





The third common reason for overall product validity was the way in which 
Ready to Scale demanded deep and documented reflection. More specifically, panelists 
alluded to the intentionality of the tool—its sequence, its questions, and its requirement 
that a charter/CMO set aside time solely dedicated to this type of “self-analysis”:  
     What you’re doing is you’re forcing people to ask the right questions, and if 
they don’t ask all of these questions or at least the vast majority of them, I think 
folks will be going into the growth process without having considered all the 
possibilities. . . . In the end, it could just have been one question that you could 
have asked in the planning time, which could have prevented you from making a 
very big expensive mistake. . . . You have also documented very well the kind of 
thinking that sometimes a very small group of people do inside their heads and 
never share with people in the broader organization or community. And they 
instead announce, “We’re expanding. Surprise!” And I don’t think that’s healthy 
for an organization. I think it’s healthy to go through this kind of exercise, write it 
all down, which makes this an even more useful tool.  
 
The majority of experts alluded to the fact that growth decision making is often 
“rushed” or that growth decisions are made for charter schools or CMOs (which the 
researcher argues is a problematic perception in the penultimate section of this chapter). 
Ready to Scale reminds charters/CMOs that setting aside time for authentic self-
assessment (or as one expert put it, “self-discovery”) assists in mitigating the myriad risks 
that replication presents. 
To support the product’s credibility further, all 10 experts shared that they would 
want colleagues in the charter sector to actually implement the tool. Panelists delineated a 
few common reasons for their rationale to recommend Ready to Scale for charter/CMO 
practitioner use. The tool’s sequence and terminology are user-friendly, especially for 
organizations contemplating growth for the very first time.   
     [F]or a newbie, it would be fairly easy to follow without . . . having an MBA 
or some other like formal training degree-wise. . . . I feel comfortable using this 





craft. But none of which have like any HR training, minimal fiscal training . . . all 
of those things that are really needed for a strong organization to replicate. 
 
Along the same lines, for single-site operators especially, experts suggested that a smaller 
school-based team is not likely to have previous experience with or knowledge of all the 
factors Ready to Scale highlights. Additionally, the product presents a framework that 
insists on a charter’s/CMO’s readiness to navigate the way in which their organizations 
will inevitable evolve prior to, during, and even beyond the growth decision-making 
process. Finally, several experts also commented on the tool’s inclusiveness and attempts 
to prevent solely top-down decision making about growth. One expert stated: 
     [D]ecisions are made at the highest level, and I think this tool really allows for 
a very inclusive process, and I think it shows vulnerability in a field that is just 
used to a pass or fail [regarding decisions]. Oftentimes, especially in Chicago, 
what I’ve seen is that a lot of the charter school decisions are made by the 
founders. The founding principals or the founding EDs, and as time passes, 
they’re not as, they’re not as tied to the day-to-day operations, so I think that they 
lose sight of what it means to be a charter school, what it means to operate on a 
day-to-day basis . . . the tool challenges this. 
 
The way in which the tool addresses top-heavy decision making is addressed later in this 
chapter in the discussion of expert feedback on the product’s “The Growth Team” 
section.  
The expert panel also confirmed that Ready to Scale fills a gap that currently 
exists in the charter sector; several experts used the phrase, “There’s nothing like this tool 
out here.” One expert noted, “I think that there’s nothing really that exists like this out 
there, or if there is, I haven’t found it yet. . . . I’m still on the board of my old charter 
school and we are looking to begin our expansion, so as soon as this is published, we 
need to use this!” Another expert noted that, based on his experience as a charter 





charters/CMOs, he hoped this tool becomes the standard for charter/CMO self-
assessment when contemplating growth:  
     I feel there’s not a high enough bar that says here’s how you grow, here’s how 
you do it well. I think there are philosophies but nothing that puts you to the test 
like [your] guide does. . . . Without it, people are still left guessing and that’s why 
we have this wild range of successful and unsuccessful charter schools and charter 
networks, because there isn’t a playbook in how to begin and prepare for that 
growth in a meaningful way on the charter side of things. I really want to affirm 
the fact that this is a tool that could fundamentally redesign the way charters and 
CMOs expand, and I hope that it becomes something that is prevalent in the 
literature and in the work out there, so charters get off on the right foot when it 
comes to replication. 
 
Several panelists actually made more technical recommendations about how to 
get the tool into the hands of practitioners sooner rather than later. One expert mentioned 
that, after a fair amount of research on her part, the phrase “Ready to Scale” was not 
copyrighted or trademarked and recommended that the researcher work to register the 
product quickly. Several experts recommended the researcher seek services to design the 
tool as a standalone product and convert it to an online application so that user groups 
could engage in the protocol electronically. One expert asked the researcher to consider 
how she would make the tool both accessible and affordable (assuming users would be 
charged for the product’s use) for single-site operators and small CMOs in particular—
the intended audience for Ready to Scale. As this expert stated, “But as I think of our 
current situation at my single-site and our desire to grow, I can’t just Google your tool 
and find it. So it needs to be accessible. If you’re not in the charter “big leagues” like us 
local mom and pop shops, small-time folks, you don’t have access to a tool of this 
quality.” Lastly, several experts affirmed that Ready to Scale is unique in that the 
researcher—an actual charter practitioner who has “lived replication” in several 





experience than someone who is just a consultant, as I mentioned earlier. So I think that’s 
important. I really wanted to call that out because that would be a selling point for me as 
a potential user.”   
While the panel affirmed the tool’s validity, it is important to note that two 
cautionary themes emerged across the panel on what could either potentially go wrong as 
charters/CMOs implement Ready to Scale or what some potential misunderstandings may 
be on the part of the user group. The themes examined the other side of what the panel 
deemed as one of its defining elements—the tool’s flexibility. The first theme was the 
potential for a user group’s subjectivity and “groupthink” to impede the honest self-
assessment that the tool requires. Experts generally agreed that the tool’s thoroughness 
and extensiveness helped to mitigate this possible pitfall, but one expert suggested the 
addition of a “disclaimer”:   
     People are going to look at this and it’s going to be subjective. . . . You might 
have to give a disclaimer that while [the tool] has markers for people to self-
diagnose if they’re proficient or optimal, there’s a subjectivity based on the 
context and the setting of each organization. 
 
Experts noted that beyond an explicit statement warning against subjectivity, having an 
external facilitator to lead the user group through the product’s implementation would be 
critical in guarding against this phenomenon. The researcher further addresses the need 
for an external facilitator in the next section as well. Additionally, the second cautionary 
theme was that, without a visual representation of the decision-making model the tool 
seeks to enact, user groups might try to “pick and choose” which portions of the tool to 
use. As a result, the researcher suggested to experts the inclusion of the conceptual 





they agreed this would be helpful in preventing lack of fidelity in the tool’s complete 
implementation.   
With this overall validation in mind, the researcher next discussed each major 
section of the tool with the experts, who still noted a number of elements that could be 
improved, added, or more explicitly addressed to strengthen the tool and ensure that its 
design and content would be guarded against possible pitfalls in user group 
implementation.  
Feedback analysis for introduction section. For this particular section and in 
response to feedback from the first round of product validation, the researcher sought to 
confirm that (a) she explicitly made the case to charters/CMOs for why the tool was 
necessary to use for growth decision-making and (b) the definitions of proficiency in 
internal factors and optimality in external factors were clearly articulated and easy for 
user groups to grasp. Additionally, experts affirmed several elements of the tool’s 
overarching guidelines for implementation and/or content, while also challenging the 
proposed guidelines for the facilitator’s role and the amount of time needed to implement 
the entire tool. As a result of these and a few other challenges, the researcher made 
several adjustments to the product, as detailed in the last part of this section.   
To make a stronger case to charter/CMO practitioners that it is paramount they 
use Ready to Scale for their growth decision-making process, the researcher added a sub-
section to the introduction entitled “Prevalent Causes for Failed Charters and CMO 
Replicators.” All experts confirmed that this was helpful for highlighting the need for this 
type of tool and, furthermore, intentionally engaging in some type of growth decision-





charters and CMOs are especially susceptible to failure in the areas of fiscal management, 
board governance, and, most importantly, academic quality. One expert characterized 
these “pitfalls” as “effective threats”: “Threats are a real impetus to engage in the Ready 
to Scale process authentically and shakes teams out of their ‘big dreamer’ or ‘overly 
ambitious” thoughts—this is a real reality check upfront.” Another expert actually 
suggested moving the reasons why charters fail, mostly during or after scaling—the 
rationale for the tool—to the beginning of the introductory section to create urgency. 
Additionally, several experts suggested a hard statistic of sorts, asking for citations of 
recent national data on charter school closures to underscore the seriousness of 
undertaking scale. Another expert also connected this urgency to the fact that, while 
scaling comes with risks, the charter sector and its funders/proponents offer very 
attractive incentives for growth:  
     There are a ton of financial incentives for growth, whether it be from the 
federal government or from philanthropy. And actually in the last ten years, there 
was a lot of pressure in the charter community to grow quickly and deal with the 
consequences later, because the thought process was that charters need to gain 
enough market share to have relevance to impact policy. And those were all 
known incentives for growth, whether it’s the money or the relevance or what 
have you, and to me, those are just as much understood but also dangerous 
reasons for growth. And those issues are still prevalent and to me, those are 
additional reasons for why this tool is important.   
 
Still another way to make the case for the product’s use and validity for the user group 
was to state explicitly that the implications for its use go far beyond the “yes” or “no” in 
the decision-making process. In fact, the expert emphasized that the tool’s 
implementation would actually shape eventual growth’s execution and trajectory.   
Regarding the definitions of proficiency and optimality, nine of the 10 experts 





definitions created for the user group; once again, the definitions were open-ended 
enough but also provided adequate guidance to help with the group’s reflection and self-
assessment throughout the entire protocol. The one expert who challenged the definitions 
specifically called into question the “somewhat proficient” and “somewhat optimal” 
designations, citing that this may be an area in which, once again, the user group’s 
subjectivity may come into play, causing them to “inflate” their rating for that particular 
factor. He suggested that the researcher include sample scenarios that clarify the 
“somewhat” rating for user groups or provide some “guard rails” for use of that particular 
rating throughout each section/factor of the tool that requires the “self-rating.” 
Other elements in the introduction that experts emphasized as strengths included 
the fact that the tool was a broad survey, forcing user groups out of the day-to-day or 
“firefighter mode” in order to think more globally and strategically about growth:  
     [T]he strength of the introduction is that it doesn’t overly emphasize one 
[factor] over another. It really is about the whole plan and about the whole field, 
and making sure that your head is thinking in those terms. I think this is very 
grounding for the people who will be using the tool. 
 
Another expert praised how the tool explicitly calls for use of both quantitative and 
qualitative data and evidence throughout the protocol, indicative of what he termed “a 
balanced evidence-based approach” to the growth decision-making process. 
While the panel praised the tool’s required facilitator, they challenged the 
researcher’s thinking and guidance that the facilitator could potentially be an internal 
team member or board member. Experts universally affirmed that the expert must be 
external for several reasons. As previously mentioned, the external nature of the 
facilitator ensured the level of objectivity needed to combat the user group’s potential 





     The external facilitator guards against “blind justification” by the Growth 
Team; the external facilitator, although expensive, is representative of responsible 
decision making on the part of the organization to avoid the pitfall of “we’re 
ready no matter what the outcome of this reflection and decision making process.” 
 
A subset of the panel agreed that not only should the facilitator be external, but 
also a “person of authority.” The researcher probed this particular idea to ensure that the 
tool stayed true to its design and intended use as a self-assessment rather than a tool for 
the authorizer to determine growth readiness for a charter/CMO. While several experts 
insisted that funders and investors had both authority and “clout,” citing that these parties 
have a vested monetary interest in the charter’s/CMO’s success, another expert stated that 
it might be useful to include funders/investors as potential members of the “Growth 
Team” instead (this is discussed later in this chapter). While external, funders and 
investors still have their own interests which are likely “pro-growth” and may not be as 
objective or neutral as a consultant or other external facilitator.   
Another element in the tool’s introductory section that the panel challenged was 
the tool’s guidelines around timeline for implementing the full protocol. The panel 
recommended being more specific about possible timeframes for length of 
implementation to avoid a user group moving too quickly or too slowly. A sub-group 
within the panel recommended a multiple-day, retreat-like setting, citing the need to set 
aside not only time but also physical space to be in the right mindset for this critical 
reflection and self-assessment. 
In response to panel feedback and expert recommendations, the researcher made 





• The “Prevalent Causes for Failed Charters and CMO Replicators” was moved 
to the beginning of the Introduction section to create urgency around the need 
for this particular tool. 
• The most up-to-date data from 2015-2016 on charter closures were included 
to further make the case for why growth decision making is so important. 
• The guidelines for the tool’s facilitator were adjusted to emphasize the 
importance of utilizing someone external to the charter/CMO for objectivity. 
• More potential scenarios were provided for the time required to implement the 
protocol fully in order to mitigate user groups executing in a reasonable 
amount of time, given the weight of the decision on the organization’s future. 
• A specific section was added as an explicit reminder to user groups to be 
mindful of subjectivity throughout the protocol; greater emphasis was on the 
idea that the more objective and evidence-driven the reflection, the more 
effective the protocol’s implementation.  
Feedback analysis for Section A: The Growth Team. This section is intended 
to provide more guidance for charters/CMOs regarding those team members/stakeholders 
critical to the growth decision-making process. In response to adjustments to the tool the 
research made according to the first round of validation, she sought specific feedback on 
the extent to which the explicit list of potential Growth Team members was helpful for 
the user group. Additionally, the panel questioned some critical stakeholders that they 
believed were absent from the Growth Team roster and pushed for clarity on who 





adjustments the researcher made to this section in the final version of the tool, as briefly 
explained at the end of this section.  
Five of the 10 panelists affirmed that the list of possible Growth Team members 
included in the tool’s first revision was satisfactory. A portion of the remaining experts 
expressed concern that, given the researcher’s proposed list, the Growth Team would 
become too large for any real reflection or decision making to occur. One possible 
adjustment to address this would be to call in specific upper- and/or middle-management 
team members for input on only those factors that directly corresponded with their 
position’s responsibilities. Another portion of remaining experts opined on the absence of 
critical stakeholders like parents, students, community members, teachers, other school-
based staff, and even key funders. These experts claimed that the list the researcher had 
added was “too top-heavy.” One expert insisted that it was critical to include these team 
members because they are the ones who will directly experience either the benefits or the 
strain of the organization’s growth on a daily basis. Another expert acknowledged that 
executive and board leadership may not be in touch with the root causes of ongoing 
issues in school settings as well. Interestingly, the researcher compiled the specific list of 
potential Growth Team members from her research interviews with charter/CMO leaders; 
none had mentioned teachers, parents, students, or other stakeholders as members of the 
Growth Team, but rather acknowledged input from these groups in either internal or 
external factor areas (i.e., teacher voice in the internal factor of Human Capital, 
parent/community voice in the external factor of Parent and Community Relations). 
In addition to these pieces of critical feedback, a few other experts pointed out 





perception that the board is not paramount to the growth decision-making process, when 
in fact, as a governing body, they should be providing strategic direction. Another expert 
emphasized explicitly listing the CEO in the table of potential team members and more 
explicitly defining who selects Growth Team members. A portion of the panel also 
expressed concerns about how appropriate the list was for single-site operators, in which 
individual employees may be serving multiple functions.   
In response to the panel’s feedback and concerns in this section, the researcher 
made the following changes to strengthen Section A: The Growth Team:  
• adding explicit guidance on the compilation of the Growth Team, citing that 
the external facilitator should work with the board president, board members, 
CEO, and other executive team members for the purpose of this tool’s 
implementation;  
• revising the list of potential Growth Team members to be more inclusive of 
such key stakeholders as teachers, middle managers, parents, students, and 
community members; however, it was important to note explicitly that for the 
sake of maintaining a manageable group with the capacity to reflect and make 
a decision effectively, the user group might consider calling in corresponding 
stakeholder groups as pertaining to the sections for which they are either 
responsible or that would be of greatest interest to them; 
• moving board members to the top of the list of potential Growth Team 
members to underscore how crucial they are to the growth decision-making 





• adding explicit guidance for single-site operators to ensure that all functions 
are represented within the user group’s Growth Team (i.e., if there is no 
Operations Manager or Director, then the Principal or Executive Director 
should also represent the Human Resource function, the School Operations 
function, and even the Finance function). 
Feedback analysis for Section B: Internal Factors. For Section B: Internal 
Factors, the researcher sought panel feedback on the specific factors discussed in this 
section, as well as their corresponding sample indicators and questions. She encouraged 
the panel to affirm any portion that underscored the tool’s overall validity as well as to be 
critical in signaling indicators/questions that were either problematic or missing. Various 
experts highlighted and praised the inclusion of specific internal factors. In addition, there 
was some consensus among experts on certain indicators that were missing or should be 
adjusted to be even more specific/nuanced within the factors of Governance and Fiscal 
Health.  
Several experts confirmed that the user group’s exploration of “the why” factor 
ensured that the intentions behind the desire to grow were student-/family-focused (rather 
than financially- or reputation-focused).  
Regarding the Organizational Identity factor, several experts highlighted how 
critical this section was to ensuring that a charter/CMO could actually articulate its model 
or, as four panelists termed it, “their secret sauce.” Furthermore, experts affirmed the 
importance of a charter/CMO reflecting on the potential scalability of its model and the 






     Executive leaders need to think through how growing to scale will impact the 
organizational identity. That’s that secret sauce comment I was making earlier. If 
your school is modeled on small school, “I know every student’s name, their 
parents’ name, their cousin’s name, where everybody works,” is that something 
that’s really scalable? And the kind of scaling you’re considering, is that 
appropriate? Maybe it is if you make a bunch of small schools, but then you have 
to have very specific types of people running the small schools to implement 
something like that. I think this is the time you need to have that conversation. In 
those instances where I’ve worked with groups trying to expand, it’s been very 
clear to me that they haven’t thought that through. . . . So I did like that part. 
 
Another expert explained that this section was helpful in pushing charters/CMOs to 
contemplate how well their model will work beyond their current jurisdiction(s):  
     Do you have a school model that you believe works in this community and is 
also going to work in another community? What is it that you have that other 
organizations don’t have AND how is it that you can put what you have elsewhere 
successfully? I don’t know if I’ve ever been with a charter that has fully been able 
to answer that question. And it’s challenging. Look at what has happened to 
[CMO A] and [CMO B] as they achieved success in [one state] only to encounter 
complete chaos in a [different state]. And why is that? Part of it is because it’s a 
completely different market and to do things the same way, they tried to replicate 
like what they are good at in [their home state], and they took some time to codify 
what they thought worked, except that it’s a different community where you’re 
putting it, it’s a different student profile, all that. But that for me is like the, in my 
experience, like the real big factor that expanding CMOs still can’t seem to get 
right.  
 
In other words, charters/CMOs must think about how their model, their secret sauces, 
will be relevant in the potential new markets they seek when contemplating expansion.  
Beyond a charter’s/CMO’s model, according to several panelists, the questions in 
this section also solidified the Growth Team’s common understanding of what the 
organization’s mission and values were and how to implement them. One expert cited 
that this was especially important since a charter’s/CMO’s mission and/or values are 
often challenged at some point during the growth process. Additionally, as it pertained to 
organizational culture, one expert pointed out the importance of ensuring that the user 





     I’ve seen the disconnect between what leadership thinks is a norm/expectation 
and what people on the ground think is the norm/expectation. For instance, what 
will the organization’s response time be to emails? I witnessed a colleague receive 
a reprimand for not responding “quickly enough” to an email that was sent at 
midnight. If rapid response is important, that should be agreed upon and shared 
across the organization.  
 
Another expert said that organizational norms also included a common “mindset” and a 
well-defined organizational “ethos.”  
This same expert connected this notion of a charter’s/CMO’s ethos to the Human 
Capital factor, insisting that once the ethos is well defined, every member of the 
organization should be trained accordingly. Additionally, the content of the employee 
recruitment and selection process should be anchored in the organization’s ethos to 
ensure that teachers and leaders are well aligned.   
Experts shared very targeted feedback for the “Governance” factor as well. 
Beyond ensuring that a charter/CMO has the right types of board members in place, the 
organization and board must commit to preparing for the transition from being a one-
school board to managing a network of two or more schools. One expert in particular 
went on to differentiate between the two types of boards: 
     [Y]ou’re asked to do very different things on those two different types of 
boards, so I think there needs to be an explicit communication during this process 
as to how a board’s responsibilities and maybe even structure might change. . . . 
Or an acknowledgment that it’s not going to change and we’re just going to try 
and make do, if that makes sense. There needs to be a very strong discussion 
about board structure. Not just who’s on it, but what the board’s responsibilities 
are. And so in the Exercise B.4 Governance section, I think it’s worth having an 
additional question. . . . Do we have the right corporate structure to do this? Or do 
we need to change our corporate structure? Which means rewriting our goals 
incorporation and bylaws and maybe starting another 501(c)(3). I think those are 
fundamental questions that will determine how any network of schools can be 






Closely related to this, the same expert who emphasized ethos in previous internal factors 
went on to challenge the researcher to ensure that board members also shape and, further, 
model the charter’s/CMO’s organizational ethos. Additionally, since ethos also 
incorporates core beliefs and mindsets, this expert, along with a few others, emphasized 
that board members must also be culturally competent and demonstrate more than 
surface-level understanding of the communities their schools serve: “Schools are deeply 
embedded in communities and there are expectations that come with that, a cultural 
awareness that’s needed to understand this. . . . Both of these are the responsibility of 
being a board member in a charter school since kids are at stake.” 
Regarding the Fiscal Health factor, several experts provided feedback to expand 
on the existing sample indicators and questions in this particular section. One panelist 
underscored that a charter/CMO must do more than engage in the sound fiscal habit of 
creating 5- and 10-year financial projections. The organization should produce a set of 
projections categorized as “best, middle, and worst.” Additionally, the charter/CMO must 
also have in place a sound protocol for analysis to accompany its financial forecast 
reports: “The question really is what is the impact on our five-year projection of 
increasing enrollment? . . . Like what are the actual dollars and cents of these 
projections?” Also, when an organization is responsible for multiple schools, regarding 
fiscal health, a charter/CMO must decide how it will manage money across a network. 
Three experts underscored determining the course of action when a school is 
underperforming financially or when one school is not funded at the same per-pupil 
allocation as another (in the case of schools in different jurisdictions). In these cases, the 





particular challenges, whether or not the organization will subsidize the school with 
either another school’s funding or tap into the reserves for a bounded period of time until 
the school becomes financially stable again (reaches or exceeds full enrollment). Experts 
also honed in on the importance of aligning financial projects with realistic and attainable 
fundraising targets.  
For the Infrastructure factor, beyond determining the level of autonomy that 
schools have in relation to the network’s central office (decentralization versus 
centralization), several experts underscored the need for explicit systems for 
organizational decision making. One expert called for a charter/CMO to create an actual 
decision-making matrix or tree to clarify who has a say in what as the organization 
expands:  
     It’s just the importance of having an organization that’s got a clear sort of 
decision-making tree. . . . I’m not advocating for a more centralized or more 
decentralized option. I think that knowing what everybody’s allowed to opine on 
is so important. I have been wrangling with this for years in my own CMO . . . 
because as you grow, it’s not four people that can sit around the table and make a 
decision anymore. It’s now twelve people, and the decisions are a lot harder to 
make. So you have to be clear on whose decision is whose to make. 
 
Other experts supported the idea that the creation of explicit guidelines for organizational 
decision making enables leaders to better manage employee expectations, prevent 
pushback, and even mitigate against school teams going rogue. This then disregards non-
negotiables that have been put in place with or without their school’s consultation.  
Closely related to the notion of a charter/CMO articulating its model and 
considering its goodness of fit in potential new communities or jurisdictions, for the 
Growth Mindset and Strategy factor, several panelists emphasized that the organization 





enables the charter/CMO to think through the cultural and socio-emotional needs of a 
prospective new community, in addition to its academic needs.   
In response to the panel’s feedback and concerns in this section, the researcher 
made the following changes to strengthen Section B: Internal Factors:  
• adding a question to Exercise B.2, Organizational Identity, that asks the user 
group to briefly but explicitly define its ethos (core beliefs, mindset, or 
disposition) separately from its mission, values, and brand; 
• adding a question to Exercise B.2, Organizational Identity, to require the user 
group to define or highlight any norms or organizational habits that further 
delineate the charter/CMO’s organizational or “people culture”;  
• revising question B.3b, Human Capital, so that the user group defines how its 
recruitment and selection practices are grounded in its organizational ethos;  
• adding a question to Exercise B.4, Governance, that asks the user group to 
consider what its board must do to prepare to move from being a one-school 
board to a multi-school board; 
• adding a question to Exercise B.4, Governance, that asks the user group to 
assess the board’s current espousal of the charter’s/CMO’s ethos and level of 
cultural competence as it pertains to the community currently served by the 
organization; 
• revising question B.5d, Fiscal Health, to account for the expert 
recommendation that a charter/CMO creates a set of three financial 
projections—best, middle, and worst—for more accurate forecasting and 





• adding a sample indicator of proficiency to section B.6, Infrastructure, that 
designates that a charter/CMO have a clear decision-making matrix, tree, or 
process in place so team members at every level of the organization 
understand their role in specific decisions while the organization continues to 
expand.  
Feedback analysis for Section C: External Factors. For Section C: External 
Factors, the researcher sought panel feedback on the specific factors discussed in this 
section, as well as their corresponding sample indicators and questions. She encouraged 
the panel to affirm any portion that underscored the tool’s overall validity and be critical 
in signaling indicators/questions that were either problematic or missing. While panelists 
affirmed specific factors, they also suggested additional sample indicators of optimality 
or questions to further improve this portion of the tool.   
Several experts affirmed how the Need and Demand factor requires the 
charter/CMO to distinguish between proactively approaching a community for expansion 
exploration or having a community approach them as an organization to explore the 
possibility of a new school in their neighborhood or jurisdiction. They also emphasized 
how laying the foundation in a new community, regardless of who initiated the idea for a 
new school, is still critical (and further highlighted later on in the tool). One expert did 
note that a charter/CMO must consider feeder systems when thinking about need, 
demand, and prospective enrollment:  
     I only say that from experience. Having run a middle school and not having 
kids ready for my school being fed into my school, as many as I thought. So I 
made a miscalculation on feeder systems. I thought there were enough dual-
language programs that they would feed into my school, and they weren’t, they 
weren’t old enough. They were all like three, four years old, so then schools with 





was starting at sixth grade, so I had that gap that was very hard to overcome and 
required some changes to the educational model. 
 
In addition to figuring out enrollment trends, a charter/CMO should not assume that 
students will enter its doors with the prerequisite skills required by its school/academic 
model.   
The panel noted that charters/CMOs tend to make numerous assumptions about 
external factors and their level of optimality, even pertaining to funding—the next 
external factor included in this section of the tool. Several experts noted that 
organizations should be mindful of the grant period for start-up funding, which likely 
does not exceed 2 years:  
     [M]ost foundations like to do start-ups, but they don’t like to do maintenance. 
So your plans for scale, and you start talking about this a little bit at C.2.D and 
C.2.E, you can’t be reliant on public start-up dollars for very long. You have to—
if you’re going to scale up, you’ve got to scale up fairly quickly I think to be 
effective; otherwise, there are a lot of foundations that’ll give you a two-year 
grant, but if you’re not financially viable or if you don’t have big reserves built 
up, year three’s going to be tough. And in charter schools, it’s usually year three 
to five that’s make-or-break. It’s not the first year like a traditional business, so. 
You point that out in C.2.D, which I think is very good.  
 
In turn, a charter/CMO must examine, arguably during the growth decision-making 
process, the extent to which its other funding prospects will alleviate the strain that 
occurs in the first several years of the organization’s replication.  
Charters/CMOs must also be careful not to make assumptions about the physical 
environment, literally the ecological composition, on which its facilities are either located 
or even newly built. Panelists shared how charters/CMOs are often so preoccupied with 
the state of the physical plant and any capital improvements needed that they often 
overlook other critical assessments. One expert shared her experience when opening a 





alleviate the dangers and harmful effects of coal waste, much more unanticipated work 
needed to be done, turning a 14-million-dollar renovation of the building into a 28-
million-dollar project. Additionally, charters/CMOs should add an additional 6 months to 
a year onto new construction and/or renovation timelines to account for the 
aforementioned needs assessments, zoning, and permit acquisition.  
For the Political Context, Policy, and Climate factor, experts also affirmed the 
inclusion of this factor as one of its external elements with which replicating 
charters/CMOs struggle the most:  
     [Political dynamics] can be the something that completely throws your charter 
off kilt, and pushes you out of a community or actually opens up the gates to 
allow you in. And I think that we don’t always want to believe that it could be a 
possibility that a school actually closed because of the political climate. It’s really 
hard to kind of make that concession or bring that to a level of awareness in the 
field. And so politics is a controversial element and different for every charter, but 
it’s so helpful that you included because it’s a reality that a lot of schools are 
facing. 
 
The final portion of this panelist’s statement also supported the notion that charter 
replication and operation are, once again, very varied across jurisdictions and authorizers. 
Another expert insisted that a charter/CMO must assess the quality or strength of its 
authorizer. Rather than capitalizing on a weak authorizer to achieve rapid growth, a 
charter/CMO must think through the operational support (like start-up funding) and 
accountability metrics (like growth-oriented goal establishment) that an authorizer will 
facilitate. A weak authorizer can actually undermine a charter’s/CMO’s ability to grow 
successfully if authorizer systems regarding funding and policies are non-existent, low 
quality, or in flux.  
Experts emphasized once more how cultural competence comes into play again 





consider the potentially different needs of subgroups within broader ethnic or racial 
populations that it either serves or seeks to serve as a result of opening new schools. One 
expert shared how Puerto Rican families bucked against a school and academic model 
that emphasized how Hispanic immigrants can successfully assimilate into American 
society: “Of course those families looked at us like we were crazy since they were born 
U.S. citizens!” 
Pertaining to community relations specifically, several panelists suggested that a 
charter/CMO should determine if there is any correlation between political support and 
community support and how those dynamics will impact the growth process. One expert 
gave an example with this scenario: “[W]e notice that it’s optimal that the community is 
begging us to come here, but politically it’s not a charter-school-friendly place and 
they’re going to fight us every way. Will we still going to go forward with growth? Is that 
community support enough for us?” A charter/CMO must consider what strategies it will 
put in place to navigate any dissonance (or build upon a consonance) between elected 
officials and the community during the growth decision-making process.   
In response to the panel’s feedback and concerns in this section, the researcher 
made the following changes to strengthen Section C: External Factors:  
• adding a question to Exercise C.1, Need and Demand, to ensure that the user 
group acquires preliminary information on feeder systems in relation to the 
prerequisite skills/experiences needed for successful transition into their 
school/academic model; 
• revising question C.2d, Funding, to account for the user group’s preliminary 





grant periods and donations can help sustain the organization throughout the 
first several years of replication;  
• adding a sample indicator of optimality to section C.3, Facilities, that 
describes how an environmental needs assessment assures that the 
physical/ecological grounds are clear for occupation without any additional 
significant costs; 
• adding a sample indicator of optimality to section C.3, Facilities, that 
describes how the charter’s facility acquisition and preparatory timeline has at 
least 6 to 12 extra months built in for zoning, permits, and so on; 
• revising question C.4e, Political Context, Policy, and Climate, to ensure the 
user group assesses its authorizer’s strengths and weaknesses in the areas of 
funding, policy, operational support, and accountability;  
• adding a question to Exercise C.5, Parent and Community Relations, to ensure 
that the user group assesses its level of cultural and contextual (i.e., 
understanding a certain neighborhood’s history) competence as it pertains to 
the current community it serves and potential future communities, should it 
move forward with its expansion plans; 
• adding a question to Exercise C.5, Parent and Community relations, that asks 
the user group to compare political will to community will as it pertains to the 
organization’s expansion and to assess how the correlation between these two 
key elements might impact potential replication.  
Feedback analysis for Section D: Determination of Our Overall Readiness to 





instructions and navigability. During the first round of validation, survey respondents 
indicated that this section was much too vague, causing confusion about how to execute 
its exercises fully and effectively. As a result, the researcher added specific, explicit 
instructions for this portion of the tool. In turn, the second validation’s expert panel 
confirmed that this addition was now easy to understand and use. Some experts made a 
few additional suggestions to improve this part of the tool even further. One expert 
advocated for the inclusion of a brief note about the tool’s flexibility to remind the user 
group that it bore the onus of completing honest and authentic reflection:   
     I would say this is where the organization is going to take it where they want 
to go with it. And I think that’s fine. Like it’s up to them to sort of say, “Well, we 
have two things we’re not proficient in, but that’s not going to stop us from 
growing. That still means we’re ready, right?” But so I think a statement just 
letting people know it’s okay to be flexible here would help. 
 
In alignment with the “subjectivity disclaimer” in the Introduction, the external facilitator 
can also be the “check” against the user group’s “pro-growth” disposition.   
A subset of the panel insisted that, after compiling the ratings for each section and 
making the growth determination, it would be beneficial for the user group to literally 
step away from the process in order to allow the appropriate amount of processing and 
then return to the decision after having thought through any other potential pitfalls or 
risks:   
     Set it aside, let it marinate. We made a decision as a group, but instead of 
immediately acting on it, let it rest. Then come back . . . and have the same group 
[Growth Team] act as their own critical thinker. I always like to try to posture 
myself in a group that seems to be going one way as the critical thinker, that sort 
of naysayer. I always use my law degree as my excuse. “Well, I’m supposed to 
worry about risk, so what’s the risk here?” . . . it might lead to a more in-depth 
discussion about particular risks. Someone may have new ideas about how to 
solve for those risks. Or alternatively, you might see some risks that you hadn’t 





to be an endless process, but you know, when you’re making such a critical 
decision, it’s—there’s value in looking at your decision carefully. 
 
Another expert suggested that the group actually physically separate to complete this 
particular portion of the tool individually first. Growth Team members would then turn 
their reflections in to the facilitator, who would read highlights of every person’s ideas 
and thoughts to the entire group and facilitate a discussion and final group-wide 
determination accordingly. In this way, all voices are heard in the decision-making 
process; the user groups ensure that even the most reserved team members’ ideas are 
heard and the facilitator trumps any “existing hierarchies” when briefly sharing each 
person’s overarching ideas.  
In response to the feedback that experts shared for this portion of the tool, the 
researcher made the following changes to Section D: Determination of Our Overall 
Readiness to Grow:  
• adding a statement, aligned with the Introduction’s caution against 
subjectivity, that emphasizes the tool’s flexibility and, in turn, the heightened 
responsibility of the user group to collaborate with the facilitator in order to 
produce a fair, accurate, and evidenced-based determination of the 
charter’s/CMO’s readiness for scale;  
• adding further guidance that allows the user group to consider completing this 
section individually and then coming back together to either share out 
themselves or have the external facilitator share out to the whole group, with 






• adding more guidance that allows the user group to pause after it comes to a 
consensus, to step away from the protocol, reflect on potential risks or 
consequences of its growth readiness decision, and return to share potential 
obstacles and solutions for addressing them proactively.  
Feedback analysis for Section E: Drafting Our Green Light Criteria. The 
researcher asked the panel members to share the extent to which they thought it was 
helpful to include this final section in the tool. The majority of experts agreed that it was 
useful in providing a “springboard” of sorts for the phase that comes after a charter/CMO 
makes the growth decision—implementing the scaling process. One particular expert 
noted how this final section was a “value add” because teams can begin to discuss what is 
most important to them for opening: whether it is having an internally-grown school 
leader in place or being in the building before August. Otherwise, if teams are not on the 
same page about what they value as they begin the scaling process, they can get into what 
one expert knew from his own experience was:  
  a frantic tizzy that puts everyone under a lot of unnecessary stress that could 
have been avoided. . . . The unfortunate and unintended consequence is that all of 
the other capacity that is actually needed to support your currently existing 
schools sort of goes by the wayside because everybody’s focused on this new 
opening fire or this new opening crisis. I think that the more people can be 
strategic and have plans or blueprints, the better off your replication 
implementation, while also maintaining what your already established schools 
will be. Besides, you can’t seek new schools at the expense of your currently 
existing ones! 
 
Another piece of useful feedback on this section was structural in nature. An 
expert shared how such a small table with so few rows might unintentionally limit or 
restrict the ability of the group to truly brainstorm criteria that it can further discuss and 





this section by adding additional rows to the Green Light Criteria table in the tool to 
incite more robust thinking and brainstorming. 
Other notable themes. Three other notable themes emerged from the expert 
panel interviews conducted during this second round of product validation. First, the 
majority of experts praised the inclusion of internal factors in the protocol. The panel 
noted how these factors are often overlooked because the standard indicators of 
replication readiness over the last 10 to 15 years have been facilities and funding. In her 
conversations with each expert, the researcher explained that the way she sequenced the 
factors—internal and then external—was intentional and aligned with how the research 
subjects responded to questions on internal and external factors. This is further discussed 
in the final section in this chapter, Of Critical Note: The Researcher’s Aspirations and 
Arguments.  
The second theme that emerged can best be described as general skepticism 
towards charter schools and CMOs regarding their behavioral tendencies in relation to 
growth decision making. This was fascinating in that the panel experts either currently 
are or were charter/CMO practitioners. Panelists used numerous words or phrases, as well 
as posed several questions, that indicated that charters’/CMOs’ desire to grow and even 
their skewed sense of organizational self overshadow responsible decision making in this 
instance:  
• Will operators and organizations truly take the time?  
 
• Will people on the Growth Team really be honest about their performance and 
their situation? 
 
• There are charters that really are doing well and then there’s charters who 
think they’re doing well and use that as justification to grow, even though 






• Will people gerrymander this process you’ve created to get what they want?  
Money to ensure their organizations are financially viable in the long term. . . .  
 
• Will people actually believe in and value the growth decision-making process 
. . . it’s not about how good your tool is, it’s about the user’s ultimate agenda 
of growth for money or, frankly, for growth’s sake. . . . 
 
Other words and phrases used in reference to charter leaders and related to the 
growth process included narcissism, bravado, arrogance, egomaniacal, and 
undisciplined. Other experts alluded to the fact that charters may not have a say in 
whether or not they grow:  
     You have to make quick decisions about growth, really. You’ll get a phone call 
from the mayor’s office or authorizer saying, ‘Well, we have a building here, do 
you guys want to replicate?’ or “Politically, we have a twelve-month window 
where we can authorize a bunch of charter schools. You guys should just replicate 
while you can.”   
 
These findings are further considered in the final section of this chapter as well.  
The last additional notable theme that emerged was the notion that much capacity 
building needs to be done around ensuring that charters and CMOs develop a full 
understanding of the preparation needed, through a process like Ready to Scale, to begin 
contemplating replication. As one expert stated:  
     There is work to do. There’s education work to do to get schools and 
organizations to acknowledge the capacity needed to use this type of tool in the 
first place. Isn’t this the case with most schools . . . that there needs to be 
incentive, and so . . . I’m focused on is there an education component or is there a 
hook to this tool’s implementation, meaning wouldn’t it be awesome if like in 
order to get the federal charter starter money, wouldn’t it be awesome if you had 
to actually use a tool like this as part of the application process? This tool is 
scripted enough to be the standard for charter scaling. . . . Why shouldn’t there be 
something that’s standard [like this tool] out there that covers all the bases? But 







While the researcher agrees that charters and CMOs need to be educated on and have 
access to a tool, a standard, which Ready to Scale presents, she takes issue with the 
notion that incentives from an authoritative and oversight-providing body like the U.S. 
Department of Education must be put in place for responsible growth decision making. 
This idea is also discussed further at the end of this chapter.   
Expert Panel’s Suggestions and Questions for Further Research   
While conducting the research for this study and validating the Ready to Scale 
product, the researcher formulated her own ideas for future exploration that are detailed 
at the end of Chapter V. However, in the expert panel interviews, several interviewees 
shared ideas for additional consideration beyond this study, which are worthy of 
consideration and briefly detailed here. First, while the research for this study has 
provided some preliminary insights, an extension of this work might involve a deeper 
examination of organizational behavior of replicating charters.  As the experts conveyed 
in the previous section, one of the root causes of the skepticism surrounding charter/CMO 
capacity to engage in this type of preparation for scale is the uncertainty around whether 
or not the organization actually has the will or discipline to follow a protocol like Ready 
to Scale with fidelity.   
Second, an extension of this study could further explore the “growth process 
cycle” within a CMO. After opening three to five schools, should a charter/CMO revisit 
its Green Light criteria? What are the benchmarks in the growth plan? As the 
organization grows to scale and more schools comprise a larger network, what happens 





schools begin to slip? Is this an unintended consequence of scale because leadership and 
governance are intently focused on newer campuses?  
The panel’s additional suggestions pertain specifically to a further refinement of 
the Ready to Scale tool. One expert shared how it may be helpful in the future (since this 
is beyond the scope of the present study) to determine through further research which 
factors, whether internal or external, are the threshold for scaling. For instance, he 
suggested that if a charter/CMO had optimal conditions in facilities and funding as well 
as proficient status regarding its academic performance, the organization seemed, at a 
minimum, ready to scale. Another expert suggested that, in the future, it would be helpful 
to consider creating the “other volume, the sequel, or Part II”—how to grow to scale. This 
How to Scale manual would really push the user group to think through every aspect of 
each of the factors included in Ready to Scale, not through a checklist but, once again, 
through a series of detailed questions.  
Yet another expert suggested that the researcher add a different version of “Part 
II” to Ready to Scale in the form of several case studies on single-site operators and 
CMOs that either succeeded or failed in the scaling process. The common thread running 
through each case study would be an assessment of each organization’s growth readiness 
decision-making process using the Ready to Scale tool (i.e., How many and/or which 
factors did each organization designate as proficient or optimal? What was the correlation 
between these ratings during the decision phase and how did the organization perform 
when implementing growth?). The same expert went on to say: 
     No one’s going to knock every one of these [factors] out of the park, right? But 
I think the goal here, the tool is that it will help tell people where the very bright 
line between ready and not ready, or between absolutely ready, maybe ready, and 






Moreover, adding several case studies that span a broad cross-section of 
charters/CMOs also underscores the notion that charter replication is highly 
contextualized. Therefore, growth decision making using a roadmap like Ready to Scale 
may be more helpful than a detailed rubric that lacks the flexibility to address the nuances 
of charter replication.  
Conclusion 
Twelve in-depth interviews with charter and CMO executive leaders from 10 
different states yielded a robust set of findings related to this study’s research questions. 
The study’s first question was: “To what extent do charter and CMO leaders value the 
notion of “readiness” when growing to scale?” The leaders who participated in this study 
collectively shared that preparedness to replicate is paramount to the charter’s/CMO’s 
continued success, especially as it pertains to the organization’s ongoing achievement of 
academic results. These leaders also expressed that, in hindsight, had their organizations 
been better prepared for the replication process as it related to the level of “health” or 
proficiency of certain internal organizational components or response to the external 
factors that could either help or hurt their growth, some of the obstacles, setbacks, and 
even failures of their scaling experiences could have been mitigated or prevented 
altogether.   
The study’s second question was: “Which internal organizational components and 
external factors have the greatest impact on a charter school or charter management 
organization’s readiness for replication?” The leaders’ interviews revealed that while 





a common set of internal factors that matter most for preparedness to scale and future 
success in these efforts—namely, “the why,” organizational identity, human capital, 
governance, fiscal health, infrastructure, and growth mindset and strategy. The interviews 
also revealed that while charters and CMOs operate in varied geographical locations that 
are characterized by a unique set of political, community, and legislative dynamics, there 
is a common set of external factors that matter most for preparedness to scale and future 
success in these efforts—namely, need and demand; funding; facilities; political context, 
policy, and climate; parent and community relations; and collaboration and competition 
inside and outside the sector.   
The study’s third question was: “How do we define proficiency in those internal 
organizational components and optimality in those external factors that are crucial in 
determining a charter’s/CMO’s readiness to scale?” During their interviews, leaders 
provided several examples of proficiency and optimality that the researcher summarized 
in the previous sections of this chapter. At the same time, the group shared the idea that 
pinpointing an exact definition of proficiency or optimality was difficult because the 
internal conditions and external circumstances for each charter and CMO are so diverse. 
However, what leaders did emphasize was that charters and CMOs must invest time, 
thought, and even financial resources in the process of considering each factor and 
weighing readiness and optimality. Further, these leaders offered insights into their own 
practice of: (a) selecting a specific set of criteria they believed was critical to growth 
readiness, and (b) designing and enacting a process that allowed them to evaluate the 
extent to which they met their selected criteria in order to determine if the organization 





this practice—“green lighting” replication. Thus, while the researcher had originally set 
out to determine more precise definitions of internal proficiency and external optimality, 
the findings from the study instead offered examples and practices for other practitioners 
in the field to consider when making their own growth readiness decisions.   
The other major goal of this study was to create an assessment tool for charter and 
CMO leaders to use in determining their organization’s readiness to scale. The researcher 
utilized both the literature and findings to build this product. She then engaged 16 charter 
school and CMO experts from across the country in a review of the draft product in order 
to provide feedback on its validity for future use in the field. Via the survey they took, the 
experts also suggested concrete ways to improve the product; the researcher took their 
feedback into consideration and revised the product to make it as comprehensive and 
useful as possible. The experts’ review of the product also confirmed several overarching 
ideas. First, charter and CMO leaders will often consider external factors when making 
decisions about scale, but must also execute an in-depth internal reflection to ensure that 
their organizations can withstand the growth process. Second, charter and CMO leaders 
can more effectively conduct their assessment of internal and external factors with 
explicit direction and guidance from a protocol such as the one the tool offers. Third, 
charter and CMO leaders must carefully consider the composition of the team of 
employees that make a charter’s/CMO’s growth readiness decision, including each team 
member’s areas of expertise and general disposition towards the organization’s capacity 
for growth. Finally, charter and CMO leaders must have a variety of data on hand—
student achievement data, enrollment data, demographic data, financial data, among 





Of Critical Note: The Researcher’s Aspirations and Arguments 
This study’s first research question sought to assess the extent to which charter 
schools, whether single-site operators or charter management organizations (CMOs), 
value readiness for growth. Throughout the interviews conducted to inform the product’s 
design as well as the survey and panel that supported its refinement, there was a common 
underlying theme—as briefly mentioned earlier in the Other Notable Themes section of 
this chapter—that many charters are going to pursue growth because they have been 
given an incentive like obtaining a building for $1 (as happens in Chicago) to which they 
cannot say “no” or being told by the mayor that he can grant 10 new campuses over the 
course of 5 years (as also happens in Chicago) to which they cannot say “no.” As one 
expert panelist put it, “We all know charters are going to grow whether ready or not . . . 
they’re just going to do it anyway.” The researcher has asked herself over the last 3½ 
years dedicated to completing this study, “Is this indicative of some type of charter or 
CMO organizational behavioral pattern that has not yet been fully studied or analyzed? Is 
this behavior not reckless or problematic? Does this stem from the fact that the charter 
movement is grounded in the notion that we are the ones that have autonomy, that we are 
the ones that do not have to ‘play by the rules’ that are in place for traditional public 
schools?” Regardless, in reviewing and re-reviewing the research and findings and then 
validating the Ready to Scale tool twice now, the researcher has realized a clear 
aspiration as both a researcher and a practitioner: Regarding readiness for growth, the 
researcher wants to change charter and CMO dispositions and behavior with the 





Having grappled professionally in her last three leadership roles in CMOs that 
have scaled for arguably the wrong reasons (i.e., financial sustainability, notoriety, 
political favors, growth for the sake of growth, etc.), the researcher cannot allow her 
fellow practitioners to continue making such statements as, “We just kind of fell into the 
business of running a whole bunch of schools.” Instead, charters and CMOs must realize 
that no matter how promising the incentives for growth are, our autonomy actually 
empowers us to make a conscious choice about our readiness to scale and about the 
actual need for our organizations to grow. Our autonomy affords us the opportunity to say 
“no” to incentives that may seem promising or to political pressure that may seem 
threatening in the short term, but whose implications may hurt our deserving students and 
families as well as our hardworking teachers and leaders in the long term.  
The researcher unequivocally states that she is still a proponent of charter and 
CMO growth. Having led it and lived through its consequences and lessons several times 
now as a public school educator, it is ingrained in her professional “design” and 
documented in the way she has worked to form this particular study. In fact, some of the 
schools in previous CMOs where the researcher has worked are now the top-performing 
charter schools in their respective cities—definitely worth the literal “growing pains.” 
But 26 years into the charter movement, the researcher also affirms that we need to move 
beyond the sole or primary consideration of external factors in growth readiness decision 
making. In the same way that transformational leaders possess a certain level of 
emotional intelligence anchored in self-awareness, transformational schools must also 
possess the organizational version of emotional intelligence in the form of the 





assessment proactively—not because an authorizer said so or because an incentive is tied 
to the process, but because it is the right thing to do to ensure that we improve our 
practice to serve our students and families better. In other words, internal factors matter, 
maybe even more than external factors do at this point in the rapid expansion of charters 
and CMOs across the country.  
Given that the majority of this study’s interview subjects—leaders of top-
performing, large-scale CMOs who are also graduates of the esteemed Aspen Pahara 
Institute and the highly sought-after Broad Residency—spent time candidly detailing 
their internal lessons learned to the researcher over the phone, in person, and via 
FaceTime speaks to the shift that must happen now so that there are no shortcuts to 
growth readiness (i.e., once I meet the minimum threshold criteria in the authorizer 
application, I’m just going to go for it!). As the charter leaders and validators/panelists 
have emphasized in this study, single charter school campuses and even fairly 
experienced CMOs must consider all internal factors and external factors in order to 
prepare for effective first-time or ongoing implementation of expansion. While this tool 
is not a guide to implementation, it provides the preliminary blueprint that has the 
potential—if used intentionally, authentically, and with fidelity—to set a charter school 
or CMO up for successful execution. Assessing readiness for scale is the incredibly-hard-
but-worth-it-work that all stakeholders—authorizers, elected officials, funders, and, most 
importantly, families and students—should hold charter/CMO leaders accountable for so 










READY TO SCALE: A READINESS ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR 




While more and more charters and CMOs seek to replicate, the sector continues to 
experience closures of single campuses and (less frequently) small networks of schools. 
During the 2015-2016 school year, 400 new charter schools opened, but over half of them 
(272) also closed within that same timeframe (National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools [NAPCS], 2016a). The Center for Education Reform (2011) cited that 
historically, the annual rate of charter closure has held steady at nearly 15%. These 
closures underscore several prevalent causes for charters and CMOs that are seeking to 
replicate, especially in the areas of effectiveness of academic program, fiscal oversight, 
and board governance. Charters and CMOs must continue to hold themselves internally 
accountable in these areas rather than rely on the oversight that most charter authorizers 
are required to provide by law (Center for Education Reform, 2011). 
Lack of student achievement and, in turn, the quality and effectiveness of the 
academic program, trends as one of the leading causes for charter and CMO failure 





academic impact is even more tenuous for smaller CMOs, who must set up systems and 
support to ensure consistent results within their own networks of schools. Whether single 
campus or CMO, consistent underperformance—not meeting the expectations for Annual 
Yearly Progress (AYP) for student growth and attainment on state-mandated tests—over 
the course of several years causes authorizers to revoke charter organizations’ contracts 
(Carpenter, 2008; Center for Education Reform, 2004; Gau, 2006). Financial troubles—
both mismanagement and malfeasance—have been another driver for charter and CMO 
shuttering, with 41% of closures being attributed to this particular factor (Carpenter, 
2008; Center for Education Reform, 2004; Gau, 2006).  
Charter organizations that do not have a long-term financial plan in place or 
proper oversight structures intact begin to spiral towards closing for a number of reasons, 
including a lack of leadership with the capacity to manage finances; lack of infrastructure 
to manage basic financial business processes such as accounts payable, poor credit 
ratings, and debt management (for those organizations that have sought financing to fund 
new construction for school facilities); and even serious ethical infractions (i.e., 
embezzlement, conflicts of interest regarding vendors, etc.) (Carpenter, 2008; Center for 
Education Reform, 2004). Some charters and CMOs simply cannot maintain consistent 
revenue for operations, which is usually tied to low enrollment coupled with the 
aforementioned inequities that exist in charter funding in most states across the country 
(Center for Education Reform, 2004). 
Finally, ill-governed charters and CMOs have also faced closure (Carpenter, 





boards with the following characteristics had an overall negative impact on the 
organization and its performance, both academically and financially:  
• dominated by founder or management company; 
• infractions against bylaws detailing duties of loyalty, obedience, and/or 
oversight; 
• lack of internal cohesion and/or role confusion; 
• excessive board member turnover; and  
• unprofessional behavior (micromanagement) towards organization’s staff.  
It is important to note that for both charters and CMOs, some have actually been able to 
replicate and open more campuses even while facing difficulties in the areas of 
performance, finance, and governance (Center for Education Reform, 2004; Gau, 2006).   
Again, while some would hold that authorizers are responsible for allowing this to 
occur, these particular cases highlight the responsibility that charters have to assess their 
own organizational health frequently, especially when contemplating and/or planning for 
scale. This assessment is a rigorous process. It requires leadership and governance to do a 
careful evaluation of a number of factors that will directly impact their capacity to expand 
successfully in order to answer the question: “Are we truly ready to grow?”  
Context 
Throughout the last two decades, public charter schools have become key players 
in bringing about change and producing improved educational outcomes for America’s 
students, especially those faced with challenging socioeconomic circumstances in urban, 
suburban, and rural settings. Charters were not always praised or acknowledged as major 





However, since 1991, the year in which Minnesota passed the first law allowing charter 
school operations, nearly 40 states and the District of Columbia have adopted similar 
legislation, leading to the present day’s 5,500 charter schools that serve nearly 1.7 million 
students (Buckley & Schneider, 2007; Frumpkin, Manno, & Edgington, 2011). The 
charter sector’s relatively rapid expansion should indicate its ability to yield student 
success consistently, as measured by achievement on standardized assessments and 
graduation rates. However, current research has suggested that charters actually continue 
to produce mixed achievement results in comparison to their peers—traditional public 
schools (Buckley & Schneider, 2007; Center for Research on Education Outcomes 
[CREDO], 2013; Frumpkin et al., 2011).   
Despite these inconsistent outcomes across the sector, charters still market 
themselves as a high-quality alternative to a family’s neighborhood school, offering 
parents and students more instructional time via a longer school day and school year, 
personalized attention for the individual student through smaller class sizes, myriad 
methods for parents to become more involved in the school community, and (depending 
on the charter school’s/organization’s external partnerships) the opportunity to engage in 
internships and college-level coursework and programs. Most importantly, most charters 
have the autonomy to design their own curriculum and, as a result, guarantee families that 
their students will graduate “college and career ready” thanks to a rigorous academic 
program (Frumpkin et al., 2011).   
While some charters over-deliver on these lofty promises and others fail to meet 
these expectations, parent and broader community demand for “better-than-the-





lengthy waiting lists demonstrate. According to the NAPCS (2013), in Summer 2013, the 
total number of students on charter wait lists across the country was 920,007. Sector 
experts project that this number will continue to grow and likely exceed one million in 
2014 (NAPCS, 2013). A recent parent survey from the NAPCS (2013) also found that 
families were astutely aware that the number of charter seats was limited and, in turn, 
sought to increase their child’s chances of obtaining one of those seats by placing 
themselves on several wait lists.  
In response to this extraordinary stakeholder demand, single-campus charter 
schools (referred to as “charters” throughout this tool), as well as charter management 
organizations (CMOs), have realized the need to grow, as indicated by parents and 
families voicing and exercising their rights to pursue the limited number of quality seats 
currently available across the public school sector.  
The replication process is multifaceted and requires careful planning and detailed 
execution; however, before a school or CMO can commence on its growth trajectory, its 
executive leadership and governance must determine the organization’s level of 
preparedness for expansion. This determination is not easily made and the stakes are 
high. As new campuses open, there is no guarantee that those schools will produce the 
same level of student achievement results. The more prepared charters and CMOs are 
from an internal standpoint regarding organizational health, as well as a risk-assessment 
perspective regarding external factors, the more likely the charter/CMO will be able to 






Overview of This Tool and How to Use It 
Ready to Scale is a growth readiness assessment tool designed to support charter 
school and CMO leadership teams and boards in this evaluation. The tool itself takes the 
form of this workbook of sequenced exercises. Its contents are based on an extensive 
review of current literature on charter and CMO replication, as well as a qualitative study 
conducted with executive leaders from successful CMOs across the United States whose 
organizations have grown from one school to upwards of 50 schools over the last two 
decades. This research highlighted several internal and external factors that are critical to 
a charter’s/CMO’s ability to grow.  
In Section B of the workbook, leaders and board members will work together to 
determine their level of proficiency in the following internal factors that directly impact 
expansion. In Section C, they will also assess whether or not the following external 
factors are optimal for expansion.   
Table 10 





“The Why” Need and Demand 
Organizational Identity Funding 
Human Capital Facilities 
Governance Political Context, Policy, and Climate 
Fiscal Health Parent and Community Relations 
Infrastructure Collaboration and Competition Inside and 
Outside the Sector 





Each internal and external factor includes a brief explanation of its connection to 
a charter’s/CMO’s readiness for expansion. In some instances, this explanation also 
details several sub-factors that comprise the overarching factor. Moreover, it contains 
examples of proficiency or optimality for the user group to consider. Directly following 
each explanation is a table that contains an exercise. Each exercise includes the following 
components:  
• several key questions that the group completing this workbook should 
consider and discuss together; 
• prompts that allow the group to assess the organization’s strengths and 
weaknesses for internal factors or potential opportunities and threats for 
external factors; and  
• a concluding question that prompts the group to decide collaboratively the 
organization’s level of proficiency for internal factors and level of optimality 
for external factors. 
Methodology for Question and Prompt Design 
Each of the following exercises contains several questions or prompts for the user 
group. Using the literature and the findings from the Ready to Scale study’s interviews, 
the researcher composed open-ended questions and prompts to align with their designated 
internal or external factors. Additionally, the questions and prompts were designed to 
help user groups engage in a deeper analysis of those factors that specifically pertained to 
preparing for growth, as detailed in the explanation of each factor that precedes its 
corresponding set of questions. Some questions also require the user group to be as 





will impede their ability to be ready for growth. Finally, some of the questions include a 
prompt that signals to the user group that they should use concrete data or evidence to 
support their responses. 
SWOT analysis. According to the second bullet on Page 214, the workbook’s 
exercises incorporate the SWOT analysis protocol. SWOT is an acronym for “Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats.” Originally utilized in the private sector by 
corporations to evaluate their “core benefits,” their position in the market, and how they 
could continue to grow, the tool has proved useful in other industries including education 
(Gomer & Hille, 2015). For Section B, the user group will identify strengths and 
weaknesses for each internal factor. For Section C, the user group will identify 
opportunities and threats for each external factor. Including the SWOT analysis protocol 
is another opportunity for the user group to evaluate its organization’s internal strengths 
and how optimal external factors are in relation to readiness for replication.   
Definitions and ratings: Proficiency and optimality. Each of the workbook’s 
exercises concludes by requiring the user group to assign its organization a rating for 
each of the aforementioned factors. For internal factors, the ratings are “Proficient,” 
“Somewhat Proficient,” and “Not Proficient.” For external factors, the ratings are 
“Optimal,” “Somewhat Optimal,” and “Not Optimal.” According to the literature and the 
findings of the study conducted with charter/CMO leaders, this workbook offers the 
following guidance on definitions for “proficient” and “optimal”:  
• Proficient: “We consider our organization’s performance to be strong in this 
internal factor. The current level at which we operate in this factor area will 





• Optimal: “We consider this external factor to be in our organization’s favor. 
The external conditions in this factor area will positively support and sustain 
us throughout the replication process.” 
Since many charters and CMOs have unique models and histories, and because they 
operate in a wide variety of geographic regions, policy environments, and political 
contexts, leaders and boards will consider their responses to the exercises’ questions as 
well as their “Strengths-Weaknesses” and “Opportunities-Threats” analyses in order to 
determine each rating.  
Section D engages participants in such a way so that they can accomplish the 
workbook’s primary outcome: generating consensus based on their assessment of the 
aforementioned internal and external factors, the group will decide, “Are we ready to 
grow? Why or why not?” This section also requires the user group to preliminarily think 
through immediate next steps after their determination of readiness, as well as how they 
might prepare to share their decision and rationale with the broader organization.  
If the group determines that its charter/CMO is in fact ready to grow, Section E is 
a brainstorming exercise in which the group drafts a set of preliminary criteria that it can 
use to “hit the go button” and open its next new school.   
Again, this workbook serves as an extended protocol, with the decision-making 
model below as its anchor, to guide teams through a reflection and discussion of internal 













Guidelines for Implementation of Workbook Protocol 
The user group will be most successful if it utilizes the following overarching 
guidelines when executing the workbook’s protocol:  
• Conduct this protocol in a group setting. 
The protocol’s questions are meant to generate robust and engaging discussion 
among a group of participants as they move through each section of the 
workbook together.   
• Ensure that both executive leadership team members and board 
members participate.   
Executive management and board members, including the board chair, should 
be present and actively participate; the literature and Ready to Scale findings 
indicated that board members are key to scaling success given the strategic 
guidance, support, and resources they provide for the organization’s 
management team. 
• Be prepared to dedicate a sizable amount of time to conduct the protocol.  
It will likely take a significant time for participants to generate the consensus 
needed to achieve the protocol’s aforementioned outcome. One example of 
managing time for this protocol is for the users to implement it over the course 
of several days during a senior leadership retreat. Another example of 
managing time for this protocol is to engage in a day-long session one to two 
times a week over the course of a period; this allows for conducting focus 





recommended that the user group not exceed a month’s time to execute this 
protocol.  
• Choose an external facilitator.  
The facilitator(s) is/are responsible for leading and moving the group through 
each section of the workbook while being mindful of time spent on each 
section. Every facilitator must be a third-party individual external to the 
organization that emulates objectivity and ensures that all reflection and 
analysis are evidence-based (using both quantitative and qualitative data). The 
best example includes a consultant or facilitating expert who is familiar 
enough with the context of the organization to execute the role effectively and 
keep the group on track and in check. 
• Choose a recorder. 
All participants have a copy of the workbook in which to write, but a recorder 
should carefully document the discussion, readiness determination, and next 
steps.   
• Prepare the group beforehand to bring data and evidence to support the 
discussion.  
Participants will need access to data and evidence to engage in meaningful 
discussion with the group. The following is a starter checklist of data/evidence 
that users should have on hand for the successful completion of this protocol: 
a. 4 or more years of student achievement data;  
b. financial performance data;  





d. demographic data for specific geographic areas; and  
e. data regarding the performance of competing traditional district and 
charter schools in these geographic areas.   
The group may determine that other sources of data and evidence, even 
qualitative (i.e., data from stakeholder surveys, performance management 
data, exit interview data, etc.), should be considered and should make those 
easily accessible during the protocol’s implementation.   
• Set group norms for authentic, accurate self-reflection.  
The facilitator should work with the group to establish norms for authentic, 
accurate self-reflection. While the goal is to assess readiness for replication, 
some team members may have already predetermined, prematurely, that the 
charter school or CMO will/must grow. The group’s norms should keep the 
team’s level of subjectivity in check; as a result, the more objective and 
evidence-driven the reflection is, the more effective the protocol’s 






Section A: The Growth Team 
The CMOs that participated in the study for the design of this tool cited how 
important it is for an organization to build a team of people to think about and eventually 
lead the replication process—the “Growth Team.”  
Growth Team Composition and Size  
Growth Teams should be comprised of employees who have various expertise 
areas related to the internal and external factors critical for growth. This expertise-factor 
alignment will also eventually drive the role that each team member will fulfill if the 
charter/CMO decides to pursue replication. Beyond the board chair and the executive 
leader of the organization, like the CEO, executive director, or principal in the case of a 
single-site operator, the literature and findings from the Ready to Scale interviews are 
shown in Table 11. 
Organizations that are still fairly small, in the case of a single-site charter school, 
often have a single team member who fulfills several of these roles. If financial 
circumstances allow, the charter/CMO can fill area-expertise gaps through the 
onboarding of an external consultant or advisor. If financial resources are limited, the role 
of board members who can offer support and insight can address any gaps in the team.  
An organization’s size will likely determine the size of its Growth Team. The 
Ready to Scale facilitator should work with the board chair and the CEO to make the final 
decision about the exact members of the Growth Team. Board chairs and CEOs should 
remember that they determine not only the size but also the make-up of the group that 







Possible Growth Team Members  
 
Internal and External Factor 
Alignment 
Potential Growth Team Member 
• “The Why”  • Board Chair/Committee Leads  
• Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
• Organizational Identity (Academic 
Model) 
• Director of Curriculum  
• Chief Academic Officer (CAO) 
• Director of Data 
• Principals/Middle Managers/Teachers* 
• Parents/Students* 
• Human Capital  
• Director of Human Resources/Talent 
• Chief Human Capital Officer 
• Principals/Middle Managers/Teachers* 
• Governance  • Board Chair/Committee Leads 
• CEO 
• Fiscal Health  • Director of Finance  
• Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
• Infrastructure  • Director of Operations 
• Chief Operating Officer (COO) 
• Growth Mindset and Strategy  • Director of Strategy  
• Chief Strategy Officer (CSO) 
• Need and Demand  
• Director of External Affairs  
• Community Engagement Coordinator  
• Parent Liaison  
• Director of Data  
• Funding 
• Director of Development  
• Director of Finance  
• Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
• Facilities  • Director of Facilities  
• Director of Real Estate  
• Political Context, Policy, and Climate  
• Board Chair/Committee Leads 
• CEO 
• Director of External Affairs  
• Parent and Community Relations 
• Director of External Affairs  
• Community Engagement Coordinator  
• Parent Liaison 
• Parents/Students* 
• Competition and Collaboration Inside 
and Outside the Sector  
• CEO 
• Director External Affairs 
 
* Growth Team should consult with the designated stakeholders on an “as needed” basis 






An asterisk (*) in Table 11 above denotes that the Growth Team should consult with the 
designated stakeholders on an “as needed” basis to ensure that the team remains a 
manageable size for reflection and decision making. 
Growth Team Member Dispositions  
The CMO leaders who participated in the Ready to Scale study indicated that at 
least one of the members of their Growth Teams was someone who acted as a “critical 
friend” to them, as well as other colleagues, as it related specifically to growth planning. 
Growth Teams can sometimes be overly optimistic and so pro-growth that they fail to be 
able to truly critique themselves and their practices. One CMO leader explained how her 
chief operating officer acted as the critical friend who challenged the Growth Team by 
asking it to think through worst-case scenarios and to anticipate potential obstacles or 
unintended consequences of replication-related decisions or strategies. In turn, the user 
group should pinpoint which colleague will play this role when putting together the 
Growth Teams.   
Exercise A Instructions  
Under the Facilitator’s direction, the user group should refer to the instructions 
below to complete Exercise A:  
• As a group, read Question A.1 together.  
• Next, allow 5 to 10 minutes for team members to reflect individually and 
record their responses in the “Response and Rationale” column in their 





• After this individual reflection time, come back together as a group to share 
ideas and supporting rationale.   
• The recorder should take written notes on the highlights from the group 
discussion, and finalize the consensus the group reaches around the response 
and rationale for each question.  




The Growth Team 
 
Question/Prompt Response and Rationale 
A.1 
Which team members should 
comprise our Growth Team? 
What specific data or evidence 
justifies how they will 
positively support our 




What areas of expertise are we 
missing from our Growth 
Team? How will we account 




Which team member will be 
the “critical friend” on our 













Section B: Reflection and Analysis—Internal Factors 
B.1: “The Why” 
A charter/CMO must be clear about its true intentions behind its desire to scale, or 
what CMO leaders who participated in Ready to Scale study termed “the why.” Many 
organizations in this position cite aspirations to have a broader impact, but the clearer and 
more concrete the charter’s/CMO’s definition of impact is, the greater the likelihood of 
being able to achieve it when growing to scale. For example, a charter/CMO can better 
define its desired impact by giving itself a timeframe in which to accomplish that impact 
and/or by designating a target service population or specific geographic region for its 
desired impact. Additionally, decision making around growth is an appropriate time to 
revisit values and contemplate how growth might challenge those values. 
Exercise B.1 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
refer to the instructions below to complete Exercise B.1:  
• As a group, read Question B.1a together.  
• Next, allow 5 to 10 minutes for team members to reflect individually and 
record their responses in the “Response and Rationale” column in their 
workbooks.   
• After this individual reflection time, come back together as a group to share 
ideas and supporting rationale.   
• The recorder should take written notes on the highlights from the group 
discussion, and record the consensus the group reaches around the response 
and rationale for each question.  





• Question B.1e asks the group to conduct its Strengths-Weaknesses analysis 
for this factor.  
• Under the direction of the facilitator, the group should execute this analysis 
through a group discussion; team members can take notes in the 
corresponding columns in Exercise B.1.  
• The recorder should take written notes and record the consensus the group 
reaches on its primary strengths and weaknesses.   
• Question B.1f requires the group to determine its final proficiency rating for 
this factor. The group can refer to the example indicators of proficiency 
listed below to guide their thinking and articulate their ideas.   
• The group can determine the rating using one of the following methods: (a) a 
majority vote or (b) a group discussion to reach a general consensus.   
• During this discussion, the group should be sure to discuss the data or 
evidence that support its final rating.    
Example indicators: Proficiency in “the why.” Based on the review of literature 
and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the following are 
example indicators of proficiency in this factor:  
• The Growth Team is “on the same page” regarding its intent to grow.  
• The charter/CMO has clearly defined the scope of its impact using time, 
service population, and geographical descriptors. For example, “By 2025, we 
will serve an additional 10,000 students from immigrant families on the 





• All members of the Growth Team share a firm belief in their organization’s 
values. 
• The Growth Team believes the charter’s/CMO’s values will withstand the 













Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.1a   
Why do we want to grow? Be 
as specific as possible. 
 
B.1b 
What specific kind of impact 




What are our organization’s 
values? Are they the same as 
they were when we first started 




How do we anticipate our 
future growth changing or 
challenging our values?  
 
B.1e 
Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, how 
would we describe our 
organization’s strengths and 





How do we rate our overall 
level of proficiency in this 
internal factor? What data or 
evidence can we use to support 




Rating (Check One) Rationale  
q Proficient  
q Somewhat Proficient 






B.2: Organizational Identity  
When considering expansion, charters/CMOs must be clear about who they are. A 
strong sense of organizational identity strengthens the charter’s/CMO’s ability to operate 
a consistent program and educational experience for students and families across multiple 
schools. 
Mission, vision, and values. A well-defined mission and vision establish 
organizational identity. According to Frumkin et al. (2011), “A mission begins with a 
statement of general values. These values explain the orientation of the school and 
provide an underlying coherence to various aspects of school operation, including 
curriculum, administration, and people’s dealings with one another” (p. 5). Additionally, 
the mission describes the organization’s approach to educating students, providing insight 
into how students will learn and, if appropriate, designates a specific group of students as 
its target population (i.e., off-track youth, immigrant students, etc.).  
Brand. When a charter school/CMO possesses a strong organization identity, this 
also solidifies its brand. The brand is comprised of a number of elements, from slogans 
that are representative to the organization’s values, like “College for Certain,” to the use 
of specific logos or other visual representations of the organization. Charter/CMO leaders 
should work relentlessly to maintain their brand, especially in all internal actions, 
including messaging, regular written communication, and even individual conversations 
between team members and CMO leadership, which should emulate the organization’s 
mission and brand (Farrell et al., 2009).   
Organizational culture. A charter’s/CMO’s organizational culture is another 





of a “people culture” that promotes values and attributes that generate excellence among 
employees. Examples of these values/attributes include trust, respect, open 
communication, collaborative problem solving, innovation, and creativity. Additionally, 
executive leaders should charge themselves and their teams, as well as middle managers 
like principals, as “curators of organizational culture,” especially during scaling, when 
new talent will be brought into the organization to staff additional campuses or support 
them centrally.  
Academic model and quality. Beyond “the why” and in support of “who we are” 
(identity), charters/CMOs must identify “the what”—their academic model. A quality 
model usually contains clearly defined frameworks for curriculum, instruction, 
assessment, and ongoing professional development for teachers (Lake, 2007; New 
Schools Venture Fund, 2006). Without this clear definition, often enacted as a set of non-
negotiables and operating systems, the school/CMO will likely find it difficult to 
replicate its academic program faithfully and with fidelity across more than one school 
(Lake, 2007). At the same time, charters/CMOs should evaluate their models for 
“replicability”; more complex models can sometimes be more difficult to scale.  
After defining “the what,” charters/CMOs must then ask themselves, “Are we 
good enough to grow?” Schools and CMOs must ensure their academic program and 
school model have a proven track record before attempting replication (Lake, 2007). In 
turn, student achievement results over a prolonged period of time (more than a single 
year) should be closely examined to make this determination.   
Model implementation. The CMOs that participated in the Ready to Scale study 





implementation of their model across their growing networks of schools. In the first 
approach, the model and its guidelines for implementation are highly scripted. In the 
second approach, the model and its guidelines allow more flexibility and autonomy to 
school sites for implementation. Whether rigid or flexible, CMOs can still produce high-
quality results as they grow; executive leaders of these organizations attribute this to 
consistent oversight and support for schools.  
The impact of replication on organizational identity. During the expansion 
process, charters/CMOs often experience philosophical challenges to their mission, 
values, or models and challenges in implementation. Executive leaders should think 
through how growing to scale will impact their organizational identity. The more 
anticipatory executive leaders are about this now, the better prepared the school/CMO 
will be to navigate this issue so that their growth plans are not stalled. 
Exercise B.2 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
utilize the protocol from Exercise B.1 to complete Exercise B.2. As a reminder, the group 
can refer to the example indicators of proficiency listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Proficiency in organizational identity. Based on the 
review of literature and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the 
following are example indicators of proficiency in this factor:  
• The organization’s mission and vision are clear and enduring. 
• The organization’s brand is well defined and has been well communicated to 





• The charter’s/CMO’s organizational culture is defined by several positive 
elements that all employees in the organization can easily understand and 
enact.   
• The charter’s/CMO’s academic model (approach to teaching, learning, and 
curriculum as well as school design) is proven as it relates to consistently high 
levels of student achievement over time. 
• The charter’s/CMO’s academic model is clearly documented; this document 
also provides guidelines for implementation of the model in schools. 
• The organization has decided how its academic model will be implemented at 
future schools. It will either take a more scripted approach or allow school 











Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.2a 
Is our mission and vision 
clear? Why or why not? What, 
if any, adjustments need to be 




How do we define our 
organizational ethos (i.e., core 
beliefs or mindsets)? Explain 
the rationale for the ethos.  
 
B.2c 
How do we define our brand 
and its major elements?  
 
B.2d 
How do we define our 
organizational culture (“people 
culture”) and its major tenets, 
including norms for the way 
we collaborate, communicate, 
and operate?  
 
B.2e 
How do we define our 




Are our student achievement 
results from the last several 
years good enough to warrant 
our expansion? What specific 
data or evidence do we have 
that support our thinking here?  
 
B.2g 
Regarding the implementation 
of our model, will our 
organization take a more 
scripted or flexible approach? 










Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.2h 
What challenges do we 
anticipate in replicating our 
model across multiple schools? 
In what other ways might 
expansion change or challenge 
who we are? What can we do 
to mitigate these challenges? 
 
B.2i 
Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, how 
would we describe our 
organization’s strengths and 





How do we rate our overall 
level of proficiency in this 
internal factor? What data or 
evidence can we use to support 
our rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Proficient  
q Somewhat Proficient 






B.3: Human Capital 
In order to replicate successfully, charter schools and CMOs need top talent 
(Farrell, Nayfack, Smith, Wohlstetter, & Wong, 2013). A number of researchers in the 
field have indicated that human capital is one of the primary drivers behind the ability of 
a charter to expand; additionally, the stronger the talent, the more accelerated the 
organization’s growth (Farrell et al., 2013; Higgins & Hess, 2009). The CMOs who 
participated in the Ready to Scale study recommended significantly investing both human 
and financial resources to recruit, select, retain, and develop the organization’s 
employees. 
Recruitment and selection. Charters/CMOs must create a human capital plan 
that includes strategies for attracting and hiring employees who will be the “best fit” for 
their organizations. The most useful strategies include the organization’s proactive 
creation of external candidate pools through partnerships with local universities and even 
alternative-certification programs for principals and teachers. CMOs should also develop 
and implement robust processes for screening, interviewing, and selecting final 
candidates. Finally, charters/CMOs should determine how they can offer salary and 
benefits packages that are as competitive as possible.   
Retention and development. Once the right candidates are on board, executive 
leaders should continue the development of their human capital plans, evaluating the 
level of talent within their organizations and devising strategies to cultivate that talent 
(Farrell et al., 2013). Applying a balanced mix of (a) targeted, differentiated 
coaching/support and (b) clear, streamlined accountability is one of the most effective 





charters/CMOs enact is the creation of internal leadership pipelines, designed not only to 
retain top-performing teachers but also to mold them as the organization’s future leaders, 
especially at the school level (Chadwick & Kowal, 2011; Doyle & Steiner, 2011; Farrell, 
Nayfack, Smith, Wohlstetter, & Wong, 2009; Farrell et al., 2013). 
Key people: Principals. The school leader role is absolutely paramount to the 
successful opening and operation of a new school as an organization grows to scale. 
Charters/CMOs should expand on their internal principal pipeline strategy to include a 
principal-in-residence program; this extension allows future school leaders to dedicate 
their time solely preparing to open a new campus. Executive leaders should also be 
strategic about founding principal management, providing not only accountability but 
also extensive coaching and moral support to ensure high rates of school leader retention. 
These strategies are costly and charters/CMOs should proactively plan for sustainable 
funding for these programs.  
Key people: CEO and executive leadership team. Boards should assess if the 
school’s/CMO’s current leader (often a founding principal or executive director) 
possesses the capacity, or potential capacity, to lead the organization’s scaling efforts as a 
CEO. In addition, the CEO must determine how to build out and successfully manage 
his/her executive team. Roles like a chief operating officer, chief financial officer, and 
chief strategy officer are integral to ensuring not only that the organization grows, but 
also improves its operations and outcomes in the process.   
Exercise B.3 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 





can refer to the example indicators of proficiency listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Proficiency in human capital. Based on the review of 
literature and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the following 
are example indicators of proficiency in this factor:  
• The organization has a clear strategy for funding all human capital initiatives, 
including the provision of competitive salary and benefits packages.   
• The organization has established a strong external talent pool.   
• The organization has created and effectively enacts a robust set of recruitment 
and selection practices. 
• The organization has created and effectively enacts a robust set of retention 
and professional development strategies.  
• The organization has established a strong internal talent pool, including 
pipeline programming and training for future founding school leaders.  
• The organization has assessed the capacity of its current executive leader and 
determined that this individual, as well as his/her senior leadership team, is the 











Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.3a  
To what extent do we currently 
invest financial and other 
resources in the development 
of our current talent? How will 
we need to change our actions 
here to create a robust human 
capital plan to get and keep top 
talent?   
 
B.3b 
What are our current 
recruitment and selection 
practices? How do we ensure 
that our practices are grounded 
in our organizational ethos? 
How effective are these 
strategies and what 
improvements do we think can 
be made?   
 
B.3c 
What actions have we taken to 
create an external pool of 
talent from which to recruit 
and select future candidates?  
 
B.3d 
How do our compensation and 
benefits packages compare to 
that of the local school district 
or other charters/CMOs? How 
can we increase the 




What are our current talent 
retention and development 
practices? How effective are 
these strategies and what 
improvements do we think can 










Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.3f 
Do we have the capacity to 
design, implement, and fund a 
principal-in-residence 
program? If not, how will we 
mitigate this? What other 
specific supports will we put in 
place to ensure the success of 
founding principals?   
 
B.3g 
Does the current leader of our 
organization have the capacity 
to “make the leap” to CEO and 
lead expansion? What data or 
evidence do we have to 
support our analysis?   
 
B.3h 
Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, how 
would we describe our 
organization’s strengths and 





How do we rate our overall 
level of proficiency in this 
internal factor? What data or 
evidence can we use to support 
our rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Proficient  
q Somewhat Proficient 






B.4: Governance  
In order to grow, charter schools and CMOs need to ensure their boards are 
sustainable by pushing for effective board composition and providing the proper training 
for all board members in their respective areas of responsibility (Butler, Smith, & 
Wohlstetter, 2008).   
Board composition and disposition. CEOs and board chairs should strategically 
target and recruit professionals from a variety of sectors whose areas of expertise are 
aligned with the charter’s/CMO’s priorities during expansion. For example, a real estate 
expert can counsel a CEO through facilities acquisition, while a multi-regional retail 
executive can advise on the effective operation of a larger number schools that span 
multiple jurisdictions. Board members who can successfully support expansion are also 
comfortable with risk and innovation.   
Board operations. CEOs should work diligently to engage and educate board 
members about growth preparation and expansion efforts. Promoting high levels of 
transparency around decision making establishes confidence and trust, allowing executive 
leadership even more autonomy to continue executing their plans to scale. CEOs should 
also collaborate with board chairs to ensure that board operations are structured and “in 
shape,” so that the board remains focused on the governance of mission, strategy, and 
expansion rather than the management of day-to-day issues, which is the responsibility of 
the executive team.  
Exercise B.4 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 





can refer to the example indicators of proficiency listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Proficiency in board governance. Based on the review of 
literature and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the following 
are example indicators of proficiency in this factor:  
• The charter/CMO board is comprised of a group of varied experts whose 
specialty areas align with the needs of the organization, both now and during 
the replication process.  
• The charter/CMO board’s collective mindset is pro-risk and pro-innovation.  
• The board has a clear set of operating procedures that allow the governing 
body to provide strategic direction and guidance to the CEO and senior team. 
• The relationship between the CEO/senior team and the board is characterized 











Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.4a 
What kind of experts are 
current members of our board? 
How aligned are their areas of 
expertise with the 
organization’s needs for growth 




How open is our board to the 
risk and innovation that the 
expansion process will require 
of the organization? What other 
collective attributes does our 
board possess that will support 
the organization’s growth?   
 
B.4c 
What concrete strategies must 
the board enact in order to 
begin its evolution into a 
governing body that serves 
multiple schools rather than a 
single campus?  
 
B.4d 
What are our board’s current 
operating procedures? What 
adjustments need to be made to 
improve governance?  
 
B.4e 
How well does the board 
currently espouse our 
organizational ethos and 
demonstrate cultural 
competence regarding the 
communities/families we 
currently serve and seek to 











Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.4f 
What strategies can our CEO 
utilize to improve board 
engagement, education, and 




Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, how 
would we describe our 
organization’s strengths and 





How do we rate our overall 
level of proficiency in this 
internal factor? What data or 
evidence can we use to support 
our rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Proficient  
q Somewhat Proficient 






B.5: Fiscal Health  
Fiscal health promotes financial sustainability, which is imperative for a 
charter/CMO undertaking the significant costs that come with expansion. An 
intentionally thorough financial planning process is imperative and should include 
“multiyear budgeting and cash flow forecasts, annual audit, and monthly careful review 
of the three critical financial statements: income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow 
statement” (Frumpkin et al., 2011, p. 117). In conjunction with regular monitoring of 
spending, several consecutive years of clean financial audits, and a robust reserve, 
generally at least 3 months’ worth of operating cash are other indicators of a 
charter’s/CMO’s fiscal health.   
Experts also recommended an additional practice to ensure fiscal health: lean 
spending. Charters and CMOs should exercise prudence, maintaining a conservative 
approach in “managing costs, incurring major expenses only after the revenue picture is 
sufficiently strong to keep the school on a sound financial footing or after financing is 
available on competitive terms” (Frumpkin et al., 2011, p. 117).    
Exercise B.5 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
utilize the protocol from Exercise B.1 to complete Exercise B.5. As a reminder, the group 
can refer to the example indicators of proficiency listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Proficiency in fiscal health. Based on the review of 
literature and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the following 





• The organization has a well-defined financial model that will enable it to 
remain financially viable throughout the replication process.   
• The organization has a clear set of financial processes for managing spending 
responsibility, including an annual audit, monthly review of cash flow and 
budget to actual statements, and the like.  
• The organization maintains a significant cash reserve—3 or more months’ 
worth of operating expenses.  
• The organization has a history of good financial performance, including 
several consecutive years of “clean” audits.  
• The organization conducts regular 5-year financial projections and assesses 










Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.5a 
What are our current financial 
processes? How frequently and 
closely do we monitor our 
expenditures?   
 
B.5b 
How much cash do we have in 
our reserves? What actions led 




Have we successfully obtained 
clean financial audits over the 
past several years? What 
actions led to the status of our 
audit each year?  
 
B.5d  
How often do we create a  
5-year financial projection in 
three distinct versions/ 
scenarios—best, middle, 
worst? In examining this 
projection, how would we 
assess the accuracy of these 
forecasts? What actions or 
events impacted accuracy?  
 
B.5e 
Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, how 
would we describe our 
organization’s strengths and 





How do we rate our overall 
level of proficiency in this 
internal factor? What data or 
evidence can we use to support 
our rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Proficient  
q Somewhat Proficient 






B.6: Infrastructure  
A charter’s/CMO’s infrastructure must grow to scale as the organization adds 
more schools, more school-based employees, and more students. Schools will need 
support in several key areas, including operations, finance, human resources, and 
curriculum. Executive leaders can best meet the needs of schools by further defining the 
role of the CMO’s central office, developing sound standard operating procedures and 
systems, and, finally, expanding the organizational chart to include positions that would 
assist schools in the midst of continued expansion.   
Role of CMO as central office. Whether the CMO took a more or less 
centralized approach to the implementation of its model at its schools, the CEOs who 
participated in the Ready to Scale study recommended that the head of the organization 
ensure that all employees understand the primary role of central office staff is to support 
schools. CEOs and other executives are also responsible for directing the provision of 
accountability to school sites.  
Systems. “Lack of systems is a barrier to the growth of the best charter operators” 
(Hassel, Hassel, & Ableidinger, 2011, p. 27). Central office teams, under the direction of 
executive leadership, should be responsible for building standard operating procedures 
for procurement, building maintenance, food service, and even student transportation. 
Additionally, academic, professional development, and management systems must also 
be established and implemented. Examples of these systems include the creation and 
implementation of a common set of interim assessments across schools; the development 





application to collect and store classroom observation data; and the creation of 
accountability protocols for schools, school leaders, teachers, and central office staff.  
Organizational chart and staffing. Charters/CMOs will eventually need to 
expand their staffing models, adding new positions to their organizational charts to 
maintain adequate support for schools or assist with expansion execution. For example, a 
recruiter might be added for human capital purposes, or a director of external relations 
brought in to execute community outreach in preparation for future school sites. There 
are financial challenges of adding central office staff when a staff is at two to six schools 
in its network. At this point in a charter’s/ CMO’s financial modeling, there is not enough 
revenue to justify overhead costs like a recruiter, a curriculum writer, or a special 
education director. As a result, the central office staff and executive leadership should be 
prepared to serve multiple functions. 
Exercise B.6 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
utilize the protocol from Exercise B.1 to complete Exercise B.6. As a reminder, the group 
can refer to the example indicators of proficiency listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Proficiency in infrastructure. Based on the review of 
literature and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the following 
are example indicators of proficiency in this factor:  
• The organization has a central office that possesses the capacity (or potential 
capacity) to provide operational support and accountability for multiple 
schools. 





• The organization has a set of standard operating procedures or systems for 
school support and accountability in the following areas: operations, human 
resources, finance and accounting, and academic model implementation 
(teaching and learning, curriculum, data and assessment).    
• The organization’s standard operating procedures and systems are clearly 
documented.  
• The organization has a clear decision-making logic model or matrix so that 
each employee at every level understands his or her role in specific decisions 










Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.6a 
What does our current infrastructure 
look like? Is there enough capacity to 
support one to two new schools in the 
near future or will we need to make 




How does our central office currently 




What systems or standard operating 
procedures do we currently have in 
place? How do we categorize these 
systems (i.e., operations, academics, 
etc.)? What adjustments will we need 
to make to prepare for growth?   
 
B.6d 
In planning for growth, what 
positions do we anticipate needing to 
add to the central office? How will we 
justify and fund these new positions? 
How possible is it for a single 
employee to carry the responsibilities 
of multiple positions that we need? 
 
B.6e 
Given our discussion of the questions 
in this exercise, how would we 
describe our organization’s strengths 





How do we rate our overall level of 
proficiency in this internal factor? 
What data or evidence can we use to 
support our rationale here? 
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Proficient  
q Somewhat Proficient 






B.7: Growth Mindset and Strategy  
Charters/CMOs will inevitably have to make adjustments to their models and 
practices in order to be responsive to the needs of students or any performance trends that 
indicate a need for improvement, especially as the organization grows the number of 
students it serves.   
Growth mindset. Growth mindset, as defined by the CMO leaders who 
participated in the Ready to Scale study, is an authentic willingness to evolve even those 
practices that are foundational to the organization’s model in order to serve students in 
ways that are more equitable or culturally competent. Highly successful charters/CMOs 
can actually become stagnant in their practices. Their results allow executive leaders to 
justify keeping long-standing practices the same, even if they are inequitable. For 
example, a no-excuses approach to discipline can lead to the disproportionate out-of-
school suspension of Black and Latino boys. The no-excuses approach aids in 
maintaining an orderly, structured school culture, but there are students who are excluded 
in the process. Charters and CMOs must be willing to examine their practices and 
abandon those that can have harmful, long-term effects on children, families, and 
communities. As Frumpkin et al. (2011) stated, models and practices should never be 
considered “immutable,” nor should executive leaders allow these organizational 
strategies to become “ossified over time.” 
Strategic plans for growth. Charters/CMOs should create a roadmap for scaling. 
Beyond basic components like overarching goals and timelines, the plan should contain 
concrete strategies for growth. For example, if the organization makes a strategic 





results, other communities in the same region are more likely to welcome new schools to 
their jurisdictions. Another example is a strategy to intentionally seek out other 
neighborhoods in which other charter schools have actually failed, citing that families 
might be more open to another school opening that has demonstrated a better record of 
success. While plans should be substantially detailed, executive leaders should remember 
to build enough flexibility into their roadmaps to account for changes and obstacles.   
Exercise B.7 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
utilize the protocol from Exercise B.1 to complete Exercise B.7. As a reminder, the group 
can refer to the example indicators of proficiency listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Proficiency in growth mindset and strategy. Based on the 
review of literature and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the 
following are example indicators of proficiency in this factor:  
• The organization has established a protocol for regularly evaluating its 
practices for inequity or lack of cultural competence.   
• The organization has established a protocol for continued quality 
improvement.   
• The organization demonstrates the capacity to navigate obstacles or 
challenges with agility.   
• The organization has a strong strategic plan in place that includes its 













Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
B.7a 
Regarding our current model 
and practices, are there any 
signs of inequity or lack of 
cultural competence? Why or 
why not? If there are signs, are 
we willing to change them? 
Why or why not?  
 
B.7b 
How comprehensive is our 
preliminary strategic plan for 
growth? How have we 
anticipated any obstacles or 
roadblocks and addressed them 
in our plan? 
 
B.7c 
Within our plan, what are the 
most impactful strategies that 
will enable us to meet our 
growth goals successfully?  
 
B.7d 
Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, how 
would we describe our 
organization’s strengths and 





How do we rate our overall 
level of proficiency in this 
internal factor? What data or 
evidence can we use to support 
our rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Proficient  
q Somewhat Proficient 






Section C: Reflection and Analysis—External Factors 
 
 
C.1: Need and Demand  
Beyond the demand that lengthy wait lists demonstrate, charters and CMOs 
should conduct careful research—“market analysis”—to gauge the need and desire for a 
school in a specific community or neighborhood (Farrell, Wohlstetter, & Smith, 2012; 
Farrell et al., 2009). Charters/CMOs should also closely examine data from neighborhood 
schools in the traditional school district; beyond a shortage of high-quality options for 
families in particular geographical area, schools that are overcrowded also indicate the 
need for a potential new school. Finally, charters/CMOs should also conduct an analysis 
of their wait lists, looking for new communities or neighborhoods with the highest 
representation of students wanting a seat. This could highlight a need that the 
charter/CMO might not have otherwise realized. 
Demand beyond families and students. Charters or CMOs should prepare to 
respond to the demand of other external stakeholders regarding growth. These 
stakeholders include politically elected officials, such as a city major; high-ranking 
municipal leaders, such as the local school district’s superintendent; and even foundations 
or donors. In the case that these individuals or groups do approach a charter or CMO, 
offering funding and even facilities assistance for expansion, the organization should 
revisit its strategic plan for growth and assess how this change impacts its overarching 
plans to scale.   
Exercise C.1 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 





can refer to the example indicators of optimality listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Optimality in need and demand. Based on the review of 
literature and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the following 
are example indicators of optimality in this factor:  
• According to waiting list and lottery data, a particular neighborhood, 
community, or geographical jurisdiction has demonstrated a substantial 
demand for the charter or CMO to potentially open a new school.   
• According to demographic data and academic performance data from nearby 
traditional district and charter schools, a particular neighborhood, community, 
or geographical jurisdiction has demonstrated a substantial need for the 
charter or CMO to potentially open a new school.  
• Because of the charter’s/CMO’s academic results, an influential external 
stakeholder(s) has extended an invitation and resources (i.e., funding, 
facilities) for the organization to open in a particular neighborhood, 












Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.1a 
How many students do we 
currently have on our 
waitlist(s)? Have we conducted 
an analysis to ensure that we 
count families only once who 
have applied to multiple 
campuses in our CMO?   
 
C.1b 
At last year’s lottery, how 
many more applications did we 
receive per total amount of 
seats? How does this figure 
compare with previous lottery 
reports? Are there any positive 
or negative trends? If so, what 




After studying our wait lists 
and lottery reports, which 
communities or neighborhoods 
are demonstrating the highest 
demand for us? Are these 
neighborhoods familiar to us or 
are there new communities 




After looking at local school 
district data related to 
performance and 
overcrowding, can we 
conclude that expanding into a 
particular community will truly 
fulfill a need for a new school? 











Have any other external 
stakeholders approached us 
about expansion? If so, who 
and what are they offering to 
us if we grow? How does this 
impact our original strategic 
growth plan?  
 
C.1f 
How do we plan to access and 
analyze feeder system 
information as it relates to the 
prerequisite skills/experiences 
needed for successful transition 




Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, what 
opportunities and threats 








How optimal are the conditions 
pertaining to this external 
factor? What data or evidence 
can we use to support our 
rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Optimal 
q Somewhat Optimal  






C.2: Funding  
The CMO leaders who participated in the Ready to Scale study shared a common 
sentiment about funding and growth: expansion is expensive. Still, organizations must 
assess the viability of the funding streams they use to generate the revenue needed to 
operate currently existing schools and execute the opening of new campuses. The federal 
government, through its Charter Schools Program (CSP) and, more specifically, the grant 
program for replication and expansion, has proven to be a major source of scaling up 
support for single site charters and CMOs (U.S. Department of Education: Charter 
Schools Program Grants for Replications, 2017a). In addition, the New Market Tax 
Credit (NMTC) Program provides additional financial incentives for charters/CMOs that 
plan to expand into and invest in low-income communities that continue to be 
underserved (NMTC, 2017). 
Still, in most cases, charters and CMOs are already at a disadvantage because of 
their state or local jurisdiction’s funding formula for charters. Often times, local policies 
dictate that charters and CMOs will only receive a certain percentage (often less to 
significantly less) of the standard per pupil allocation allotted traditional public schools 
(Farrell et al., 2013; Frumpkin et al., 2011). In order to make up for this shortfall of 
public dollars, charters and CMOs must seek philanthropic funding.  
Private dollars. Many charter schools and CMOs depend on philanthropy and 
fundraising for a significant amount of their incoming revenue, some as much as 13% of 
their total operating costs (Wohlstetter et al., 2011). However, especially if a charter or 
CMO has demonstrated academic quality over time, several foundations, venture groups, 





replication. Charters and CMOs should take caution not to rely too heavily on private 
money for operating costs because most grants and other support will end after a certain 
period of time. In turn, charters and CMOs must determine their own timelines for 
becoming financially self-sustainable and be prepared to engage in a constant search for 
new funders (Frumpkin et al., 2011; Wohlstetter et al., 2011). 
Exercise C.2 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
utilize the protocol from Exercise B.1 to complete Exercise C.2. As a reminder, the group 
can refer to the example indicators of optimality listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Optimality in funding. Based on the review of literature 
and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the following are 
example indicators of optimality in this factor:  
• A variety of external funding streams, both public and private, are available to 
the charter/CMO; the organization already successfully accesses several of 
these streams.  
• Of the variety of external funding streams available, several of them provide 
financial resources specifically for replication.  
• Although not equal, the charter’s/CMO’s per-pupil allocation is equitable in 
relation to the allocation for traditional public schools in their jurisdiction.  
• The charter/CMO has an established portfolio of private funders or 
foundations that are committed to the organization’s replication of schools.  












Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.2a 
What external funding streams 
currently comprise our revenue 
portfolio? What portion of our 
revenue comes from public 
dollars? What portion from 
private dollars?  
 
C.2b 
To what extent do we meet the 
baseline requirements for 
CSP’s grant programs that 
support replication and 
expansion as well as facilities 
credits? What data or evidence 
support our level of 




What is our organization’s 
eligibility for the NMTC 
program? If we are not eligible, 
will we aspire to partner with a 
charter/CMO support 
organization that can help us 
acquire NMTC financing? 
Why or why not?  
 
C.2d 
Given how much less our per-
pupil allocation is than that of 
traditional district schools in 
our jurisdiction, how large is 
the gap (in dollars) that we 
must cover via fundraising?   
 
C.2e 
What is our current fundraising 
goal? What impact will 
expansion have on future 
fundraising goals? How will 
we make sure we have the 
capacity in the central office to 












Which donors and foundations 
have continued to support us 
over extended periods of time? 
In addition, what prospective 
funders will only fund 
expansion in the short term 
versus program 
implementation over an 
extended period of time?  
 
C.2g 
Beyond public and private 
dollars, to what extent have we 
explored other revenue options 
such as venture funds? 
 
C.2h 
What kind of planning must we 
do now to ensure that we 
become financially self-
sustainable in the next 5 to 10 
years?   
 
Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.2i 
Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, what 
opportunities and threats 





How optimal are the conditions 
pertaining to this external 
factor? What data or evidence 
can we use to support our 
rationale here?    






q Somewhat Optimal  






C.3: Facilities  
In addition to the availability of buildings for new schools, the effective 
acquisition of sound facilities is crucial to expansion plans. Whether a charter/CMO plans 
to rent space, share space, purchase a building, or construct a new one from the ground 
up, facilities obstacles can derail the opening of a new school, even if all other elements 
for the new site have been already been finalized and secured. Depending on geographic 
location, neighborhood, or community, and the extent to which other charters are already 
located in them, schools and CMOs will likely find themselves competing not only with 
the traditional school district for sound facilities to house schools, but also contending 
with each other for physical plants that are in need of little repair and available at a 
relatively low cost for rent or purchase.  
Because of the general facilities shortages that many charters and CMOs face, 
they should be weary of moving into a new community or neighborhood because a great 
building is available there. In addition, since securing a facility is such a complex 
process, charters and CMOs should ensure access to real estate expertise, either through 
their boards or through the addition of a senior or executive leader to their teams. In 
addition, charters and CMOs should be prepared to conduct their own facilities 
evaluation (or secure a consultant to conduct one) before securing a space; this ensures as 
few unexpected repair or renovation costs as possible in the future.  
Rent or share. When renting space, charters should be prepared to negotiate 
responsibility for renovations and capital improvements. Realistically, as a tenant, 
organizations should plan financially for building maintenance and upgrades. When co-





common spaces, especially as it relates to daily school operations—use of the cafeteria 
for breakfast and lunch, access to the parking lot for student morning arrival and 
afternoon pick up, and so on.  
Buy, finance, and/or build. The benefit of purchasing a facility or building a 
completely new one, especially at a good interest rate, is that charters and CMOs do not 
have to depend on a landlord or negotiate with a co-tenant; they are in full control of the 
space. However, charters should be prepared, once again through access to the 
aforementioned expertise, to be responsible for all and any issues with new construction, 
such as schedule delays, as well as capital costs to bring buildings up to code. 
Exercise C.3 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
utilize the protocol from Exercise B.1 to complete Exercise C.3. As a reminder, the group 
can refer to the example indicators of optimality listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.  
Example indicators: Optimality in facilities. Based on the review of literature 
and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, the following are 
example indicators of optimality in this factor:  
• Several sound or nearly sound facilities are available in the neighborhood, 
community, or geographic jurisdiction in which (a) families have 
demonstrated demand for the charter/CMO or (b) there is a significant need 
(not enough quality education options or overcrowding).  
• The facilities cost is within or under the amount the charter/CMO has 





• The available facilities are in need of little to no renovations or capital 
improvements.  
• The physical property (environment/land) has passed an environmental 
assessment and is clear for occupation without any additional significant 
costs.  
• The facility acquisition and preparatory timeline has at least 6 to 12 extra 











Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.3a 
To what extent have we 
assessed the availability of 
sound facilities in the 
neighborhoods or communities 
that are in greatest 
need/demonstrating demand for 
our schools? How many 




Who do we currently consult 
with regarding real estate and 
facilities issues? Are there other 
experts in our respective 
networks to whom we can 
readily gain access?    
 
C.3c 
What makes the most sense for 
our organization and our 
financial condition—renting 
space, sharing space, 
purchasing a building, or 
constructing a brand-new 
facility? Why?  
 
C.3d 
Are capital renovations or other 
modifications to facilities a 
deterrent for us when it comes 
to securing space for a future 
new school? Why or why not?   
 
C.3e 
Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, what 
opportunities and threats 




















Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.3f 
How optimal are the conditions 
pertaining to this external 
factor? What data or evidence 
can we use to support our 
rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Optimal 
q Somewhat Optimal  






C.4: Political Context, Policy, and Climate 
Charters and CMOs must learn, especially when growing to scale, to navigate the 
political contexts in which their schools are located. According to Farrell et al. (2012), 
“education has long been governed by local actors and policies. . . . CMOs [often] 
identified a wide range of local actors who were instrumental in helping their CMOs 
expand, including district superintendents, local school board members, mayors, county 
supervisors, city councilmen, and community and church leaders” (p. 18). The dynamics 
in a charter’s/CMO’s political context often dictate what the policy environment and 
general climate are for charters as well.   
These same officials and influential individuals also possess the power to cripple 
an organization’s expansion. Furthermore, when these individuals band together, charters 
and CMOs are faced with organized opposition, which can produce very harmful anti-
charter policy, such as charter caps and the abolishment of start-up and special facilities 
funding for charters and CMOs. In turn, charters/CMOs should not only proactively 
develop relationships with key players who will support their schools, but also invest 
time and financial resources to actually influence and shape the development of pro-
charter policy. One example of this strategy is organizing parents and students to testify 
at the state legislature for more equitable funding for charters. Charters/CMOs share a 
valuable and very powerful constituent group with elected officials—parents. Through 
authentic partnership and engagement, charters and CMOs can leverage the influence of 





From a state perspective, Todd Ziebarth’s annual report A Model Law for 
Supporting the Growth of High-Quality Charter Schools is a useful tool for charters and 
CMOs to evaluate their state’s policy context.   
Authorizer relations. Since the authorizer provides direct accountability to 
charters and CMOs, the authorizer’s policies, as well as the number of authorizers 
available within a state, region, or jurisdiction, are critical factors for replication (Farrell 
et al., 2012). As such, charters and CMOs should develop working relationships and open 
communication with their authorizer. Additionally, executive leaders should be prepared 
to navigate the challenges that authorizers sometimes present, such as fluctuating 
accountability metrics or frequent policy changes.   
Exercise C.4 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
utilize the protocol from Exercise B.1 to complete Exercise C.4. As a reminder, the group 
can refer to the example indicators of optimality listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Optimality in political context, policy, and climate. 
Based on the review of literature and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to 
Scale study, the following are example indicators of optimality in this factor:  
• The political dynamics as well as policies in the jurisdiction for potential 
future schools are charter-friendly.  
• There are elected officials and/or high-ranking appointed government officials 
who are allies that publicly support and endorse the charter/CMO.  
• Political “key players” are generally open and responsive when the 





• The political “key players,” whether supportive or not, recognize the 








Political Context, Policy, and Climate 
 
	 	
Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.4a 
How does the state in which we 
seek to replicate rank against 
the criteria for Todd Ziebarth’s 
A Model Law for Supporting 
the Growth of High-Quality 
Charter Schools?  
 
C.4b 
How do we characterize our 
current, local political context 
in terms of charter-friendliness? 
What evidence do we have to 




Who are our strongest political 
allies (elected officials, etc.) 
and why? How often do we 
engage them and what else can 
we do to strengthen our 
relationships with them?  
 
C.4d 
Who are our staunchest 
political enemies and why? 
What strategies can we employ 
to neutralize them? How well 
are we keeping a pulse on any 
other organized opposition?  
 
C.4e 
To what extent are we 
positioned to take a more 
proactive role in the political 
dynamics in our jurisdiction? 











How would we describe our 
authorizer’s disposition towards 
us? How well have we been 
able to navigate their oversight 
to date? Additionally, how 
would we assess our 
authorizer’s strengths/ 
weaknesses in the areas of 
funding, policy, operational 
support, and accountability? 
Explain. 
 
Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.4g 
Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, what 
opportunities and threats 








How optimal are the conditions 
pertaining to this external 
factor? What data or evidence 
can we use to support our 
rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Optimal 
q Somewhat Optimal  






C.5: Parent and Community Relations 
As mentioned in the previous section, parents and community members are 
another set of extremely valuable external stakeholders with whom charters and CMOs 
should develop positive working relationships. Charters should invest financial and 
human capital resources early on to begin parent and community engagement, especially 
when exploring new neighborhoods or communities for potential future schools. In 
Farrell et al.’s (2009) interview with the leader of a large CMO, the executive simply 
stated: “Our CMO has grown in response to what the community and the parents have 
asked us to do. With this approach, we’ve ensured that students will show up the first day 
the school opens” (p. 20).   
Examples of strategies for deeper, more authentic parent and community 
partnership include conducting listening tours to give these stakeholders a forum to voice 
their hopes and concerns for a new school. If the charter/CMO prescribes to a more 
flexible academic and school model at campuses in its network, then listening tours can 
also be facilitated in such a way that parents actually give input on the academic 
programming and extracurricular activities they would like to see the new school offer. 
Another strategy is the establishment of a diverse community advisory board to provide 
additional thought partnership and even advocacy within the community, garnering 
additional support for the charter/CMO as it continues to expand.   
Exercise C.5 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
utilize the protocol from Exercise B.1 to complete Exercise C.5. As a reminder, the group 
can refer to the example indicators of optimality listed below to guide its thinking and 





Example indicators: Optimality in parent and community relations. Based on 
the review of literature and interviews with CMO leaders from the Ready to Scale study, 
the following are example indicators of optimality in this factor:  
• The majority of parents have indicated to the charter/CMO that they are 
highly or very satisfied with their children’s educational experience.  
• Several influential parents in the charter’s/CMO’s currently existing school(s) 
have expressed the desire to support and participate actively in replication 
efforts.  
• Several influential community members or leaders have indicated to the 
charter/CMO that they are highly or very satisfied with the way the 
organization has benefited their jurisdiction.  
• Several influential community members or leaders have expressed the desire 








Parent and Community Relations 
 
	 	
Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.5a 
Which influential parents or 
community members are our 
allies? Why do they support 
us?   
 
C.5b 
Which influential parents or 
community members are not as 
engaged with us? Why?  
 
C.5c 
How satisfied are our current 
parents and/or influential 
community members with our 
model, our practices, and our 
results? How do we know?  
 
C.5d 
How do we rate our level of 
cultural and contextual 
competence as it pertains to the 
current community that we 
serve and the potential future 
community that we seek to 
serve should we open another 
school? Explain.   
 
C.5e 
How does community will 
compare to political will in our 
current context as it pertains to 
potential expansion? If there is 
any relationship between these 
two elements, how will we 
navigate the dynamics (polar or 




Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, what 
opportunities and threats 















Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.5g 
How optimal are the conditions 
pertaining to this external 
factor? What data or evidence 
can we use to support our 
rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Optimal 
q Somewhat Optimal  






C.6: Collaboration and Competition Inside and Outside the Sector  
Scaling Up Charter Management Organizations: Eight Key Lessons for Success 
elaborates on charter schools and CMOs building relationships—more specifically, those 
that will support the replication of the organization (Farrell et al., 2009). There are three 
key areas for partnership development: (a) other education organizations or institutions, 
(b) public-private relationships, and (c) connecting with other organizations who will 
make “good planning partners” (Farrell et al., 2009).  
Charter schools and CMOs can benefit from the fiscal, human, political, and 
organizational resources that non-traditional partners can offer (Wohlstetter & Smith, 
2010). These partners are considered non-traditional in that they may be private and 
hence have little to no experience in the public (education) sector; however, many 
community-based, for-profit, and faith-based entities have found that partnership with 
public charter schools can be mutually beneficial (Wohlstetter & Smith, 2010). 
Charter schools and CMOs should also cultivate partnerships that are synergistic, 
even with other peer charters and CMOs. Collaborating with other charters/CMOs can 
increase both organizations’ levels of positive impact on students and communities. As 
an example, two CMO leaders who participated in the Ready to Scale study detailed how 
they joined forces, serving a combined total of 20,000 students, to put pressure on the 
local school district regarding student achievement; the leaders believed they would not 
have been able to do this on their own. Other leaders gave examples of combining their 
parent groups for a trip to the state capital to advocate for increased facilities funding to 





Charters/CMOs must also be cognizant of those peer schools and organizations 
with whom they are competing, not only for financial resources and facilities but also for 
students. Charters and CMOs should carefully assess oversaturation of high-quality 
choices in a given neighborhood or community to avoid this type of competition.   
Exercise C.6 instructions. Under the facilitator’s direction, the user group should 
utilize the protocol from Exercise B.1 to complete Exercise C.6. As a reminder, the group 
can refer to the example indicators of optimality listed below to guide its thinking and 
articulate its ideas.   
Example indicators: Optimality in collaboration and competition inside and 
outside the sector. Based on the review of literature and interviews with CMO leaders 
from the Ready to Scale study, the following are example indicators of optimality in this 
factor:  
• The charter/CMO has cultivated collaborative relationships with several 
external partners who add value to the organization’s operations.  
• When the organization engages potential external partners, these entities are 
open and responsive to prospective partnership.   
• The charter/CMO has established collaborative relationships with other 
charter schools or CMOs who can act as thought partners and allies.    
• The charter/CMO fully understands and can mitigate any competitive 
dynamics that exist with other charter schools or CMOs in the jurisdiction, 













Question/Prompt Reflection and Analysis 
C.6a 
What external partnerships 
have we already established 
with community organizations, 
government agencies, or 
private companies? How can 
these relationships support our 
future expansion?  
 
C.6b 
Is there an external partnership 
that we still need to pursue? 
Why? How open will this 
potential partner be to 
collaborating with us?   
 
C.6c 
Who are our peer charter or 
CMO partners? How often do 
we engage with them?  
 
C.6d 
Who are our primary charter or 
CMO competitors? What led 
us to compete with them? Are 
we competing for any 
resources? If so, which ones?  
 
C.6e 
Given our discussion of the 
questions in this exercise, what 
opportunities and threats 





How optimal are the conditions 
pertaining to this external 
factor? What data or evidence 
can we use to support our 
rationale here?    
Rating (Check One) Rationale  
 
q Optimal 
q Somewhat Optimal  






Section D: Determination of Our Overall Readiness for Growth and Next Steps 
After discussion and analysis of the aforementioned internal and external factors, 
the user group will continue to work together to determine its charter’s/CMO’s overall 
readiness for growth. Exercise D supports the user group in accomplishing the primary 
goal of this workbook. 
Instructions for Exercise D 
• Under the facilitator’s direction, the group will complete Section D.1 together. 
Users should refer to the previous sections to see which rating they checked 
for each factor and then record the “Rating.” This process should be fairly 
quick.  
• Section D.2 contains questions that the group should complete together, 
designating how many of its organization’s factors are proficient and how 
many are optimal.   
• Section D.3 asks the group to determine its growth readiness and give its 
rationale. The facilitator should lead the group in a discussion to come to a 
consensus and respond “Yes” or “No.”   
• Please note: Regarding Sections D.1 through D.3, the group is welcome to 
conduct individual reflections first for 15 to 20 minutes and then come back 
together to (a) have the facilitator read highlights from each team member’s 
reflection and (b) come to a consensus on growth readiness.  
• If the group checks “Yes,” the facilitator should move the group to Section E.  





• Please note that the group can decide to break here for a finite period of time 
(i.e., an hour for lunch or a few days if need be); the purpose of the short 
break is for the Growth Team to step away from the protocol, reflect on the 
potential risks or consequences of its growth readiness decision, and return to 
share potential obstacles and solutions for proactively addressing them.  
• Note: The Growth Team is reminded to remain true to the group norms it set 
at the beginning of this protocol, in conjunction with the facilitator, that 
promote authentic and honest self-assessment as pertaining, in this specific 








Assessment of Overall Readiness 
 
D.1:  Summary of Ratings 
Internal Factors 
Rating 
(Refer to previous sections to record ratings in 
this table.) 
Key: Proficient, Somewhat Proficient,  
Not Proficient  
The “Why”  
Organizational Identity  
Human Capital  
Governance  
Fiscal Health  
Infrastructure  
Growth Mindset and Strategy  
External Factors 
Rating 
(Refer to previous sections to record ratings in 
this table.) 
Key:  Optimal, Somewhat Optimal, Not Optimal 
Need and Demand  
Funding  
Facilities  
Political Context, Policy, and Climate  
Parent and Community Relations  
Collaboration and Competition Inside 







Exercise D (continued) 	
D.2: Analysis of Ratings Summary 
How many internal factors are 
proficient?    
How many external factors are optimal?  
D.3: Determination of Growth Readiness 
Given our ratings 
summary: 
Are we ready to 
grow? Why or 
why not?   
Are we ready? 




















D.4:  Preliminary Planning to Address Gaps 
Now that we have determined we are not 
ready to grow, what are our preliminary 
next steps to address the gaps that 
currently exist in internal proficiency 
and/or external optimality?  
Internal Factors:  








External Factors:   













Section E: Drafting Our Green Light Criteria 
If the team has determined that it is ready to grow based on its analysis and 
reflection in the previous sections of this workbook, the exercise below pushes the team 
to draft a set of “green light criteria.” Several leaders who participated in the Ready to 
Scale study offered the following definition for “green light criteria”: If the organization 
meets or is currently demonstrating strong performance in each criterion area, executive 
leaders have the “green light” to move forward with the opening of a new campus. Some 
examples of criteria are as follows: 
• The organization has identified a principal that is well prepared to open a new 
school.   
• The organization has engaged in out-of-sector (public-private) partnerships 
that provide resources, such as a facility, that are critical for successful 
scaling.   
Instructions for Exercise E 
Exercise E requires the team to draft its own green light criteria in relation to both 
internal factors and external factors.   
• Under the direction of the facilitator, the user group reviews Example E 
below.    
• The group engages in a discussion to choose its top three internal factors and 






• The group also determines its top external factors and corresponding set of 
green light criteria, providing its rationale in the far-right column.   
 




Internal Factor Criteria 
Human Capital  
The organization has 
a principal who is 
well prepared to open 
a new school. 
External Factor Criteria 
Partnerships 




provide resources that 
are critical for 









Drafting Our Green Light Criteria 
 
Internal Factor Criteria Our Rationale for Criteria 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
External Factor Criteria Our Rationale for Criteria 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







This workbook is a tool that enables charters and CMOs to carefully consider 
those internal and external factors that are most critical to their future scaling success. 
The tool consists of a brief review of internal and external factors, along with 
corresponding questions and SWOT analyses. By working their way through the protocol 
for each factor, executive leaders, board members, and other employees who are part of 
the charter/CMO Growth Team will determine if they are ready or not. If they are ready 
to grow, the final section of the workbook facilitates the Growth Team’s preliminary 
brainstorming of the “green light criteria” they can use in the near future to begin their 
actual replication process.   
Implications for Further Research 
This study and its findings have implications for further research on charter 
school and CMO expansion. First, while the researcher used the terms growth and 
replication interchangeably in this study, one of the leaders interviewed discussed how 
she believed that replication was one type of growth. She shared that other types of 
growth could be deepening an organization’s service population or developing a specific 
population expertise. Further exploration of these different categorizations will help 
charter and CMO leaders determine how to prepare better for the growth they wish to 
pursue.  
During the study, the researcher highlighted a few connections between internal 
and external factors that are important for future scaling success. Further research of 





will help leaders better understand how their actions in one factor area can positively or 
negatively impact the proficiency or optimality of another factor. This understanding can 
also aid in growth planning, especially when creating a strategic plan for growth. 
While the researcher noted the charter sector’s aggressive growth, further work 
could be done in the future to study the authorizer action that continues to happen in 
tandem with the opening of new schools – the closing of currently existing charter 
schools.  The researcher is curious to learn more specifically regarding authorizer 
practices as it pertains to closing schools that are apart of already-existing CMOs, as well 
as approval for a CMO that already operates a fairly large number of campuses.  
Finally, the researcher took care throughout the study to stay aligned with the idea 
of readiness for growth rather than strategies for effective growth. However, these ideas 
are very much interconnected. Further exploration of best practices and strategies for 
charters and CMOs on how to execute their growth plans effectively will be helpful in 
supporting these organizations to take the next step beyond their readiness decision 
making.  
Conclusion 
In 2000, there were less than 2,000 charter schools in existence; in 2016-2017, the 
number of schools more than tripled to nearly 7,000 campuses with an enrollment of 3.1 
million students across the country (Mead et al., 2015; NAPCS, 2017). Much of this 
growth can be attributed to charter management organizations continuing to grow, adding 
new campuses to their portfolios of schools and/or expanding already existing smaller 





is clear, according to these more recent reports, that the charter sector continues its rapid 
expansion, despite the mixed academic results among schools, as well as the challenges, 
both internal and external that come with scaling.  
A charter or charter management organization’s readiness for expansion is a 
complex subject. Readiness is critical for replication success over the long term; several 
executive leaders of charters and CMOs who have grown their organizations throughout 
the last two decades confirmed this. When leaders work to consider their organization’s 
level of proficiency for several critical internal factors and the level of optimality for 
several external factors, they are able to make sound decisions in response to the question 
“Are we ready to grow?”   
As the leaders who participated in this study indicated, charters and CMOs as a 
whole have no intention to slow their efforts to open more schools across the country. 
The researcher’s hope is that this study’s literature review, findings, and Ready to Scale 
readiness assessment tool will help charters and CMOs that are considering growth. The 
study aims to aid charter and CMO leaders in realizing the importance of preparation for 
growth. When the organization is prepared, it can better anticipate the obstacles that 
growth presents and be more proactive in refining internal operations and influencing 
external factors. Charters and CMOs must do everything they can to guarantee that their 
expansion is effective. The lives and futures of the students they serve depend on the 








Aldeman, C., Carey, K., Dillon, E., Rotherham, A., & Tucker, B. (2009). Growing pains: 
Scaling up the nation’s best charter schools. Washington, DC: Education Sector.  
 
American Institute of Research. (2012). Hiring quality school leaders: Challenges and 
emerging practices. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Application for New Awards. (2016, May 10). Charter Schools Program (CSP)—Grants 
for Replication and Expansion of High-Quality Charter Schools, 81, Fed. Reg. 
28837. Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-05-10/pdf/2016-
10925.pdf 
 
Asae, B. (2009). Measuring charter school financial health. Authorizing Matters: Issue 




Borg, W., & Gall, J. (1989). Educational research: An introduction (5th ed.). White 
Plains, NY: Longman. 
 
Buckley, J., & Schneider, M. (2007). Charter schools: Hope or hype? Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Butler, E., Smith, J., & Wohlstetter, P. (2008). Creating and sustaining high-quality 
charter school governing boards. Los Angeles, CA: National Resource Center on 
Charter School Finance and Governance. 
 
California Charter Schools Association. (2010). CSBA et al. vs. State Board of Education 
(Aspire). Retrieved from http://www.ccsa.org/blog/assets_c/2013/02/2010_ 
CSBA_v.State_Board_of_Education_and_Aspire_Long_Fact_Sheet.pdf 
 
Carpenter, B. (2008). Good to gone: Five lessons from research about charter schools 
that make the leap . . . into extinction. Mt. Pleasant, MI: National Charter Schools 
Institute. 
 
Center for Education Reform. (2004). Charter schools today: Changing the face of 
American education. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Center for Education Reform. (2011). The state of charter schools: What we know—and 
what we do not—about performance and accountability. Washington, DC: 
Author. 
 
Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO). (2013). National charter school 






Center on Reinventing Education. (2007). Quantity counts: The growth of charter school 
management organizations. Retrieved from www.crpe.org/publications/quantity-
counts-growth-charter-school-management-organizations  
 
Chadwick, C., & Kowal, J. (2011). Preparing for growth: Human capital innovations in 
charter public schools. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress & The 
Broad Education Foundation. 
 
Charter Board Partners. (2014). Standards for highly effective charter school board 
governance. Retrieved from www.charterboards.org 
 
Collins, J. C. (2001). Good to great: Why some companies make the leap . . . and others 
don’t. New York, NY: HarperBusiness. 
 
Daft, R. (2008). Organization theory and design. Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage 
Learning.   
 




Doyle, D., & Steiner, L. (2011). Developing education talent pipelines for charter 




Drucker, P. (1990). Managing the nonprofit organization. New York, NY: Collins 
Business.  
 
Duncan, A. (2009). Turning around the bottom 5 percent. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Education. Retrieved from https://www2.ed.gov/news/ 
speeches/2009/06/06222009.pdf 
 
Eadie, D. (2003). Eight keys to an extraordinary board-superintendent partnership. New 
York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Education.   
 
Empowering Parents through Quality Charter Schools Act, H.R. 2218, 112th Cong. 
(2011). Retrieved from https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hr_2218 
_bill_summary.pdf 
 
Farrell, C., Nayfack, M., Smith, J., Wohlstetter, P., & Wong, A. (2009). Scaling up 
charter management organizations: Eight key lessons for success. Los Angeles, 







Farrell, C., Nayfack, M., Smith, J., Wohlstetter, P., & Wong, A. (2013). One size does 
not fit all: Understanding the variation in charter management scale-up. Journal of 
Educational Change. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007% 
2Fs10833-013-9216-7 
 
Farrell, C., Wohlstetter, P., & Smith, J. (2012). Charter management organizations: An 
emerging approach to scaling up what works. Educational Policy. Retrieved from 
http://epx.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/05/01/0895904811417587  
 
Frumpkin, P., Manno, B., & Edgington, N. (2011). The strategic management of charter 
schools. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.  
 
Gau, R. (2006). Trends in charter school authorizing. Washington, DC: Thomas B. 
Fordham Institute. 
 
Grignano, C. (1999). Guidance for charter school operators. Pittsburgh, PA: Charter 
Schools Project, Duquesne University. 
 
Hassel, E., Hassel, B., & Ableidinger, J. (2011). Going exponential: Growing the charter 
school sector’s best. Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute.   
 
Higgins, M. (2005). Career imprints: Creating leaders across an industry. New York, 
NY: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Higgins, M., & Hess, F. (2009). Learning to succeed at scale. Journal of School Choice, 
3, 8-24. 
 
High Tech High. (2017). Retrieved from https://www.hightechhigh.org/about-us/ 
 
High Tech High Graduate School of Education. (2017). Retrieved from https://hthgse.edu 
 
Huerta, L. & Zuckerman, A. (2009). An institutional theory analysis of charter schools: 
Addressing institutional challenges to scale. Peabody Journal of Education, 84(3), 
414-431.   
 
Internal Revenue Service. (2010). New markets tax credit. Retrieved from 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/atgnmtc.pdf 
 
Kahan, S. (2010). Eleven lessons for scaling up. Fast Company. Retrieved from 
http://www.fastcompany.com/1614223/eleven-lessons-scaling 
 
Kardos, S., Johnson, S., Peske, H., Kauffman, D., & Liu, E. (2001). Counting on 
colleagues: New teachers encounter the professional cultures of their schools. 







Keller, S., & Price, C. (2011). Beyond performance: How great organizations build 
ultimate competitive advantage. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons. 
 
Kern, N., & Gebru, W. (2014). Details from the dashboard: Waiting lists to attend charter 
schools top 1 million names. Retrieved from http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/NAPCS-2014-Wait-List-Report.pdf?x87663 
 
Lake, R. (2007). Identifying and replicating the “DNA” of successful charter schools. 
Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education.   
 
Lake, R., Bowen, M., Demeritt, A., & Hill, P. (2012). The national study of charter 
management organization (CMO) effectiveness—Charter school management 
organizations: Diverse strategies and diverse impacts. National Center for 
Reinventing Education. Retrieved from http://crpe.org/sites/default/files/pub_ 
cmofinal_Jan12_0.pdf  
 
Lake, R., & Demeritt, A. (2011). Paying for scale: Results of a symposium on CMO 
finance. Seattle, WA: National Center for Reinventing Education.   
 
Lake, R., Dusseault, Bowen, M., Demeritt, A., & Hill, P. (2010). The national study of 
charter management organization (CMO) effectiveness: Report on interim 
findings. Seattle, WA: National Center for Reinventing Education. Retrieved from 
www.charterschooltools.org/tools/InterimFindingsCMO.pdf  
 
Lencioni, P. (2012). The advantage: Why organizational health trumps everything else in 
business. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.  
 
Levinson, H. (2002). Organizational assessment: A step-by-step guide to effective 
consulting. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.   
 
Lowman, R. (2005). The importance of diagnosis in organizational assessment: Harry 
Levinson’s contributions. The Psychologist Management Journal, 8(1), 17-28.  
 
Marzano, R., & Waters, T. (2009). District leadership that works. Bloomington, IN: 
Solution Tree Press.   
 
Mead, S., Mitchel, A., & Rotherham, A. (2015). The state of the charter school 
movement. [Power Point slides]. Retrieved from https://bellwethereducation.org/ 
sites/default/files/Charter%20Researcg%200908%20FINAL.pdf 
 
Merriam, S. (2009). Qualitative research. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.   
 
Minkoff, D., & Powell, W. (2006). Nonprofit mission: Constancy, responsiveness, or 
deflection? In W. W. Powell & R. Steinberg (Eds.), The nonprofit sector: A 






Miron, G., & Urschel, J. L. (2010). Profiled of nonprofit education management 
organizations: 2009-2010. Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center. 
Retrieved from http:/nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMO-NP-09-10  
 
National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS). (2013). National charter school 
waitlist numbers approach one million. [Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://www.publiccharters.org/pressreleasepublic/default.aspx?id=1068  
 
National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS). (2014). CMO and EMO public 





National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS). (2016a). A closer look at the 
charter school movement: Charter schools, students, and management 
organizations, 2015-16. Retrieved from http://www.publiccharters.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/New-Closed-2016.pdf?x87663 
 
National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS). (2016b). The Every Student 





National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS). (2017). Estimated Charter Public 
 School Enrollment.  Retrieved from https://www.publiccharters.org/sites/ 
default/files/migrated/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/EER_Report_V5.pdf 
 
National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS). (2018). Federal policy. Retrieved 
from https://www.publiccharters.org/our-work/federal-policy 
 
National Association of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA). (2009). Charter school 
replication. Chicago, IL: P. O’Neill. 
 
National Association of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA). (2010). Authorizing 
matters: NACSA charter school replication guide. Replication Brief 1. Chicago, 
IL: P. O’Neill.   
 
National Association of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA). (2012). The state of 
charter school authorizing: Fifth annual report of NACSA’s authorizer survey. 
Chicago, IL: P. O’Neill. 
 
National Association of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA). (2013). Core 
performance framework and guidance: Academic, financial, and organizational 





National Association of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA). (2016). Federal policy  
2016: ESSA and authorizing. Retrieved from http://www.qualitycharters.org/ 
research-policies/archive/education-and-secondary-education-act-esea/ 
 
National Consensus Panel on Charter School Operational Quality/National Alliance of 
Public Charter Schools. (2009). A framework for operational quality. Retrieved 
from www.publiccharters.org  
 
New Market Tax Credit (NMTC). (2017). Charter schools. Retrieved from 
http://nmtccoalition.org/charter-schools/ 
 
New Schools Venture Fund. (2006). Charter management organizations: Toward scale 
with quality. San Francisco, CA: Author. 
 
New York City Center for Charter School Excellence. (2006). New York City charter 
schools fundraising guidebook. New York, NY: Author. 
 
Perkins, L., Nightingale, D., Valerdi, R., & Rifkin, S. (2010). Organizational assessment 
models for enterprise transformation. Cambridge, MA: Lean Advancement 
Initiative—Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
Smith, J., Wohlstetter, P., & Brewer, J. (2007). Under new management: Are charter 
schools making the most of new governance options? In Hopes, fears, and reality: 
A balanced look at charter schools in 2007 (pp. 17-27). Seattle, WA: National 
Charter School Research Project.   
 
Stanford, N. (2013). Organizational health: An integrated approach to building optimum 
performance. Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page. 
 
Sutton, R., & Rao, H. (2014). Scaling up excellence: Getting to more without settling for 
less. New York, NY: Random House.  
 




U.S. Department of Education. (2017a). Charter schools program grants for replications 












U.S. Department of Education. (2017c). Credit enhancement for charter school facilities 
program. Retrieved from https://innovation.ed.gov/what-we-do/charter-schools/ 
credit-enhancement-for-charter-school-facilities-program/ 
 
Washington State School Directors’ Association. (2014). The role of school boards in 
improving student achievement. Retrieved from www.wssda.org/Portals/0/ 
Resources/Publications/satfpospaper.pdf  
 
Whitmire, R. (2016). The founders: Inside the revolution to invent (and reinvent) 
America’s best charter schools. New York, NY: The 74 Media, Inc. 
 
Wohlstetter, P., & Smith, J. (2010). Uncommon players, common goals: Partnerships in 
charter schools. In C. Lubienski & P. C. Weitzel, The charter school experiment 
[E-reader version]. Retrieved from https://read.amazon.com/?asin=B00ELV5ZB8 
 
Wohlstetter, P., Smith, J., & Farrell, C. (2013). Choices and challenges: Charter school 
performance in perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press.   
 
Wohlstetter, P., Smith, J., Farrell, C., Hentschke, G., & Hirman, J. (2011). How funding 
shapes the growth of charter management organizations: Is the tail wagging the 
dog? Journal of Education Finance, 37, 150-173. 
 
Wolfe, C. (2016). Charter schools and the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) 




Ziebarth, T., & Palmer, L. (2018). Measuring up to the model: A ranking of state public 




Ziebarth, T., Palmer, L., & O’Neil, P. (2016). A new model law for supporting the growth 











Sample Growth Discussion Protocol and Greenlighting Framework  
 
 
According to the leaders interviewed for this study, charters and CMOs should 
create a set of green light criteria and a protocol to discuss and determine readiness for 
growth. This appendix contains a sample discussion protocol and set of green light 
criteria from a CMO in the Southwest region. This CMO has successfully grown from 
one to 15 schools over the last 16 years. The sample is in the form of Microsoft Power 
Point slides. The CMO’s logo was removed from each slide to preserve the leader’s 
anonymity.       
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